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Contrary to Owen (2000), Hume's problem is, as has traditionally been supposed, a problem for 
the justification of inductive inference. But, contrary to tradition, induction on Hume's account 
is not deductively invalid. Furthermore, on a more modem conception of inductive or 
ampliative inference, it is a mistake to suppose that the proper construai of an argument 
explicating the supposed justification for such inferences should in general be non-deductive. 
On a general requirement for argument cogency that arguments should be suitably constructed 
so as to make it clear to the audience that the subject is justified, on whatever basis is cited, in 
regarding the hypothesis with whatever epistemic attitude the arguer purports to be so justified, 
arguments in general, fully explicated and properly construed, should be deductively valid. 
Hume's problem does not prevent such justification because his crucial argument establishes 
only that our basic assumptions cannot be justified, in the sense of being 'proven', or shown by 
non-question-begging argument to be just. It does not establish that our basic assumptions, 
properly explicated, are not just, or that they are not (at least to the satisfaction of most of us) 
clearly so. Nor does Goodman's 'new riddle' of induction pose a serious problem for the 
justification of our inductive inferences, as is still commonly suggested, since Jackson figured 
out the solution to the riddle thirty years ago. There is an analogous problem to Hume's for the 
provability of principles or claims of deductive inferability, and i f my analysis of the proper 
construai of the structure of argument (in the natural sense) is correct, this will block Howson's 
(2000) proposed escape route. Nevertheless, as with the case of induction, the unprovability of 
basic claims and principles of deductive inferability does not bar their deployment in cogent 
justifications. 
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INTRODUCTION 
WHAT IS A GOOD ARGUMENT? 
In 'What is a good argument?' (1992) Trudy Govier presents a critical survey of a number of 
different accounts of what it is for an argument to be cogent. This article, along with her 
elaboration of some of the key points in her earlier book Problems in Argument Analysis and 
Evaluation (1987) - and especially chapter 3 on 'The Great Divide' (between deductive and 
inductive arguments) - constitute a convenient point of reference for introduction of the topic of 
this thesis, and identification of the general subject area within informal logic. My concern in 
this thesis is with the concept of induction, its relation to deduction, its logical structure, and the 
significance of philosophical problems that have been raised against its cogency. 
Govier introduces the basic concept of the 'cogency' (or 'goodness') of an argument in terms of 
its being 'epistemically and logically adequate'. By this she means that it satisfies two types of 
condition, one concerning the premises (which we might call pz-ewwe-adequacy) and one 
concerning the relation between the premises and conclusion (which we may call logical 
adequacy). Different theories about argument cogency offer different accounts of what these 
conditions are. Before proceeding to discuss the relative merits of alternative accounts of 
argument cogency, Govier sets out three conditions that she believes ought to be met by any 
adequate theory of argument cogency. These are basically as follows: 
Govier's conditions for an adequate account of argument cogency 
(1) The theory should set conditions for cogency that are neither too strict nor too lenient -
as judged by the standards of (a) common intuitions about examples, (b) philosophical 
opinion, and (c) the widely accepted opinions of influential scientists.' 
(2) The theory should be 'reliable' - in the weak sense that it can be used by different 
people to get the same result^ - except when different results can be explained by 
-^Govier presents this latter standard as if it were meant to exemplify the aforementioned. But since it 
seems to represent an appeal to scientific authority, in contrast to common intuition or philosophical 
opinion, I think it stands better as a supplement. 
Which we may distinguish from a perhaps more natural strong sense, that application of the theory 
always or mostly identifies arguments that actually are cogent. 
differences of opinion about whether the premises satisfy the respective premise 
conditions.^ 
(3) The theory should be fairly easy ('uncumbersome') to apply. 
While I have no particular problem with the third condition of (reasonable) ease of application," 
I am somewhat puzzled, with regard to condition (2), why Govier thinks that while scope for 
differences of opinion about whether the respective premise condition is satisfied in any 
particular case need not compromise the adequacy of a theory, she does not appear to permit 
any scope for differences of opinion about whether the respective logical condition (in her 
terminology 'inferential condition') - i.e. the condition relating to the appropriate relation 
between premises and conclusion - is satisfied. This would be understandable if, for any 
serious candidate account of logical adequacy, it would be unlikely for there to be any scope for 
difference of opinion in particular cases about whether it is satisfied. But of course that is 
unlikely to be the case with some serious candidates - notably with regard to accounts of logical 
adequacy that permit some non-deductive relation between premises and conclusion - not only 
because some of us, as Govier acknowledges, are deductivists, but because even among those 
who are not, there often is scope for disagreement about whether a particular conclusion is or is 
not inductively inferable (even granted any particular interpretation of the latter) from given 
premises.^ In view of this just as we are prepared to admit that there may be scope for 
disagreement over satisfaction of the premise condition (as distinct from the applicability or 
legitimacy of the premise condition) it seems that we should likewise be prepared to admit that 
there may be scope for disagreement about satisfaction of the logical condition. But i f we make 
the appropriate revision, the 'reliability' condition doesn't seem to amount to very much at all, 
since then it simply amounts to the condition that we should agree about the result if we agree 
that the premise condition and the logical condition are both satisfied. But that would seem to 
be nothing more than a truism that would apply to any theory whatsoever - i f indeed as Govier 
suggests it is simply in respect of satisfaction of these two conditions that we call an argument 
'cogent'. In that case the condition (as amended) would appear to be otiose. 
^ Actually Govier refers to difference of opinion about 'the warrantedness of the premises'. But that 
would appear to presuppose a particular account of the condition for premise-adequacy. I guess she 
would agree the amendment that I propose. 
* at least as a principle of preference for choosing between otherwise equally appealing theories. But of 
course it must go without saying that apparent correctness of a theory, which will be determined by other 
criteria^ must take precedence over relative ease of use. 
' For example proponents of the logical theory of inductive probability generally conceded that, since we 
are not logically omniscient, we may often be mistaken about the value of a specified probability, and that 
our personal judgements as to the respective values may differ. Nor is this just a matter of academic 
dispute among philosophers, practitioners - even expert practitioners in agreement about the evidence 
As regards condition (1) - seeming to be right by the standards of intuition, philosophical 
opinion, and scientific endorsement, these are all worthy aims, but of course we might anticipate 
some problems of consistency between standards that may be perceived to be appropriate from 
each of these perspectives, and of course even from the viewing area of one of these 
perspectives there will be considerable scope for disagreement, since there wil l be disagreement 
in all areas about what legitimately follows granted certain given premises in many cases, as 
well as disagreement about the criteria for the logical adequacy of arguments in those areas 
where this relatively theoretical question is considered. Fortunately though, despite these 
apparently overwhelming problems for the conditions of theory adequacy proposed by Govier, I 
believe there is a line of approach to this issue that enables us to establish an account of 
argument cogency that on reflection should warrant a broad range of agreement from each of 
these perspectives, and moreover which should satisfy Govier's condition of reliability as 
originally specified (a requirement which is certainly not otiose) by justifying a simple and 
easily applicable criterion for logical adequacy - a criterion which, i f my arguments concerning 
the appropriate structure of argument are right, should be generally agreeable to deductivist and 
inductivist alike. 
As regards condition (3) - easy applicability, as I have said, this will be readily met in respect of 
establishing whether the condition of logical adequacy is satisfied - which I regard as a major 
merit of the approach I shall propose. But the problem of establishing agreement about 
satisfaction of the premise condition is always going to pose a formidable difficulty for 
application of any serious theory of argument cogency - whatever the proposed condition. 
Moreover I shall argue that this is in fact more of a problem than is traditionally accounted for: 
I f my arguments in what follows are right, unless we want to commit ourselves to a strictly 
logical theory of inductive probability - a theory most commonly regarded as untenable - then 
we need to acknowledge that our disagreements about what is non-deductively 'inferable' from 
what are (or at least appear to be) substantive disagreements about logically contingent 
conditionals.^ And as such their proper logical position in any properly formulated argument is 
base and from the same school of statistics - may often disagree about the probability of a hypothesis or 
whether a particular conclusion may be drawn. 
* Although I personally accept the objections that have been raised against the logical theory of 
probability, as set out e.g. in Gillies (2000, Ch. 3), in fact I do not intend my general theory of argument 
structure and evaluation to rule out that theory. Even if there are strictly logical-inductive probabilities, 
a«c/these have a consequence that the respective conditionals I refer to here are in fact, unbeknown to 
most of us, analytic. No harm is done to the cogency of an argument merely by stating among the 
premises a proposition that is in fact analytic. The only problem for my account of argument structure 
and cogency, even i f that were the case, would be that it is slightly less economic than in principle it 
should need to be - if we were all logically omniscient and no-one was in any doubt about the analyticity 
of the respective conditionals. 
among the premises that are to be acknowledged and evaluated prior to, or independently of, the 
relatively unproblematic question of logical adequacy. 
Despite the shift, as distinct from relief, of burden in this regard, I believe that this line of 
approach is nevertheless of significant importance, since it clarifies the proper logical status of 
the divisive issue of inductive inferability. I f 1 am right, this should not to be confused with the 
question of the logical adequacy of an argument, as it most commonly and traditionally has 
been. I f we can agree at least this much, which seems on a reflection to be a quite simple point 
about inductive inference (a point moreover which I shall argue was not, as is commonly 
supposed, disputed by Hume) then perhaps we may at least begin to look in the right direction 
in seeking to resolve our differences about inductive inferability. I f my arguments are good 
enough, then perhaps many more of us will no longer feel the need to divide ourselves into the 
traditionally opposing camps of the deductivist and the inductivist. I f the proper structure of 
argument is as I shall argue it is, and the corresponding conditions for both premise and logical 
adequacy are as agreeable as I think they wil l be, once that proper structure is recognised, then 
all of us should be able to present our respective arguments to one another, without any 
distortion or omission of our intentions, in a logical format that none of us should have any 
particular difficulty endorsing - at least so long as we don't have any difficulty with the logical 
adequacy of deduction Of course philosophical problems have been raised with regard to 
deduction - one of which has indeed been claimed to be a precise analogue of the classical 
problem of induction. And 1 shall make some comment on the significance of such problems in 
the final section of the thesis. 
In further mitigation for the above-mentioned shift of burden, in the latter part of this thesis I 
shall also attempt to offer some considerations in support of the view that more recent, and 
potentially more serious, problems related to Hume's might not be quite as intractable or 
hopeless as some philosophers would have us suppose. In particular, I shall comment briefly on 
the infamous 'new riddle' of induction posed by Goodman. Since the issue of particular 
concern with regard to argument cogency is the question of the logical adequacy of inductive 
arguments, the proper place to begin my argument is with an examination of the concept of 
induction and the fundamental problem that has traditionally been associated with it. Thus I 
shall approach this broader issue in the first instance via an interpretive analysis of Hume's 
famous, but all too commonly misrepresented, account of inductive inference and the problem 
he found with it. 
PART ONE 
HUME'S PROBLEM, 
AND THE CONCEPT OF INDUCTION 
C H A P T E R ONE 
HUME'S P R O B L E M F O R T H E JUSTIFICATION O F INDUCTION: 
HIS CLAIMS, HIS ARGUMENTS, AND T H E I R C O N T E X T . 
David Owen has recently argued that the classical arguments of Hume - which have commonly 
been interpreted as arguments for the conclusion that our inferences from what we have 
observed to what we have not observed are not, and could not possibly he, justified-have been 
misunderstood (Owen, 2000^). Owen claims that Hume does not argue for such an 
unjustifiability conclusion in these arguments, and that his apparent claims to that effect in the 
respective passages should be understood rather in terms of the negative explanatory claim that 
our beliefs in the unobserved are not produced by reasoning - thereby leaving open the 
possibility of justification. My preliminary aim in this chapter is to clarify the context and 
significance of Hume's traditionally supposed arguments for unjustifiability, and in particular to 
defend the traditional view that the arguments in question are indeed arguments for the 
unjustifiability of induction - in a particular sense of the term. Following these preliminary 
considerations, we shall examine the finer details of the unjustifiability thesis and Hume's 
argument for it, in the following chapter, with particular consideration of the common claim that 
Hume presents a problem for the validity of inductive inference. 
The Humean concept of inductive inference 
'Induction', in a traditional sense associated with certain issues addressed by Hume in his 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), is 
generally characterised basically as inference (or argument) from the observed to the 
unobserved. For example, Wesley Salmon, in his classic textbook The Foundations of Scientific 
Inference (1966) describes the problem of inductive inference as 
the problem of determining whether the inferences by which we attempt to make the transition 
from knowledge of the observed to knowledge of the unobserved are logically correct (Salmon 
1966, p6)* 
' The main arguments of Owen in support of this claim are cenfred in chapter 6, p 113-146, and his 
attempt to render his interpretation compatible with Hume's remarks in his Conclusion to the first book 
(7>"ea//se, 1.4.7) is presented in chapter 9, p i 97-223, -
* Note however that by 'logically correct' Salmon does not intend 'deductively valid' which is the 
standard of'logical correctoess' for deductive arguments. He sees explication of exactly what would 
while acknowledging that determining the logical structure of'inductive' inference, so 
construed, in Salmon's words 'the logical relationship between evidence and conclusion' is an 
essential preliminary to answering that question. Hume himself however made it clear from the 
outset that the defining feature of the type of inference with which he was concerned, at least in 
the context of his primary arguments on these issues, was causal inference: 
I shall proceed to examine ... Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily 
have such particular effects; and what is the nature of the inference we draw from the one to the 
other (Treatise, Book 1, part 3, section 2, paras. 13-15) 
However, the common emphasis on observation, rather than causation, as the essential 
foundation of inductive inference in Hume's theory is explicable in the light of Hume's view 
that our inferences relating to causation are founded on experience: 
as the power, by which one object produces another, is never discoverable merely from their 
ideas, 'tis evident cause and effect are relations, of which we receive information from 
experience, and not from any abstract reasoning or reflection. (Treatise 1.3.1.1.) 
Hume describes the relevant aspects of our experience, and the relation between this and our 
inferences with regard to cause and effect, as follows: 
'Tis ... by EXPERIENCE only, that we can infer the existence of one object from that of 
another. The nature of experience is this. We remember to have had frequent instances of the 
existence of one species of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of another species of 
objects have always attended them, and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and 
succession with regard to them. ... We likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past 
instances. Without any further ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer 
the existence of the one from that of the other. (Treatise 1.3.6.2. Hume's emphases) 
It is notable that one of the points Hume had already noted in his preliminary consideration of 
the concepts of cause and effect, is that the terms 'cause' and 'effect' are logically related. For 
example, he pointed out that those 'who say, that every effect must have a cause' are 'frivolous' 
because 'tis imply'd in the very idea of effect. Every effect necessarily presupposes a cause; 
effect being a relative term, of which cause is the correlative. But this does not prove, that every 
constitute the appropriate relation of'logical correctness' for inductive inferences as an essential part of 
the problem. 
10 
being must have a cause; no more than it follows, because every husband must have a wife, that 
therefore every man must be marry'd. {Treatise 1.3.3.8.) 
The implication of this, in the context of the inference described above (Treatise 1.3.6.2.) where 
'Without any further ceremony, we call the one cause and the other effect, and infer the 
existence of the one from that of the other' is that in so doing, i.e. by calling them 'cause' and 
'effect' - without first establishing any justification for so doing - we are effectively assuming 
(as distinct from proving) that the one wil l (and must) be followed by the other. And as we 
shall see, it is this key point that Hume proceeds to develop and utilise throughout the course of 
his analyses of the logical structure and epistemological credentials of inductive inference. 
Comparison with other concepts of induction 
Before proceeding much further though, first we ought to note at the outset that the term 
'induction' or 'inductive inference' was not systematically employed by Hume, who generally 
used terms such as 'probable reasoning' and 'arguments from experience'; although the 
traditional use of the term may be traced to his suggestion in the Enquiry that fi-om objects, 
which appear similar (in respect of features with regard to which, in our experience, they have 
been frequently and constantly conjoined with certain 'effects') 
we are induced to expect effects similar to those, which we have found to follow from such 
objects. (Enquiry section 4, part 2, para. 7, my emphasis). 
We also need to note at the outset that Hume's basic account of the concept of 'inductive' 
inference needs to be distinguished from other and more recent senses in which the term has 
been used: 
(i) Humean induction v. non-deductive inference 
This Humean causation/observation-based concept of induction needs to be distinguished in 
particular from a more recent sense of the term, as typified by the text-book definitions of 
Skyrms and Swinburne: 
I shall say that an inductive argument is an argument which is not deductively valid hut one in 
which, it is claimed, the premises 'make it reasonable' for us to accept the conclusion. 
(Swinburne 1974, p2, my emphasis) 
11 
An argument is inductively strong if and only if it is improbable that its conclusion is false while 
its premises are true, and it is not deductively valid (Skyrms 1975, p7, my emphasis)' 
What is notable about these definitions is that they omit any reference to foundation on 
observational premises and, in particular, that they presuppose (or stipulate) that an inductive 
argument cannot, by its nature, be deductively valid. I draw attention to the distinction mainly 
in order to alert the reader to the possible error of projecting such a relatively modem 
conception of'induction', understood specifically in terms of non-deductive inference, onto 
their interpretation of Hume's statement about our causal expectations being 'induced'. As we 
shall see, it is by no means uncommon for commentators to fall into the error of regarding 
Humean induction as a special case of 'induction' in this anti-deductive sense. 
On the face of it, Hume's claim that we are 'induced' to expect certain effects would not appear 
to demand anything other than the natural interpretation that something makes ('determines') or 
inclines us to, expect a continuation of the conjunction of certain types of event when they have 
hitherto (in our extensive or experimental experience) been constantly conjoined. In his 
discussion of the problem of induction, Hume considers in some detail what leads us to this 
expectation, i.e. by what process of 'inference' we arrive at this belief, and considers in 
particular 'whether we are determin'd by reason to make the transition', or by something else'" 
(Treatise 1.3.6.4. my emphasis). 
I f there were any more dedicated logical significance that Hume intended to be attached to his 
use of the term 'induce' here, rather than the apparent equivalence to this broad use of the term 
'determin'd', compatible with natural or psychological explanation as well as it is with logical 
explanation, we would certainly expect him to make more common use, and to provide some 
explication, of the term 'induce' in his analysis of the logic of this particular kind of inference. 
But unlike his key logical terms, such as 'demonstrative' and 'probable', there is no apparent 
replication or clarification of the term 'induce' in his extended analyses of the logical structure 
and justificatory credentials of this form of inference. On this natural interpretation of 'induce', 
Corresponding accounts of inference may of course be had by substituting 'inference' for 'argument', 
and perhaps 'assumptions' for 'premises', and 'supposed' for 'claimed'. 
specifically, the alternative Hume specifies here regarding what 'determines' us to make the inference 
we do is 'a certain association and relation of perceptions'. However, Hume's psychological explanation 
of what makes or 'induces' us, to make the inference we do, is to be distinguished from his claims about 
the logical structure of the inference, which is our concern here; Thus the mentioned 'association of 
perceptions' is presumably meant to explain why we make the presumption that Hume goes on to insist 
that we make. Whereas all Hume requires with regard to the logical status within inductive inference of 
the proposition in question is the acknowledgement that it is a presumption. 
12 
Hume is here simply acknowledging that something (perhaps mysteriously) causes or compels 
us to make the inferences we do when we observe a constant conjunction of events, and wants 
to know whether what does so is the compulsion of compelling reason, or rational justification. 
In order to pursue the explanation of why we make the inductive inferences we do - what makes 
or 'induces' us take such a the train of thought, and the associated question of whether the chain 
of thoughts or beliefs (about the relevant facts and the relations between them) that constitute 
the inference make up a satisfactory justification for the ensuing beliefs, it is of course a 
necessary preliminary for Hume to examine the nature and in particular the logical structure of 
inductive inference. This question of the logical structure of induction involves consideration of 
the logical status of the beliefs invoked in the inference - distinguishing in particular between 
those which are 'taken for granted', or 'presumed' and those which are justified in the course of 
the inference - and the inferential relations between them - in particular what is inferentially 
dependent on what (i.e. which beliefs would not be inferred, or held, without other prior 
beliefs). Our concern is with the latter logical and epistemological issues, or more specifically 
Hume's view of them, rather than with Hume's positive views about the psychological 
explanation of induction.'^ 
(ii) Russellian induction: 
sense-data v. the Humean presumption of the veracity of observation 
Another notable variation on the concept of induction is that presented by Bertrand Russell in 
his essay 'On Induction' (1912), wherein our (private) 'sense-data' are taken to be the 
foundations of our inductive inferences, rather than our beliefs about the supposedly observed 
external objects that we naturally take to be associated with them. 
What things are there in the universe whose existence is known to us owing to our being 
acquainted with them? So far our answer has been that we are acquainted with our sense-data, 
and, probably, with ourselves. These we know to exist... But if we are to be able to draw 
inferences from these data ... we must know general principles of some kind by means of which 
such inferences can be drawn. / The principle we are examining may be called the principle of 
induction (Russell 1912, p l9 / p23) 
12 
Hume's negative view about the explanation of inductive inference - that it is not to be explained by 
compelling reaso« for making the inferences, does of course fall within the scope of our logical and 
epistemological concerns. 
13 
In Russell's view, it would appear that the basic aim of induction is to 'extend our knowledge 
beyond the sphere of our private experience' (Russell 1912, pi 9, my emphasis). 
Hume in contrast begins with the supposition that it is 'impossible to decide with certainty' 
whether the impressions (of observation) that arise from the senses 'represent nature justly, or 
be mere illusions'. What Hume more modestly concerns himself with in this context is the 
inferences we draw from our perceptions - 'whether they be true or false; whether they 
represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses.' (Treatise, 1.3.5. para. 2). The 
question Hume addresses then, with regard to inductive inference, is basically as follows: even 
leaving aside the justificatory problems noted with respect to our observational presumptions, 
why do we draw the conclusions we do about the unobserved, and by what process of inference 
do we arrive at our conclusions? (Treatise, 1.3.2.13-15, above). 
'Hume's problem': 
Hume's claims and the traditional interpretation of them. 
Although there may be scope for disagreement about the finer details of interpretation of 
Hume's classical account of what is generally believed to constitute a fundamental problem for 
the justification of inductive inference, there are a number of points in Hume's Treatise where 
he expresses, in terms that at least appear to be reasonably clear, the core claims of the 
particular problem of induction that has become his namesake. One of the core claims of what 
is (almost) universally referred to as 'Hume's problem' for inductive reasoning is Hume's claim 
that we have no reason to make the inductive inferences we do: 
even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason 
to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience; ... 
[This principle] we have found to be sufficiently convincing, even with regard to our most 
certain reasonings from causation (Treatise, 1.3.12.20) 
Moreover, when Hume says that we have no reason to draw these inferences, he doesn't just 
mean that we haven't thought hard enough about their justification, and haven't quite clarified, 
articulated, or identified the reasons that do or would support them. He means that the evidence 
we have could not possibly provide us with satisfactory reasons for believing the conclusions 
we draw from it. When we look at the details of his argument for the above claim it becomes 
apparent that the basic problem perceived by Hume in this regard is that it is impossible for us 
to establish any reason for believing the conclusions of such inferences - even in what appear to 
14 
be the most compelling of cases (i.e. 'our most certain reasonings from causation', based on 
observation of the 'constant conjunction' of objects). Thus: 
even after experience has inform'd us of their constant conjunction, 'tis impossible for us to 
satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou'd extend that experience beyond those particular 
instances, which have fallen under our observation (Treatise, 1.3.6.11, my emphasis in 
bold.) 
In short it would appear that Hume has objections to raise against any suggestion either that we 
do or even that we could possibly have or establish any (satisfactory) rational justification for 
drawing the inferences we do on the basis of what we have observed. 
Owen's challenge to the traditional view 
But is Hume's problem really, as it appears, about the justification of inductive inference, 
traditionally supposed? David Owen has recently argued that 
as IS 
It is tempting to read into Hume a more current problem: given that we have such beliefs [in the 
unobserved], how, if at all are they justified? Hume's problem is more one of explanation than 
justification: given that we have such beliefs, what is their nature and how is it that we come to 
have them? (Owen, 2000, pi 18) 
I am not denying that there is a problem of induction that is largely concerned with justification. 
I am only claiming that it is not Hume's problem. (Owen, 2000, pi 39) 
The problem is how these beliefs are produced, not how they are justified. (Owen, 2000, 
pl37) 
More specifically, Owen claims that even after the passage that is generally regarded as 
containing the first and fundamental instance of Hume's basic line of argument against 
justifiability (including Treatise 1.3.6, quoted above) 
Hume has not yet raised the issue of warrant (Owen, 2000, p 13 7, my emphasis) 
Moreover, Owen makes it quite clear that not only does he believe that the traditional 
that 'Hume is saying ... that conclusions of probable reasoning are without justification 




This would be bizarre. ... To say that every instance of probable reasoning was fallacious would 
be to reject probable reasoning and would force us to treat Hume's frequent references to 
probable reasoning ... as mere instances offacon deparler. (Owen, 2000, pi37) 
As we shall see, in presenting his case for a radical re-interpretation of Hume's apparent 
arguments against our having any justification for our inductive inferences, Owen makes much 
of the broader context within which these apparent justificatory denials, and the arguments 
underlying them, are utilised. I shall argue that in attempting to support his apparently (and 
purportedly'^) controversial interpretation, Owen instead falls guilty of conflating the particular, 
and in Hume's view psychologically devastating claim,''' and the arguments underlying it that 
have came to be called "Hume's problem' - a problem for which Hume does not purport to have 
any solution'^ - with a further and less worrying claim that is derived from the justificatory 
problem - a problem regarding which he has a positive theory to offer - and which has not 
became his namesake. 
In order to clarify these points, and to appreciate the background to Owen's challenge, let us 
first examine the broader context of the argument in the Treatise that is commonly regarded as 
constituting Hume's first and main argument for the unjustifiability of inductive inference. 
The first unjustifiability argument and the use Hume makes of it. 
The first argument Hume presents in support of his above cited 'no-reason-fo-infer' conclusion 
{Treatise, 1.3.12.20) - relating to our 'most certain' causal inferences crops up in a somewhat 
earlier context. That initial and main component of his larger 'no-reason-/o-infer' argument is 
introduced as one of the lines of argument that Hume uses in support of his answer to a subtly 
distinct question about the actual process of production of our 'most certain' causal inferences. 
I.e. 
whether we are determin'd Ay reason ... {Treatise, 1.3.6.4, my emphasis) 
to make such inferences, or whether these beliefs are produced by some process other than the 
comprehension of compelling reasons. We may describe this question of the process of belief 
'^  'The point is controversial' (Owen, 2000, pi 18.) 
The significance for Hume of the justificatory problem is brought out in extensive detail in his 
Conclusion to Book 1 of the Treatise - discussed below. 
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production as Hume's explanatory problem, and we may call his negative answer to the 
explanatory question, o f whether such non-observational convictions are produced by our 
understanding o f compelling reasons for belief, the 'not-fty-reason' conclusion. 
In order first to establish that the explanatory problem is a problem, Hume shows that the 
traditional supposition that we are compelled by reason to make our causal inferences - on 
account o f our acknowledgement o f compelling reasons for believing the respective conclusions 
- is untenable. This is where the justificatory question comes in - whether we have any reason 
to believe the conclusions o f our causal inferences. Hume argues that we couldn't possibly 
have satisfactory reason for drawing these inferences and so no proofs"' for the conclusions o f 
our causal inferences are even possible. He expresses this initial unprovability conclusion as 
follows: 
even after experience has informed us of their constant conjunction, 'tis impossible for us to 
satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou'd extend that experience beyond those particular 
instances, which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but are never able to prove, 
that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and 
those which lie beyond . . . {Treatise, \ .li.d.W. Italics are Hume's emphasis. Underline 
is mine.) 
On the basis o f his negative answer to this justificatory question - specifically a question o f 
provability - Hume then proceeds to the negative answer to the explanatory question - the 'no t -
Z>y-reason' conclusion: 
When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object [which has fallen 
under our observation] to the idea or belief of another [which has not], it is not determin'd by 
reason... (Treatise, \.3.6.]2) 
Furthermore, Hume is quite clear in introducing this strategy o f approaching the explanatory 
issue via consideration o f the justificatory issue: 
'For my part, 1 know not what ought to be done in the present case. I can only observe what is 
commonly done; which is, that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of; and even where it has once 
been present to the mind, is quickly forgot' (Treatise, 1.4.7.7) 
There is some scope for debate about how strict a sense of 'proof Hume is employing here. Although 
'proof could be interpreted as argument that warrants certainty, Hume is not so much concerned with the 
degree of intensity o f our belief in this context as with the question of whether our belief in any case can 
be justified by reason. But even i f provability were interpreted in a strong sense, it remains quite clear 
that whether or not a proposition is provable is a matter of (a particularly strong kind of) justifiability -
not a matter of explanation. 
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I f reason determin'd us [to make inductive inferences], it wou'd proceed upon that principle, [the 
'continuity' or 'uniformity' principle] that instances, of which we have had no experience, must 
resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always 
uniformly the same. In order therefore to clear up this matter [of whether we are determined by 
reason to make such inferences], let us consider all the arguments on which such a principle may 
be suppos'd to be founded ... and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this nature. 
{Treatise, 1.3.6.14., italics Hume's, bold mine.) 
In order to understand the significance o f this passage we need to ask ourselves how ( in Hume's 
view) would finding out whether any o f the alternative candidate justifications for this principle 
are in fact genuine justifications clear up the matter o f whether we are determined by reason 
when we make the inferences that depend on it? In other words, what is the connection between 
the just i f iabi l i ty o f the principle on which our inductive inferences depend, and the explanatory 
question o f whether we are determined by reason when we make those inferences? In this 
passage Hume appears to be suggesting that reason w i l l determine us in the drawing o f our 
conclusions only //the principles employed in the drawing o f those conclusions are themselves 
just if ied. Hume's basic rationale here then seems to be that i f no argument (or line o f 
reasoning) we may have to offer in support o f the continuity principle could jus t i fy our 
acceptance o f that principle, then no argument employing that principle could possibly jus t i fy 
our acceptance o f the conclusions that depend on it. The crucial link then between the 
justificatory and explanatory issues that Hume is exploiting here, is quite simply that i f we 
cannot establish any line o f reasoning that w i l l justify the conclusions o f our inductive 
inferences, then it cannot be the case that we are compelled by reason to draw those 
conclusions. And as we have seen above, such a reading o f this introductory passage appears to 
be confirmed by the logic o f Hume's ultimate and penultimate conclusions, relating respectively 
to the explanatory awi/justificatory questions. 
The difference between these claims, and the direction o f derivation, are quite clear f rom the 
fact that the converse implication does not hold. Supposing only that we were led to draw our 
inductive inferences by some influence other than the comprehension o f satisfactory or 
compelling reasons, that in itself would appear to leave open the possibility that we might 
nevertheless be able to jus t i fy those inferences retrospectively. But in contrast the impossibility 
of /ustiftcation, or the lack o f any reasons to make the inference, rules out the hypothesis that we 
have in fact been compelled by our powers o f reason to draw them. And it is precisely this 
incompatibility that is the key to this particular argument (the argument f rom unjustifiability) 
that Hume offers in support o f his not-by-reason conclusion. Hume's argument here, in 
contrast to what Owen suggests, quite plainly does not leave 'wide open' the justificatory 
question (Owen, 2000, p i46) . 
Hume also has additional arguments to support that 'not-Z)>'-reason' conclusion, besides the 
'no-reason-/o-infer' line o f argument, and these are particularly prominent towards the end o f 
the relevant section in his later Enquiry. 
The distinction between justifiability and justness 
It is natural and common to interpret the no-reason-to-infer conclusion as implying that we are 
not and could not possibly be rationally justified in making the inductive inferences we do. 
However we need to take note o f a distinction between two possible interpretations o f 
just i f iabi l i ty , on only one of which this appears to be a direct implication o f Hume's claim here. 
The sense o f ' justifiable' on which this appears to be a direct implication is a sense that may be 
associated with provability, since he paraphrases his conclusion with the claim that 
We suppose, but are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, 
of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond the reach of our discovery. 
{Treatise, 1.3.6.11) 
In this sense o f just if iabil i ty, a belief is justifiable i f f it is possible to provide, i.e. to set out or 
present (or perhaps at least to comprehend) satisfactory reasons for holding that belief 
However the term is sometimes used in a stronger sense, whereby when someone denies that a 
belief (or an action) is justifiable, they intend to deny that the belief (or action) is just - i.e that it 
is a belief or an action that we ought to (or at least may) hold (or take) - not merely that we are 
able to provide, to set out or identify, satisfactory reasons for holding the belief or taking the 
action. Although some interpreters might want to take Hume's conclusion in the latter stronger 
sense, on examination o f his argument for the conclusion it would not appear in itself to sustain 
such a strong conclusion, since Hume simply proceeds by eliminating any possible lines o f 
proof, or satisfactory argument, for the respective conclusions. I f indeed he does intend the 
stronger 'not-possibly-just ' conclusion, as distinct f rom the weaker 'no-possible-proof 
conclusion he overtly presents here, he offers no bridging arguments for the further step.'' The 
important point o f distinction with regard to our appraisal o f Owen, is that this is a claim 
relating to the possibility of justifying - in the weaker sense o f proving - the conclusions o f our 
" Of course he might be assuming that such an implication is too much of a platitude to warrant mention, 
but since he provides no argument for it we need not concern ourselves in our analysis of Hume with a 
critical appraisal of any such inference. 
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inductive inferences: It is not merely the claim that we don't proceed in our inductive 
inferences by jus t i fy ing or proving the conclusions, and it does nol leave open the possibility 
that such logical justification or proof might be attainable. 
In summary then the main preliminary points we need to note, before attending to the details o f 
Owen's objections, are: 
(a) This initial occurrence o f a negative justificatory claim (concerning the possibility o f 
proof), and the argument for it, contributes to the later and more general 'no-reason-
to- infer ' conclusion {Treatise, 1.3.12.20, above) but is related specifically to the 
possibility o f proof for our 'most certain' causal inferences. 
(b) This initial occurrence o f a justificatory 'no-reason-to-infer' argument arises within the 
broader context o f consideration o f a prior explanatory issue, and constitutes part o f a 
larger argument for a negative 'not-by-reason' conclusion to that explanatory question. 
(c) The general, and profoundly problematic, negative justificatory claim that we have no 
reason to draw any inductive inferences, and the arguments Hume presents in support 
o f it (which include the initial unprovability argument for causal inference) is what has 
become generally referred to as 'Hume's problem'. 
I f Owen has a substantial interpretive point'^ to make on this matter, as he alleges, it is not about 
which argument here ought rightfully to be called 'Hume's problem', it is about the proper 
interpretation o f the particular argument that is called 'Hume's problem', and which is 
commonly regarded as an argument for the claim that we cannot possibly establish any logical 
justification for our inductive inferences. 
For convenience o f reference I have provided an illustration o f the broader context in which this 
initial unprovability argument arises, in the form o f summary quotations, in figure 1. 
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Does the initial unprovability thesis relate only to causal inferences? 
Referring to figure 1, it is notable in the argument Hume presents here for unprovability with 
respect to causal inference, that although he does not make explicit the general 'no-reason-to-
infer ' conclusion (for all inductive inferences), that stronger conclusion would nevertheless 
appear to be derivable f rom this line o f argument granted premise (3) - where Hume claims, in 
line with his prior considerations, that only the relation o f causation can 'lead us beyond' the 
immediate evidence o f our memory and senses: I f all inductive inferences require causal 
inference and causal inference cannot be justif ied, then it would seem to fo l low that no 
inductive inference could be just if ied. We shall f ind that this interpretation is confirmed when 
Hume later turns to the issue ' O f the probability o f chances' {Treatise 1.3.11), but since he has 
made explicit his view that all inductive inferences depend on causal inferences, it would seem 
that Hume is content for the moment to focus on this fundamental case in its own right, granted 
the clear implication that i f this kind o f inductive inference cannot be just i f ied, none can. 
O f course the stronger, more general, conclusion might still have been intended to be implicit in 
Hume's argument here. The significance o f 'even after experience . . . o f constant conjunction' 
in the unprovability conclusion (7) might well be taken to imply something like ' in this 
strongest case and therefore in the weaker dependent cases too' . But that semantic question is 
relatively unimportant here, since it seems to be sufficiently clear that the stronger conclusion is 
a valid implication o f Hume's argument, and that it is understood by him to be so at this point 
although the f u l l clarification o f the point is reserved until later. In any case however, the 
essential issue at stake between Owen and the traditionalist here is not so much about whether 
the (supposed) argument for the unjustifiability o f inductive inference in general is complete at 
this stage, but simply whether it is an argument about the unjustifiability o f the type o f inference 
under consideration as distinct f rom merely the explanation o f the type o f inference under 
consideration. Thus, although this issue w i l l be relevant to our response to one o f Owen's 
supposedly controversial claims, our defence o f a justificatory interpretation o f this early 
argument for unprovability w i l l not depend on this issue o f completeness. 
What is clear though is that this argument is at least intended to apply to (purely) causal 
inductive inferences, and that Hume does later supply further arguments that relate specifically 
to weaker and dependent forms o f inference. In this case, for our purpose, we may regard this 
early argument as an argument relating specifically to causal inference, albeit carrying broader 
implication for inductive inference in general. I t is notable that Hume begins and ends the 
as distinct from a relatively trivial evaluative point, suggesting for example that the one was 'more 
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section in which the argument falls wi th explicit reference to 'the inference we draw from cause 
to effect ' and 'our reasonings f rom that relation [o f cause and effect] ' respectively (Treatise, 
1.3.6. 1 &15.) . Examining the immediate context o f the argument, as illustrated in the text boxes 
below, it appears then that it is with regard to our causal inferences that Hume is addressing his 
explanatory question in this passage, and so it is natural that the unjustifiability line o f approach 
to elimination o f the 'by reason' hypothesis at this point in his argument should be related to the 
same type o f inference. 
Summary quotation of the initial unprovability argument in context. 
T H E C O N T E X T 




In Treatise, 1.3.6. 
(para. nos. in subscript) 
The 'iij'-reason?' question: 
Since it appears, that the transition from an impression present to the memory 
or senses to the idea of an object, which we call cause or effect, is founded on 
past experience, and on our remembrance of their constant conjunction, the 
next question is, whether experience [and our remembrance of their constant 
conjunction] produces the idea [of the cause or effect] by means of the 
understanding or [by] the imagination; whether we are determin'd by reason 
to make the transition, or by a certain association and relation of perceptions?4 
T H E S T R A T E G Y 
OF APPROACHING THE 
EXPLANATORY ISSUE 
VIA CONSIDERATION OF 
JUTST/F/ABILITY:-
I f reason determin'd us, it wou'd proceed upon that principle, [the principle of 
'continuity' or 'uniformity'] that instances, of which we have had no 
experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that 
the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. In order therefore 
to clear up this matter, let us consider all the arguments on which such a 
principle may be suppos'd to be founded; and as these must be deriv'd either 
from knowledge or probability, let us cast our eye on each of these degrees of 
evidence and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this nature.4 

















T H E A R G U M E N T S : -
(For unprovability, and for the 'not-Ay-reason' claim) 
(1) I f reason determin'd us, it wou'd proceed upon that principle, [the principle o f continuity' or 
'uniformity'] that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which 
we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same, 
(2) there can be no demonstrative arguments' to prove, that those instances, of which we 
have had no experience, resemble those, of which we hax'e had experience^ 
' l i s ... necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be something present to the mind, 
either seen or remember'd; and that from this we infer something connected with it, 
[Hume's concept of probable inference] which is not seen or remember'd.6 
(3) The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate 
impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; ... 'tis the only one, 
on which we can found a just inference from one object to another. 
(4) The idea of cause and effect is derived from experience, which informs us that, such 
particular objects, in all past instances, have been constantly conjoin'd with each other: 
And as an object similar to one of these is supposed to be immediately present in its 
impression, we thence presume on the existence of one similar to its usual attendant? 
[But] Why from this experience [should'] we form any conclusion beyond those past 
instances, of which we have had experience?\(, [Interjected question] 
(5) [We have seen that] probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance 
betwixt those objects of which we have had experience, and those of which we have had 
none, [From the second c lause of (4)] 
(6) therefore 'tis impossible this presumption can arise from'' probability , 
(7) Thus ... even after experience has inform'd us of their constant conjunction, 'tis 
impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason [i.e. either by demonsfration or by 
probable argument], why we shou'd extend that experience beyond those particular 
instances, which have fallen under our observation. We suppose but are never able to 
prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had 
experience, and those which lie beyond,, [From (2) and (6)] 
(The 'no-reason-to-infer' or more specifically 'unprovability' conclusion 
'most certain' causal inferences) 
for our 
(8) When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or 
belief of another, it is not determined by reason,2 [From (1) and (7)] 



























NOTES ON 'THE ARGUMENTS' 
I have omitted all details of the arguments against demonstrability, since this is the least contentious part 
of Hume's argument, and it is the explicit reference to the justificatory issue of provability that is my 
concern here. 
^This question actually occurs in the context of an interjection into Hume's main argument, following his 
specification of the problem of circularity, where he is 'examining' a purported line of justification for 
causal inference to see whether it yields a conclusion which is indeed 'built on solid reasoning'. I present 
the question at this point in Hume's main background argument, immediately prior to his specification of 
the problem of circularity, because I think it is also applicable at this particular point: It helps to clarify 
Hume's introduction of the problem of circularity by focussing attention on the significance of his use of 
the term 'presume' rather than 'infer' in the preceding statement. It would seem that his use of'presume' 
here is intended to suggest that the specified basis of the inference does not, in itssM, justify the conclusion 
- a point which is highlighted by the question I have brought forward. My insertion of the word 'should' 
here, suggesting that this is a question of justification (rather than inserting 'do', which would suggest a 
question of explanation) is based on (a) the immediate context of the actual point of occurrence of the 
question (specified above): also note that Hume adds here that i f this question is answered in the same 
manner as previously it would become apparent that the foregoing reasoning had no just foundation' (my 
emphasis), (b) Hume's subsequent use of the word 'shou'd' in the 'no-reason-to-infer' conclusion (7) that 
he immediately draws from this, and (c) the immediate context within which I suggest the question also 
applies (as described above). 
^ Hume is clearest about the perceived circularity underlying this step of inference in the Enquiry: 'To 
endeavour ... the proof of this last supposition [of continuity] by probable arguments ... must be evidently 
going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.'. {Enquiry, 4,2,30). It 
may well be that, at this point in the Treatise, Hume is leaping to the explanatory or 'process' conclusion 
(with respect to probable arguments) with his use of the term 'arise from' rather than 'be proven by', and 
that he is suppressing the apparent (and intermediate) unprovability implication. But in any case it 
becomes apparent (from (7)) that he does believe he has established unprovability with respect to probable 
arguments as well as with respect to demonstration, and so, even i f that were the right interpretation of 
'arise from' the line of implication at this point would appear to be that probable reasoning cannot explain 
the presumption of continuity because dependence excludes the possibility of any (non-circular) probable 
proof of continuity. 
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The traditional interpretation of the unprovability argument 
What I have presented here is a traditional interpretation o f Hume's early argument for the 
unjustifiabili ty o f casual inference - which provides a fundamental part o f the support for his 
general 'no-reason-to-infer' conclusion relating to inductive inference in general - along with 
clarification o f the broader explanatory issue within which context this particular argument 
arises. Although there is scope for the view that Hume's entire argument for the unjustifiability 
o f induction is not complete at that early stage, this is nevertheless, as is traditional, a 
justificatory interpretation o f the argument that Hume employs at this early stage: Even that 
early argument for the unprovability o f the conclusions o f our causal inductive inference is an 
argument about logical justifiability, and specifically about the possibility of proof. The 
unprovability thesis that Hume establishes in that early argument is not in itself a thesis about 
how our inductive beliefs are or are not produced. The negative explanatory conclusion -
which is about belief production - is a fiirther and weaker conclusion that is derived from the 
famous unprovability thesis. 
I t does not appear that there is any case to be had here for a denial that that early argument for 
unprovability concerns the logical justifiability o f causal inferences, and that it forms the 
essential basis o f Hume's later claim concerning the just if iabil i ty o f any inductive inferences. 
The fact that the early unprovability argument is initially utilised to form part o f a larger 
argument concerning the explanation o f causal inference in no way undermines the justificatory 
interpretation o f the unprovability conclusion that is derived therein, or the premises on which 
that conclusion is based. In fact, in order to make sense o f this particular line o f argument for 
the explanatory 'not-by-reason' conclusion, the justificatory interpretation o f the unprovability 
basis for that conclusion appears quite clearly, to be the only natural and reasonable 
interpretation. 
Nor is there any case for denying that this early unprovability argument constitutes an essential 
part o f the support for Hume's later and more general 'no-reason-to-infer' conclusion. In fact 
we have seen that he explicitly refers retrospectively to the earlier argument as a fundamental 
part o f the support for his later claim. 
i.e. in the initial form Stove gives them, on p31. 
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Stove's misinterpretation of Hume's psychological claims. 
David Stove (1973, p33) apparently failed to appreciate the strategic position o f Hume's 
justificatory argument as an argument within a larger argument concerning the psychological 
explanation o f induction, and consequently misinterpreted the overtly psychological references 
where these arise in the relevant passages. In this regard it is notable that instead o f 
distinguishing between the two subtly different conclusions set out in (7) and (8) above 
{Treatise, 1.3.6.11 and 12), Stove conjoins the two in a single conclusion that reads like the 
psychological conclusion 
(j) Even after we have had experience of the appropriate constant conjunction, it is not reason 
(but custom, etc.) which determines us to infer the idea (e.g. of heat) from the impression 
(e.g. of flame). (Stove, 1973, p31) 
but which he insists is to be interpreted in justificatory terms as 
(j) A l l predictive-inductive inferences are unreasonable. (Stove, 1973, p45) 
The situation is similar wi th respect to his account o f a purported intermediate conclusion to a 
supposed 'Stage P o f Hume's argument: 
(d) The inference from the impression to the idea, prior to experience, is not one which reason 
engages us to make. (Stove, 1973, p31) 
Again this reads like a psychological claim, but Stove ultimately interprets it as an 'evaluative' 
claim equivalent to 
(d) Al l apnon inferences are unreasonable. (Stove, 1973, p45) 
Stove makes explicit and justifies this interpretation as follows: 
The reason why (j) and (d) require at least some translation at present^" is that they appear on the 
surface to be propositions of a kind which // is certain they really are not. Hume's two 
conclusions appear to be factual, and in particular, psychological propositions: as though (j) for 
example, were Hume'sjinswer to a causal question, 'What faculty of the mind is it which is at 
work in us when we make predictive-inductive inferences?' But to any philosophical reader of 
Hume it will be obvious that this appearance is misleading. Here, at any rate, Hume's interest in 
26 
the inferences he discusses is not empirical and psychological, but rather the kind of interest 
which a philosopher usually takes in inferences: viz. an evaluative, and in some sense, logico-
philosophical interest. In the conclusions (j) and (d) as they stand, we have in fact just another 
instance of what we know to be true in general of Hume (as of most philosophers between the 
seventeenth and twentieth centuries) that he asserts logico-philosophical theses in the guise of 
remarks about the constitution of the human mind. 
... there can be no doubt that Hume intends by (j) an extremely unfavourable evaluation 
of the inferences which are its subject. After all, ( j ) is that famous sceptical conclusion which 
Hume came to about inductive inferences (Stove, 1973, p31, my emphases.) 
As I have indicated by highlighting with italics. Stove's argument here for the conclusion - that 
these apparently psychological claims aren't in fact so intended, but are rather logical 
evaluations - rests heavily on appeal to prior conviction, rather than on close examination o f the 
textual context. In this regard, the basic failings o f Stove's approach become all too obvious; 
Stove avoids employment o f actual quotations f rom Hume's argument in his initial 
representation o f it, and avoids any close analysis o f the immediately surrounding context in 
which it arises. Once the finer details o f what Hume actually says in these passages, and o f 
their context, are carefiilly attended to it becomes apparent that Hume is indeed concerned here 
with the question 'What faculty o f the mind is it which is at work in us when we make 
predictive-inductive inferences?'. In fact Hume's ultimate conclusion in the relevant passage o f 
the Treatise is precisely that the mind is not determined by reason to make inductive inferences, 
but by the operation o f the imagination: 
When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief 
of another, it is not determined by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the 
ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination. Had ideas no more union in the fancy 
than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference from causes 
to effects, nor repose belief in any matter of fact. {Treatise, 1.3.6.12, my emphases) 
Since Hume also immediately proceeds to explain how he thinks the faculty o f the imagination 
(as distinct f rom the faculty o f reason) induces the mind to form the expectations it does. Stoves 
claim that Hume's apparent concern with the question o f which faculty of the mind is in 
operation here is in fact illusory is quite incredible. Likewise with the Enquiry: 
I f the mind is not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other 
principle ... What that principle is'ma^ y Weirbe"wbrth"the 
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... Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the 
force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it 
{Enquiry, 5.\.2, 5.2.2.) 
Similarly in the Abstract: 
'tis custom alone, not reason, which determines us to make [experience of effects] the standard 
of our future judgements. {Abstract, 25, my emphasis) 
The presence of this visible object, and the constant conjunction of that particular effect, render 
the idea different to the feeling from those loose ideas, which come into the mind without any 
introduction. ... 
... whatever name we may give to this feeling, which constitutes belief, our author 
thinks it evident, that it has a more forcible effect on the mind than fiction and mere conception. 
This he proves by its influence on the passions and on the imagination; which are only moved by 
truth and what is taken for such. {Abstract, 21, 22.) 
It seems quite incredible to suggest that these are not, as they appear, psychological conclusions 
rather than logical conclusions, as Stove suggests they are. But they are ran together with 
Hume's logical conclusions in these passages simply because, as Hume explains at the outset 
{Treatise, 1.3.6.4., figure 1 above), his strategy is to approach the psychological issue via initial 
consideration o f the logical issue, leading thereby to elimination o f the psychological hypothesis 
that we proceed by employment o f our faculty o f reasoning and the establishment o f proof 
Stove notes (p34) that there are points where Hume does express his claims in overtly logical or 
justificatory terms (in this case quoting Treatise, 1.3.12.20, f rom a later point in the Treatise 
where Hume reiterates and comments on his earlier justificatory conclusions), but still fails to 
appreciate that these actually are subtly different claims to the overtly psychological claims that 
arise wi thin the passages where the justificatory argument occurs. Thus, despite the fact that 
Hume does satisfactorily distinguish his psychological and justificatory conclusions, both with 
regard to his advance account o f the strategy o f his larger (psychological/explanatory) 
argument, and with regard to the terminology he employs in his expressions o f the respective 
points. Stove insists on conflating these claims wi th the result that when the actual evaluative 
(logical or justificatory) conclusions are (directly and clearly) expressed as such he confusedly 
describes them as 'having been shorn o f their usual pseudo-psychological air' (Stove, 1973, 
p34). 
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Stove suggests, in the above passage, that it was not uncommon in Hume's time for logical 
points to be expressed in psychological terms. But o f course that point could hardly be 
maintained without also acknowledging that it w i l l nevertheless usually be possible to 
distinguish by the context, between cases where a genuine psychological claim is being made 
and cases where a psychological turn o f phrase is employed in a sense that is indicative o f a 
logical point. But, as we have seen, it is clear f rom the present context that Stove has failed to 
make the relevant distinction in this case. In the penultimate sentence o f the above passage 
Stove claims that 'there can be no doubt that Hume intends by ( j ) an extremely unfavourable 
evaluation o f the inferences which are its subject.' (Stove, 1973, p31). In subtle but significant 
contrast, what does seem clear f rom this context is that Hume does indeed intend (and express) 
an unfavourable evaluation o f these inferences, but that ( j ) - or at least Hume's actual statement 
that approximates to ( j ) (i.e. (8) as distinct f rom (7) in my figure I above) - is not the statement 
that is intended by Hume to express that evaluative/logical conclusion, ( j ) is, as it appears, a 
psychological conclusion that is inferred from the immediately prior justificatory conclusion. 
Owen's misinterpretation also appears to be due to a failure to appreciate that what we have 
here is an argument (the famous justificatory one) within an argument (the less famous 
psychological one) - not a simple argument which is just about one or the other issue. But in 
Owen's case, the justificatory claims and conclusions that arise within the core justificatory 
argument are mistakenly interpreted in terms o f the psychological issue that is the subject o f the 
broader argument that Hume builds on the basis o f the initial justificatory conclusion in this 
passage, rather than the other way round as in Stove's misinterpretation. 
Owen's mistaken perception of the traditional interpretation of Hume 
Owen points to a number o f points in the text o f the Treatise where Hume expresses a concern 
with the transition f rom impressions o f the observed to ideas o f the unobserved, and the 
question of 'whether we are determin'd by reason' or by something else when we make this 
transition. And he alleges that 
the traditional view requires us to treat all this [i.e. the references to the question of how our 
beliefs are produced] as a concern with the justification of a belief whose existence is somehow 
unproblematic. (Owen, 2000, p i 3 8 ) 
But that is simply not true. The undeniable fact that the question o f tew'olfr beliefs are 
produced is a major concern o f Hume within Book I o f the Treatise is neither news nor 
controversial for the traditional interpreter o f Hume. In fact, it would be d i f f icu l t to find any 
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other interpretation o f Hume's various questions claims and theories that are referred to quite 
explicitly as questions claims and theories 'Of the causes of belief (Section title. Treatise 
1.3.8). 
Nor, for anyone who actually reads Hume's surrounding text, should there be any question 
about the fact that the unprovability thesis is actually argued and used in order to support the 
further and weaker conclusion that we don't make our inductive inferences on the basis o f 
proofs. It is quite clear within the text that Hume immediately makes the inference from the 
unprovability conclusion to the weaker conclusion that our fundamental inductive belief (the 
belief in the continuity o f causal regularities) isn't based on proof and is simply taken for 
granted. In the version in the Abstract o f the Treatise, he even runs the two propositions 
together in a single sentence, as this final step o f inference seems to be so obvious: 
This therefore is a point, which can admit of no proof at all, and which we take for granted 
without any proof. (Abstract o f the Treatise, para. 14, my underline, my italics) 
Having eliminated these potential points o f confusion, and erroneous allegations by Owen, as to 
what precisely he thinks the difference might be between his own and the traditional 
interpretation o f the unprovability argument, it would seem that we still need to identify some 
substantial claim which Owen believes to be representative o f his position and which, once his 
terms o f reference are understood, the traditional interpreter o f Hume actually would find 
objectionable. 
An open question? Hume's extension of his argument to 'the probability of chances' 
However there are some explicit points that Owen makes on which the traditionalist would 
disagree. As we have noted, Owen claims that even after the specification o f the unprovability 
argument, and the ensuing elimination o f the 'determined-by-reason' production hypothesis: 
Hume has not yet raised the issue of warrant^' (Owen, 2000, p i 37, my emphasis) 
Similarly, but less strongly, in the closing statement o f his conclusion Owen says 
^' Presumably Owen intends this as a synonym of'justification', since the latter is what he originally 
claimed to be at issue between himself and the fraditionalist. In any case what matters with regard to the 
question of the confroversiality of his view is whether he intends this statement about warrant in some 
sense in which traditionalists in general, or at least in the main, would want to deny it. 
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Far from being settled by the end of Hume's negative argument, the question of the warrant of 
probable reasoning remains wide open. (Owen, 2000, p i46) 
Considering the stronger claim first, so long as Owen does intend 'warrant' in its normal sense 
as synonym for ' justif ication' , it would seem that he is quite mistaken i f he thinks that Hume 
does not even raise the question o f warrant in his lead up to the unprovability argument. As we 
have noted, and as illustrated in 'The Strategy' section o f f i gu re l , Hume makes it quite clear 
that he intends to approach the issue o f belief production, and specifically the 'by reason' 
hypothesis, by consideration of the question ofjustifiability. He explains quite explicitly that he 
intends to examine each type o f argument on which it might be supposed that the principle o f 
continuity has been established by logical reasoning - in order to see whether either type o f 
argument is capable o f providing rational justification for such a conclusion {Treatise, 1.3.6.4). 
The intent here is clearly that i f we can provide rational justification for this belief, then that 
might well explain why and how we have come to believe it. But i f we can't, then o f course it 
won' t . 
What then o f Owen's weaker claim here, that the question o f warrant remains open after this 
early argument relating to causal inductive inference? We have already noted that, even on a 
justificatory interpretation, the justificationist might want to agree that Hume's justificatory 
argument is not strictly complete at this early stage, since it is designed to relate specifically to 
our 'most certain' inductive inferences f rom causation, and in that respect the issue might 
appear to remain to some extent open, wi th regard to weaker probabilistic arguments. However, 
we have also noted that Hume appears to think that the more general justificatory denial is, on 
the basis o f his considerations at this stage, a foregone conclusion, since he has already argued 
that all our inductive inferences are based on cause and effect. And indeed this is a point Hume 
clearly confirms when he later takes up the issue o f completeness^^ with regard to ^the 
probability of chances' (Section heading, Treatise 1.3.11.1), and 'that evidence which is still 
attended with uncertainty' {Treatise 1.3.11.2) where he explains how chances depend on 
association with causal factors that constrain the relevant range o f possibilities: 
'tis impossible for us to conceive this combination of chances, which is requisite to render one 
hazard superior to another, without supposing a mixture of causes among the chances, ... Where 
nothing limits the chances, every notion that the most exfravagant fancy can form, is upon a 
footing of equality; ... Thus unless we allow, that there are some causes to make the dice fall, 
and preserve their form in their fall, and lie upon some one of their sides, we can form no 
calculation concerning the laws of hazard. (Treatise 1.3.11.6) 
22 I in order to bestow on this system its fiill force and evidence' {Treatise 1.3.11.1) 
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So, despite his needing to f i l l in the story in this regard, it becomes quite clear at this point that 
on Hume's understanding o f the situation, having shown that our causal inferences are 
unjustifiable, he had in fact done enough to establish that even our expectations based on 
probability in the sense o f chance were likewise unjustifiable. 
Furthennore, in this regard it also needs to be noted that it is not only the justificatory issue that 
requires further clarification after the initial argument: Hume also acknowledges that his 
explanatory argument is to some extent incomplete at this stage, and indeed in this regard he 
proceeds by essentially the same strategy in the case o f inference relating to chance as he did in 
the case o f causal inference: 
we may repeat all same arguments we employ'd in examining that belief, which arises from 
causes; and may prove after the same manner, that a superior number of chances produces our 
assent neither by demonstration nor probability. {Treatise, 1.3.11.7, my emphasis in bold) 
Once again Hume employs a negative justificatory argument, in order to reach this negative 
explanatory conclusion - arguing that 
'tis impossible to prove with certainty that, that any event must fall on that side where there is a 
superior number of chances {Treatise, 1.3.11.7) 
and furthermore that considerations o f probability, interpreted in terms o f chance, can provide 
us with no more reason to expect any particular outcome than can a tautology: 
when we say 'tis likely the event will fall on the side, which is superior, ... we do no more than 
affirm, that where there is a superior number of chances there is actually a superior, ... which are 
identical propositions, and of no consequence. {Treatise, 1.3.11.8). 
Having established in these points that we cannot possibly justify our beliefs or expectations 
about matters o f chance by logical reasoning, Hume as before immediately concludes that those 
beliefs cannot have been produced by such logical considerations. And fo l lowing this, in just 
the same way, Hume proceeds to develop his positive account o f how our beliefs relating to 
chance are produced. In this case it is quite clear that any objection to the justificatory 
interpretation o f the earlier argument for unprovability, on the basis thatJhe justificatory issue 
is not entirely settled at that point would equally apply to Owen's suggestion that it should then 
instead be interpreted as an explanatory argument about how our beliefs are produced, since that 
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question equally is not entirely settled at that point (if not more so, considering Hume's point 
relating to the decisiveness of the case for general unjustifiability on the basis of the result 
relating to causal inference). 
This should in any case be clear in virtue of the above-noted justificatory dependence of his 
production theory on his negative answer to the justifiability question within this particular line 
of argument for the 'not-by-reason' conclusion - i.e. arguing^ow the impossibility of logical 
justification to the negative explanatory thesis that we do not acquire our inductive beliefs by 
logical justification. In view of this it is clear that, as far as this line of argument for the 
negative explanatory thesis is concerned, if Hume's argument for the justificatory thesis - that it 
is impossible to logically justify our inductive inferences - did leave us with any remaining 
doubt about that impossibility, then that line of argument would fail to clinch the case for the 
negative explanatory conclusion that therefore we cannot have acquired our inductive beliefs by 
any such process of logical justification. 
Hume's explanatory theory, and the question that still needs to be answered 
Hume's positive view of the psychological process of inductive inference is that this propensity 
or inclination to believe (or expect) what we do not see is a result of the operation of experience 
and habit on the imagination, influencing the forcefulness or intensity of our ideas: 
Experience is a principle, which instructs me in the several conjunctions of objects for the past. 
Habit is another principle, which determines me to expect the same for the future; and both of 
them conspiring to operate upon the imagination, make me form certain ideas in a more intense 
and lively manner, than others, ... Without this quality, by which the mind enlivens some ideas 
beyond others (which seemingly so trivial, and so little founded on reason) we cou'd never 
assent to any argument, nor carry our view beyond those few objects, which are present to our 
senses. {Treatise, 1.4.7.3) 
Even with regard to 'the most usual conjunctions of cause and effect' Hume concludes 
the ultimate principle, which binds them together, ... proceeds merely from an illusion of the 
imagination; {Treatise, 1.4.7.6) 
Owen suggests that 
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Hume does begin to face the question of warrant at this point [section 7 ('Conclusion of this 
book')], and gives the beginning of an answer (Owen, 2000, p211, my emphases) 
But for Hume, at this stage in his analysis 
the question is, how far we ought to yield to these illusions. ((Treatise, 1.4.7.6., my 
emphasis) 
not how far we might still be able to establish some logical justification or proof that these 
'illusions' are true. The situation now facing Hume is this: since we have seen that it is not 
possible to provide any logical justification for the extra-observational beliefs produced in us by 
the processes of nature - how far should we be prepared to go along with these natural belief-
inducing processes? Should we simply accept whatever we are naturally inclined to believe, or 
should we sometimes resist our natural belief inclinations - and if so under what circumstances? 
Thus, not only is Owen's claim here quite clearly a misinterpretation of the question that Hume 
is now struggling with, but Owen's failure to realise that Hume has long since ruled out the 
possibility of logical justification prevents any proper understanding of the background context 
that makes sense of the question Hume is now considering. 
The 'textual evidence' for Owen's view: 
Owen's conflation of content with context 
Owen suggests (pi 38) that there is 'ample textual evidence' for his view that Hume does not 
even raise the question of justification in the passage we have examined. The first piece of 
'evidence' he offers is that of Hume's predominant concern with the question of 'whether we 
are determin'd by reason' to move from our observations to our non-observational beliefs, 'or 
by a certain association and relation of perceptions'. But we have already dealt with the 
question of which of the arguments Hume presents is the subject of 'Hume's problem', in the 
sense in which this phrase is generally intended - the argument which the traditional interpreter 
believes to be intended by Hume as an argument for unjustifiability. And we have noted that 
the arguments that form the basis of Hume's denial of justifiability are presented within the 
context of Hume's arguing for a negative conclusion to that broader question of belief 
production. 
In view of this it would appear that Owen's perception of th^e references to the issue of belief 
production as evidence for his view that Hume does not even raise, let alone answer, the issue 
of justificatioti at this point amounts to nothing more than a fallacy of conflating the content of 
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Hume's unjustifiability claims (and his argument for them) with the broader context in which 
they arise. 
The use Owen makes of the second quotation he takes to support his view further illustrates the 
type of interpretive error he is making in this regard: 
In the Abstract, Hume says: "However easy this step may seem, reason would never, to all 
eternity, be able to make it" ... Hume's point is, 'How do we make this step?' 
(Owen, 2000, pi38, my emphasis, my double quotation marks to mark the actual 
quotation of Hume, as distinct from Owen's interpretation in single quotation marks) 
The actual content of Hume's statement here, as distinct from the broader use he makes of it, is 
of course just what Hume says in the statement. Although there is some play with language 
here, in that Hume talks about whether 'reason' would be able to make the inference, it is quite 
clear that what he is talking about is whether we, however long and carefully we thought about 
it, could possibly make the inference by (satisfactory) logical reasoning. This is of course much 
stronger than simply suggesting that we don't make such inferences by logical reasoning when 
we make them, and in contrast to Owen's view, clearly rules out the possibility that nevertheless 
we might eventually be able to justify such inferences by logical reasoning. 
O f course Hume does go on to consider by what process we do proceed to such beliefs. For 
those of us who always thought that there were good reasons for making the inductive 
inferences we do - and that we made them because we understood that there were good reasons 
for doing so - the question of origin becomes pertinent, once the point made about 
unjustifiability is accepted. But as we have clarified at some length, these two issues are 
nevertheless distinct, and in this particular quotation the point actually made is quite clearly 
distinct from the question that then arises. But the simple fact that Owen's interpretation of 
Hume's 'point' here is a question, while Hume's perfectly clear point is a statement starkly 
illustrates the fact that Owen is here once again losing sight of the true significance of what 
Hume actually says, by focusing his interpretation of Hume's explicit claims on the surrounding 
context in which the claims arise, rather than on their actual content. 
The 'evidence' of the thread of Hume's argument 
Owen (2000, pi 34) suggests that 'the best defence of this [view] of Hume's negative argument 
involves a look ahead to his positive claims'. On considering the thread of Hume's early 
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argument through his initial ('negative') argument for the 'not-by-reason' conclusion, and the 
immediately following development of his positive account of belief production, Owen notes 
that the latter does not make any pretension of attributing justification as an inherent part of the 
process. He then goes on to argue as follows: 
If [Hume's] negative account is as 1 have described it, lacking concern with justification and 
warrant, then Hume's positive account [of belief production] is right on target. We may disagree 
about whether it is the best account or whether it is any good at all. But at least it squarely 
addresses the problem as posed and attempts to find an adequate solution for it. But if the 
problem is really a problem about justification and warrant, then Hume' solution is hopeless. It 
makes no mention of warrant or justification and thus completely avoids the allegedly central 
issue. (Owen, 2000, pi36) 
But we have seen that in fact Hume uses his stated problem for the justification of causal 
inference specifically as a means to the end of eliminating the 'by-reason' production 
hypothesis, in the broader context of context of considering how our causal beliefs are 
produced. Since answering that broader question is the initial theoretical aim at this early stage, 
it is theoretically appropriate for Hume to continue his answer to that explanatory question 
before discussing the psychological and practical implications of the negative justificatory 
conclusion established in the process of examination of the broader theoretical question - even 
despite the relative seriousness of the latter (as drawn out at length in his Conclusion to Book 
!)• 
The fact that Hume's positive account of belief production answers the explanatory question 
that this passage is designed to tackle in no way supports Owen's view that the argument 'lacks 
concern' with justification of warrant, and that the issue of justification 'does not enter the 
picture'. On the contrary, as we have seen, Hume's case for the elimination of the 'by-reason' 
production hypothesis in this passage proceeds quite specifically hy consideration of the 
justifiability of our causal inferences. Moreover, as we have seen, in this particular line of 
argument for the elimination of the 'by-reason' hypothesis (in contrast to the supplementary 
arguments in the later Enquiry) the famous argument for unprovability does all the crucial and 
substantial work for the support of that weaker conclusion. Not only does it 'enter the picture' 
in Hume's broader discussion of the explanatory issue, but as far as Hume's line of argument on 
the explanatory issue in the Treatise is concerned, the negative justificatory conclusion is 
essential to that broader line of argument. In order to properly understand the context of 
Hume's development of his positive theory of belief production, it is necessary to understand 
not only that he has by this stage (effectively) eliminated the 'by-reason' hypothesis, but how 
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he has eliminated it - and it is clear enough that here in the Treatise Hume does this by 
establishing that // is not possible to justify or prove our extra-observational beliefs. 
The cool continuation of the implications of the unjustifiability conclusion for the initial 
question about the process of inductive inference within the main text of the Treatise, in 
contrast to the impassioned reflection on its more serious practical implications in the 
Conclusion to Book 1 {Treatise, 1.4.7.) can make one wonder for a moment if Hume really did 
mean what he appears to have just said. But the eventual disclosure of his emotional response 
to this problem after the completion of his purely theoretical deliberations ultimately eliminates 
any prior grounds for suspicion that perhaps he did not. 
Owen's theoretical analysis in support of his interpretation 
In purported support of his controversial interpretation of Hume's unprovability argument Owen 
suggests that what, in the context, the unprovability argument is designed to show is that our 
belief in the continuity principle (or as he, in common with many others, calls it - the 
'uniformity principle') cannot be used to explain how we reason probabilistically: 
The concern [of the unprovability argument] is not whether the uniformity principle is justified. 
The concern is whether it is something we can believe or know, prior to our engaging in 
probable reasoning, so that we might explain how we do in fact reason probably. If it were 
available to us, it would serve, much as the idea of necessary connection might have served, to 
facilitate the transmission from the impression to the idea. Moreover [I] [the uniformity 
principle] would facilitate the transition in such a way that in making the transition, we would 
be 'determin'd by reason'. Hume's conclusion is that [2] it is not something that we believe or 
know prior to our engaging in probable reasoning, and so [3] it cannot be used to explain the 
origin of that practice. ... Hume argues that after we do engage in the practice of probable 
reasoning, explained in Hume's way, we do come to believe in the uniformity principle and 
make use of it in some of our more reflective causal reasonings. (Owen, 2000, p 141 —2, my 
emphases, my numbering.) 
It would seem that what Owen is trying to do here is to support his interpretation of the 
unprovability argument by providing what is supposed to be an illuminating or at least plausible 
account of Hume's underlying theoretical intentions at this point. However there are two 
compelling lines of objection that need to be raised against Owen's suggestions in this passage, 
the first point to note, as with the arguments considered above, is that this purported analysis of 
Hume's underlying line of thought does not in any way reflect what Hume's actually says in the 
unprovability argument. What the unprovability argument (or at least the part of it relating 
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specifically to probable reasoning) actually says is that the 'uniformity principle' cannot be 
proved by any probable arguments because all probable arguments require a presupposition of 
it. It does not say that the principle can't explain the origin of probable reasoning because we 
didn't believe it before we first engaged in probable reasoning. 
In addition to this crucial point of the non-identity of Owen's expressed interpretation here with 
the explicit content of the unprovability argument itself, we may also note that he even appears 
to misinterpret the broader argument, within which Hume makes use of the unprovability 
conclusion in order to establish the weaker conclusion that we aren't determined by reason 
when we make our inductive inferences. Not only is this not what Hume says in this particular 
argument for the 'not-by-reason' conclusion, but Hume would not even subscribe to the claims 
that Owen attributes to him here. 
Owen suggests in the passage above [2] that Hume is claiming here that we don't believe the 
uniformity principle prior to engaging in probable reasoning. But Hume, in stark contrast, is 
claiming quite the contrary. Hume is claiming that the uniformity principle is an actual, and 
fundamental presupposition of any probable argument or inference: 
... (Abstract, para 14) 
For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the 
past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. (Enquiry 4.2.8.) 
This is the inference fi-om cause to effect; and of this nature are all our reasonings in the 
conduct of life: On this is founded alt our belief in history ... It follows, then, that all 
reasonings concerning cause and effect are founded on experience, and that all reasonings from 
experience are founded on the supposition, that the course of nature will continue uniformly the 
same. ... All probable arguments are built on the supposition, that there is this conformity 
betwixt the future and the past (Abstract, paras 10,13, & 14, my emphasis) 
Moreover, this is not the only claim that Owen attributes to Hume here but which Hume would 
not subscribe to. Owen also suggests (statement [3]) that Hume is claiming that a prior belief^ ^ 
in the uniformity principle can't be used to explain the origin of probable reasoning. But in 
Hume's account of probable reasoning, a prior belief in the uniformity principle plays an 
" Compare Owen's second sentence in this passage, plus statements [2] and [4] to confirm this 
interpretation of statement [3] in terms of belief in the uniformity principle. 
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essential role in explaining the origin of probable reasoning. In Hume's view, 
acknowledgement of a prior belief in the uniformity principle is an essential requirement for any 
satisfactory explanation of probable reasoning precisely because (in his view) probable 
reasoning cannot happen without it. 
Thirdly, Owen also wrongly suggests here (statement [ 1 ]) that Hume would have us suppose 
that if a prior belief^'' in the uniformity principle were available to us 'it would facilitate the 
transition [from the observational impression to the non-observational idea] in such a way that 
in making the transition, we would be 'determin'd by reason^'. But Hume's argument is, quite 
to the contrary, that although we do (and must) base our probable arguments on a prior belief in 
the uniformity principle, that does not amount to supplying a proof of, or a reason for believing, 
the conclusion of the inference (because there is no possible proof or reason for believing that 
crucial presupposition). What Hume actually says in this regard in the Treatise is that 
According to this account of things, which is, I think in every point unquestioinable, probability 
is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had 
experience, and those, of which we have had none; and therefore 'tis impossible this 
presumption can arise from probability. {Treatise \ .3.6.7., my emphasis) 
Hume is not saying that it is impossible we can presume the unobserved will resemble the 
observed - on the contrary he here quite explicitly insists that we do so in all our probable 
reasonings. His complaint is rather that this presumption cannot justly^' arise from probable 
reasoning (the problem of course, taken for granted here, but made more explicit in the Enquiry 
being that such a justification would be circular). That this is the significance of the problem 
here is further clarified in the immediately following paragraph, which Hume begins as follows: 
Shou'd any one think to elude this argument; and ... pretend that all conclusions from causes 
and effects are built on solid reasoning: . ..{Treatise 1.3.6.7., my emphasis) 
Hume's reference here to the 'solidity' of the reasoning described clarifies the point that this 
complaint is a complaint about the justification for the cited presumption - not about whether 
the presumption is actually, or possibly, made - as Owen's interpretation demands. 
*^ Again, compare the context for confirmation that Owen's point essentially concerns prior 6e//e/in the 
principle. 
" This being clarified in the introductory context - 'let us cast our eye on each of these degrees of 
evidence and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this nature.' {Treatise 1.3.6.4., my 
emphasis.) 
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Thus, in stark contrast to Owen's suggestion, Hume's (broader) argument here is that even 
though we do have a prior belief in the uniformity principle this will not facilitate the transition 
in such a way that we are determined by reason - in other words compelled by rational proof-
to draw the conclusions we do about the unobserved^^ 
The extent to which Owen appears determined to resist seeing what Hume is actually saying in 
this argument, and to read something quite different into it, is quite remarkable. 
Owen's final misunderstanding: the 'tu quoque' argument 
Finally (with reference to Baier^^ 1991) Owen offers the argument that 
[probable] reasoning is the sort of reasoning that makes up the bulk of Hume's Treatise. ... So it 
will not do to treat Hume as entirely negative about [the warrant of]^ * probable reasoning, if we 
are to avoid saddling him with a virtual contradiction at the heart of his enterprise. Far from 
being settled by the end of Hume's negative argument, the question of the warrant of probable 
reasoning remains wide open. (Owen, 2000, p 146) 
But even granted the traditional view that Hume is (virtually"') entirely negative about the 
logical justifiability of probable reasoning, there is nothing like a contradiction to be had here: 
Hume does not purport to have any genuine logical justification for his inductively based 
opinions, despite the surface appearance of some of the phrases he uses. In fact Hume was 
perfectly aware of the threat of an objection along just these lines and responded to it at the end 
of his Conclusion to Book 1: 
[I]f we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination 
which we feel to employing ourselves after that manner. 11 [W]e should yield to that, which 
inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light in which we 
In the preamble to the unprovability argument in the Abstract Hume begins with consideration of the 
situation of Adam prior to any experience - in which situation we might suppose that he did not have a 
belief to the uniformity principle, since Hume says that belief in it is based on experience. But as he 
approaches the unprovability argument itself Hume makes it quite clear that he is about to show that even 
with the benefit of experience, and moreover even with the belief in the uniformity principle that naturally 
arises in the course of experience, Adam could never have proven the principle, nor have been 
determined by reason in the conclusions he draws from the use of it. 
The quotation Owen mentions is 'If Hume really distrusts causal inferenece, then he must distrust his 
own Treatise' (Baier, 1991, p55). 
The traditionalist does not suggest that Hume is entirely negative in everything he says about probable 
reasoning: he claims that Hume is (at least virtually) entirely negative about the (logical) justifiability (or 
in Owen's terms 'warrant') of probable reasoning. That this is the position that Owen intends to target in 
his objection here is evident from the reference to warrant in his conclusion as quoted. 
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survey them in any particular instant. ... On such an occasion we are apt... to forget our 
scepticism, ... and make use of such terms as these, 'tis evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable; ... 
I may have fallen into this fault... but I here ... declare that such expressions were extorted 
ft-om me by my present view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea of 
my own judgement 15 (Treatise, X.A.I, paragraph numbers in subscript) 
Hume's position then is that we formulate inductive beliefs in accordance with the continuity 
principle of probable reasoning because we are irresistibly compelled to do so by the force of 
natural habit (along with the associated apparent consequences of doing otherwise: 'it costs us 
too much pains to do otherwise'). But he is also quite explicit in distancing himself from any 
claim, despite appearances to the contrary, that he is able to provide any proof for his view. It is 
simply his belief, which he holds without any apparent hope or claim of /og/ca/justification. 
Hume does not purport to compel the reader to follow his theories in the Treatise by provision 
of unobjectionable argument. He merely invites the reader to follow him in his 'speculations' 
on these matters - if he is so inclined. 
If the reader finds himself in the same easy disposition, let him follow me in my future 
speculations. If not, let him follow his inclinations (Treatise, 1.4.7. 14) 
The fact that Hume feels the need to provide such a radical response to this tu quoque line of 
objection - a line of objection that, in Owen's own admission, would appear to be in order if 
Hume had argued that probable inference was unjustifiable, - provides additional support in 
favour of the view that Hume has indeed propounded such an argument, and recognises that his 
arguments are subject to this objection - that he cannot provide any ultimate justification for his 
beliefs or for the inferences that he makes, despite his natural inclination to think and sometimes 
say otherwise. 
Hume's apparent reservations about the impossibility 
of a logical justification of induction in the Enquiry 
However, despite the force of these considerations in favour of the traditional view, that is not 
the end of the story with regard to this interpretive issue. What we have seen is that this appears 
to be Hume's position at the time of composition of the Treatise. But of course Hume's later 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding ( \ 74S) was intended mainly as a more careful and 
concise revision of the ground covered in the Treatise. And Hume did say that he wafited his 
Barring the occasional apparent admission of the possibility that he is mistaken in his beliefs and 
arguments. 
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arguments to be judged on the basis of this rather than the Treatise: In the opening 
Advertisement to the 1777 edition of the Enquiries Hume says 
the Author desires, that the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his 
philosophical sentiments and principles. 
And although Owen does not make particular use of the point, opting to base his argument on 
the original text of the Treatise, Hume does appear, at certain points in the text of the Enquiry, 
to treat with some reservation the apparent claim that there is no possible argument that could 
support our inductive inferences. 
Hume's reproduction of the unprovability argument in the Enquiry 
Before proceeding to consider the significance of these apparent reservations, let us first 
confirm that Hume does nevertheless reproduce the argument for unprovability: 
all inferences from experience suppose as their foundation that the future will resemble the past, 
... It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of 
the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that 
resemblance. {Enquiry, 4.2, para 8, my emphasis) 
Immediately following the repetition of the demonstration that no arguments could possibly 
prove the inductive inferential principle (or presupposition) of past/future continuity, Hume 
says, with (at least initially) apparent sincerity^": 
as a philosopher ... / want to learn the foundation of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has 
yet been able to remove my difficulty, or give me satisfaction in a matter of such importance. 
Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, i have small 
hopes of obtaining a solution? We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance ... 
I must confess that a man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an 
argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. {Enquiry, 
4.2, 8-9, my emphasis) 
Perhaps these statements should not be taken at face value. But in either case, sincere or ironic the 
argument I shall present in defence of the traditional interpretation of the unprovability argument will 
stand without an assumption of irony. The attribution of a degree of conftision in the line of argument 
that Hume presents m this passage of the Enquiry is unfortunately, in any case, inevitable 
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It would seem then that the difficulty 'of such importance' to which Hume refers here is rather 
the difficulty that appears to arise from Hume's immediately preceding demonstration that there 
is no possible way of proving the continuity principle. Certainly it would seem from what 
Hume is saying that he can't see any way it would be possible to provide any satisfactory proof 
of it, and doubts that anyone else can either. The point expressed in this passage then appears to 
be the suggestion that perhaps Hume may have been guilty of an oversight within his argument 
for unprovability, and that he might in fact be mistaken in drawing such a pessimistic 
conclusion: perhaps there might after all be some possible way of proving the 
continuity/resemblance principle that he has failed to consider. 
Hume's purported elimination of these doubts, 
and his apparent confirmation of Owen's interpretation 
Immediately following this suggestion though, it would seem that Hume is about to provide 
decisive confirmation that he is not mistaken about this, when he adds: 
But with regard to the present subject, there are some considerations which seem to remove all 
this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of a mistake. (Enquiry, 4.2.9) 
Surprisingly though, as it turns out, the following passage provides instead what on the surface 
appears to be a compelling piece of textual evidence for Ch\'en's view, since it is at this point 
that Hume brings in two considerations that are used to provide independent confirmation of the 
weaker conclusion that'// is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the 
future': (a) the point that an infant or animal that is incapable of logical reasoning naturally 
develops inductive expectations when faced for example with objects that have previously 
caused pain, and (b) the fact that even we cannot immediately report the reasons on which our 
inferences are supposed to be based, but need instead to try to construct an appropriate 
argument. Having first suggested that there might be some possible proof of the uniformity 
principle which he has overlooked; Hume explicitly introduces these final considerations with 
the suggestion that they will 'remove' any such doubt. 
It seems quite clear that what Hume was talking about in the lead up to this supposed settlement 
of the issue was the question of whether, despite his failure to find or imagine any argument that 
would satisfactorily (without circularity) support the continuity principle, there might 
"nevertheless be some possible line of argument hitherto unthought of that would support it. So 
unless Hume is actually going to change the subject, what appears to be promised here are some 
considerations that will remove any suspicion that some possible line of logical support for the 
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continuity principle may have been overlooked. But that is not what he provides. These 
arguments do leave open the question of whether we might, with sufficient logical ingenuity and 
painstaking research, be able to think of an argument that would provide satisfactory logical 
support for the continuity principle. Their conclusion is merely that we don't use any such 
argument when we make our inductive inferences. 
Moreover - just in case we might suspect that perhaps Hume is merely appealing to 
(extraordinarily) poor or weak arguments in support of the strong unprovability conclusion -
Hume immediately makes it clear that the conclusion of these arguments is the relatively weak 
explanatory conclusion - that 
it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, 
and moreover emphasises that: 
This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section 
and furthermore that it is a relatively weak conclusion: 
If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. {Enquiry, 4.2.10, my 
emphases) 
It would appear then that in the Enquiry, which Hume specifically asked to be regarded as the 
definitive account of his philosophical views and arguments, he is in the end insisting that we 
interpret the conclusion of what has traditionally been interpretd as a strong justificatory 
argument for unprovability in precisely the way that Owen is suggesting - rather as a negative 
explanatory argument for a weak 'not-by-reason' conclusion. What then is the traditionalist to 
make of this? Could Owen be right after all? 
The context of the unprovability argument, 
and Hume's fallacious defence against the objection 
that it might be based on an error of oversight. 
There does of course remain the problem that the two respective statements in Hume's text (the 
unprovability statement and the 'not-by-reason' statement) do not in any way appear to be 
identical, and the fact that, as we have seen, the unprovability claim, as we have (traditionally) 
understood it appears to be an essential component of the unprovability line of argument for the 
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not-by reason conclusion. And of course this line of argument still appears to be present - and 
indeed the primary line of argument - presented in the Enquiry. In view of this it would seem 
that the right way to attempt to make sense of this puzzling passage is to seek some account of 
Hume's intentions, and possible errors, in this passage that is compatible with the results of our 
analysis thus far. 
I think that the charitable interpretation of the situation here, is that Hume is using the 
supplementary arguments not simply to confirm the particular claim regarding which the 
question of possible oversight has been raised, as his connecting statement might appear to 
suggest. Rather, he is using the supplementary arguments to confirm his ultimate conclusion 
concerning the broader theoretical issue which is the subject of this 'present section' as a whole. 
That is why he emphasises just that point immediately following the conclusion of those 
additional arguments. 
However, even though this may be a perfectly reasonable strategy for him to take under the 
circumstances of suspicion about this particular (unprovability) line of support for the 
conclusion of ultimate theoretical concern at this point in the Enquiry, the problem nevertheless 
remains that Hume does appear, by his choice of words in the connecting passage, to suggest 
that the arguments to follow will clear up 'this' immediately forementioned 'suspicion of 
mistake'. And this immediately forementioned suspicion of mistake was specifically a 
suspicion that some possible proof for the continuity thesis might have been overlooked, i.e. that 
there might be some mistake about the unprovability conclusion. In this case, despite the 
legitimacy of Hume's use here in the Enquiry of additional arguments in response to the 
problem of doubt about the unprovability line of argument for the not-by-reason conclusion 
(i.e. provision of alternative arguments for the ultimate conclusion that it was intended to 
support) he is nevertheless - with respect to his implicit promise to eliminate any scope for 
doubt about the unprovability thesis - guilty of the fallacy of changing the subject (to a similar 
one more easily defendable). To be specific, Hume's fallacy here is that he is guilty of 
changing the subject of what it is that, on this suggestion, might have been overlooked. The 
initial objection was that Hume might have overlooked some possible line of argument that 
could be used to prove the continuity principle. But the only issue of possible oversight that 
Hume addresses in these closing arguments is the question of whether there might possibly be 
any argument that actually has been used or understood by us within the course of our inductive 
inferences. On this understanding of Hume's puzzling line of argument at this point in the 
Treatise, it would seem that what might look on the face of it like a confirmation of Owen's 
interpretation of Hume's problem, is merely a case of Hume having himself fallen 
uncharacteristically into the fallacy of momentarily conflating the two closely related but subtly 
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distinct conclusions for which he argues in his discussion of the justification and explanation of 
inductive inference. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have clarified the context of Hume's problem for the justification of induction, 
and in so doing I have defended the traditional view, against the objections of Owen, that 
Hume's apparent arguments for the unjustifiability of our inductive inferences are indeed 
arguments for their unjustifiability. We have seen that Hume's unjustifiability thesis is 
employed by Hume in the context of a broader argument concerning the process of our 
inductive inferences. Hume argues that since our inductive inferences cannot possibly be 
justified by any line of reasoning, in the sense that they cannot be 'proven' or shown to be true, 
they are not arrived at by our comprehension of any satisfactory line of reasoning. 
With the benefit of these fundamental and contextual considerations, in the following chapter I 
shall consider in more detail the precise interpretation of Hume's unjustifiability thesis, with 
regard to the question of whether Hume is suggesting that justification fails on account of a 
failure of premise-adequacy or a failure of logical adequacy. In particular I shall approach this 
issue by consideration of the common supposition that one of the core strands of Hume's 
argument is a claim that our inductive inferences cannot be deductively valid. 1 shall argue that 
this interpretation of Hume's unjustifiability argument is a mistake, and that Hume simply made 
a case for the unjustifiability of inductive inference on the basis that a crucial assumption of our 
inductive inferences and representative arguments is unjustifiable. Hume had no complaint to 




WAS HUME'S PROBLEM A PROBLEM FOR 
THE VALroiTY OF INDUCTIVE INFERENCE? 
It is commonly claimed, and taught, that in Hume's view the crucial problem for inductive 
inference was that such inferences are logically invalid.^' Musgrave (1993) for example 
presents the following account of Hume's objection to inductive reasoning: 
Hume thought that as a matter of psychological fact we cannot help reasoning inductively. ... 
Nor did he dispute (at least in this context) that the premises of such arguments could be known 
for certain to be true from past experience. His objection is that inductive arguments are 
logically invalid: the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion, it is 
possible for the conclusion to be false even though all the premises are frue (Musgrave, 1993, 
pi52, my emphasis) 
In this chapter I shall argue that, contrary to popular opinion, Hume did not find a problem with 
the validity of the inferences we are 'induced' to make about things we have not observed. 
Furthermore, close attention to the details of Hume's account of the logical structure of 
inductive inferences reveals this as a form of inference that is in fact deductively valid. The 
justificatory problem of induction, as Hume understood it, does not present us with any reason 
to question the validity of inductive inference - not, that is, unless we should wish to contend 
Hume's account of its logical structure. 
Colin Howson's initial account of induction in his recent discussion of Hume's Problem 
(Howson 2000) reflects Hume's emphasis on observation as an essential and basic feature of 
inductive inference, but also draws attention to one or two other significant aspects of induction: 
The inferential process by which observation, suitably confrolled, is regarded as conferring an 
affidavit of reliability on what in a sfrict logical sense extends beyond it philosophers have 
fraditionally called induction. (Howson 2000, p6) 
It would appear from the context of this introductory characterisation that Howson's use of the 
qualification 'suitably controlled' is intended to relate to the context of controlled experiments, 
since he goes on to elaborate this in terms of 'observational data obtained in suitably rigorous 
'^ See below for further examples. 
47 
ways'. Hume himself sometimes spoke of the outcomes of induction in terms of our 
'experimental conclusions', and stressed that 
It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance 
and security with regard to a particular event. {Enquiry 4.2.7.) 
However it is worthy of note that there is a further sense in which the qualification 'suitably 
controlled' could, and should, be taken to apply in the context of inductive inference, and which 
applies in the case of Hume's understanding of the nature of inductive inference. Even granted 
that controlled experiment has been utilised in obtaining the observational information on which 
our inductive inferences are founded, what is inferred from that information also needs to be 
'controlled', in the following sense: Whatever the structure of inductive inference might be, it 
needs to include - in addition to the mere content of the initial observational information - some 
crucial component or feature which effectively controls what is and what is not inferred from 
the content of that information via that controlling factor. One thing 1 intend to show in what 
follows is that Hume expresses and maintains a particular view as to just what that inferential 
controlling factor is, and makes a particular point of insistence on its precise logical status 
within the inference. 
Another notable point about Howson's initial characterisation of induction at this point is that, 
in emphasising that the conclusion 'in a strict logical sense extends beyond' the observational 
information on which it is based, this properly represents a true characterising feature of 
Humean induction. Unfortunately, this correct account of the character of Humean induction is 
all too often mistaken for a subtly but importantly different account, and moreover, at least on 
the face of it, it seems that Howson also falls foul of this interpretive fallacy in his ensuing 
representation of Hume's account of induction and the problem associated with it. 
Did Hume deny the possibility of deductive induction? 
It is commonly supposed that it is quite obvious that inductive inference, as Hume understood it, 
cannot be deductively valid - that Hume acknowledged this - and moreover that this constituted 
a basic premise of the problem that Hume perceived to threaten the justification of inductive 
inference on his understanding of it. I shall argue that on all these points this common 
perception of Hume's understanding of the logical structure of inductive inference and his 
problem for the justification of such inference is mistaken. 
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This common perception of Hume's view appears to be endorsed by Howson,^^ when he 
suggests that 
Hume's argument... is very simple. Hume commences by pointing out that no inference from 
the observed to the as-yet unobserved is deductive: (Howson, 2000, pi 0) 
- presuming of course, as one naturally might, that Howson here intends 'inference from the 
observed to the as-yet unobserved' implicitly to be understood as a reference to inductive 
inference as Hume understands it.^^ Howson quotes Hume's Enquiry to illustrate the point: 
That there are no demonstrative arguments in this case seems evident; since it implies no 
contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those we 
have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. {Enquiry 4.2.5.) 
But is Howson right to suggest that Hume's point here is intended to imply that our inferences 
from what we have observed to what we have not are not deductive (or, more to the point, 
deductively valid)? There are problems with Howson's interpretation of this point of Hume's. 
Another recent example is to be found in Alexander Bird's account of the nature of induction and 
Hume's problem, in his recent contribution to the series 'Fundamentals of Philosophy' Philosophy of 
Science (1998) plO-17. Here Bird takes care to distinguish 'Humean induction' from a 'broader' sense 
'in which it means just "non-deductive"', and describes Humean induction as a form of argument 'where 
we argue from [our observations of a limited range of] several particular cases to the truth of a 
generalization covering them [all, not just the ones we have seen]' (pl3, parentheses quote elaborations in 
example on pl4). Bird specifically frames his account of Hume's problem 'in terms of Humean 
induction' (my emphasis) pointing out that 'those observations along with the form of the inductive 
argument should justify the [conclusion]', but nevertheless goes on to argue that this 'cannot be the sort 
of justification that a deductive argument gives to its conclusion' since 'in inductive arguments it is 
logically possible for the conclusion to be false while the premises are true' and refers in elaboration to 
'The very fact that inductive arguments are not deductive' (pi5). 
Salmon (1966) also appears to hold that Humean induction, by its nature, is not deductively 
valid. Salmon holds that 'All valid deductions are demonsfrative inferences' (p8), that 'AH ampliative 
inference is non-demonsfrative' (and therefore not deductively valid) (plO), and admits that 'In 
presenting Hume's argument, 1 was careful to set it up so that it would apply to any kind of ampliative or 
non-demonstrative [and therefore non-deductive] inference' (p20). Salmon supposes that 'Any type of 
logically correct ampliative [hence, on Salmon's terms, non-deductive] inference is induction' and that 
'the problem of induction is to show that some form of ampliative inference is justifiable' (p20, my 
emphasis and parentheses). 
Ladyman (2002) also takes this view of induction: 'Induction in the broadest sense is just any 
form of reasoning that is not deductive' (p28), 'By definition, in inductive arguments, it is possible the 
premises may all be true and the conclusion nevertheless false' (p39). 
^ In discussion on this point Howson has in fact indicated that he is largely in agreement with my 
interpretation of Hume here, and that he simply means that Hume is saying that there is no deductive 
argument from Just our observations to what is unobserved. I of course accept that Hume would surely 
agree such a claim - and indeed, as I explain below, he does even seem to invoke something like that 
point in response to considered line of objectioii at one poiiit in the £«^M/>>'; However rhy arguni is 
that this is by no means the central claim Hume is making in his account of the problem of induction. 
Moreover, understanding exactly what Hume is saying here helps us to get a more accurate picture (than 
the traditional view) of Hume's understanding of the logical structure of inductive inference. 
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One problem, which I shall take up below, is that what Howson appears to interpret this claim 
as saying does not follow from the grounds Hume offers for the claim. But a more basic 
problem concerns Howson's apparent interpretation of Hume's term 'demonstrative' here as 
equivalent to 'deductive'. 
Hume's concept of 'demonstration' 
It is not uncommon for commentators to read Hume's account of the problem of induction with 
a modem interpretation of the concept of'demonstration' in mind, whereby ' A l l valid 
deductions are demonstrative inferences' (Salmon, 1966, p8). But on consideration of the 
textual evidence, of which this statement is a prime example, there appear to be a compelling 
case for thinking that this interpretation of Hume's use of the term 'demonstrative' basically as 
'deductive' is mistaken. From the statements Hume makes about demonstrative inferences, it 
would appear that Hume would regard only arguments whose conclusions are logically (or 
semantically) necessary - i.e. imply a contradiction - as demonstrations. This is apparent from 
a number of passages, and in particular from the following clause from paragraph 11 of the 
Abstract of the Treatise. 
whenever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction. 
(Hume Abstract, para. 11) 
The natural reading of this statement is that the contrary of that which is demonstrated the 
conclusion of the demonstration) is impossible. To force an interpretation of 'demonstration' as 
'valid deduction' in our normal semantic sense of the term as an argument for which the 
conjunction of the premises with the contrary of the conclusion implies a contradiction, would 
require a much more convoluted reading of what it is, whenever a demonstration takes place, 
the contrary of which is supposed to be impossible. On an interpretation of 'demonstration' as 
'valid deduction' we would need to read this as 'the contrary of the negation of the conjunction 
of the premises with the negation of the conclusion is impossible' or something equivalent. 
This reading is so convoluted that it is not particularly easy even to see the point without the 
of symbols: Where A is the assumption (or the conjunction of the assumptions) and C the 
conclusion, what by definition is impossible in the case of a valid deduction is A&~C. 
Employing the traditional symbol o for 'I t is possible that... ' ( ~ as the sign for negation, and 




But in Hume's account of 'demonstration', he is saying that 'the contrary' of something is 
impossible. I f indeed then he intends this in a sense equivalent to 'valid deduction', we need to 
find an equivalent expression for the clause in brackets (A&~C) where the main operator is 
negation. An easy way to do this is to apply double negation, thus: 
~0 —(Ai&~C) 
On this interpretation then the unspecified 'something' the contrary of which is impossible, in 
symbols, would need to be ~(A&~C) or some equivalent. In comparison with the far simpler 
natural reading on which the contrary of the conclusion is impossible in the case of 
demonstration, it appears at least on this initial analysis, that there is a compelling case for 
going along with Stove's view that 
to suppose that Hume used 'demonsfrative argument' in this sense [equivalent to 'deductively 
valid'] would be to impute to him an error unbelievably gross and often repeated. For he would 
then be saying ... that there cannot be a valid argument which has a contingent conclusion] 
(Stove, 1973, p35-6, my emphasis) 
Stove, quite naturally, appears simply to assume that the unspecified 'something', the contrary 
of which Hume claims to be impossible in the case of'demonstration', is simply the conclusion. 
And our initial comparison with what would be needed to fill that space on an interpretation as 
'valid deduction' would appear to rule out that alternative as a construction too complex and 
abstract to be taken by Hume as being sufficiently obvious from the context as not even to need 
mention. 
However, with regard to this question of comparative simplicity of interpretation, this initial 
comparison is somewhat misleading, since the relatively complex construction ~(A&~C) can be 
significantly simplified, and furthermore, what it reduces to is not such an implausible candidate 
for the space-filler in this context after all. ~{A&~C) is of course equivalent to the material 
conditional A->C (I f A then C).^ "* In order to appreciate the significance of this in the context, 
we may note that Hume thinks of a 'chain of reasoning' as a sequence of suitably related 
propositions, whereby the relations between directly inferred propositions are apparent either 
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from experience or (in the case of relations of ideas associated with demonstration) by intuition, 
so that by following the chain of individually apparent connections it becomes clear that there is 
a satisfactory, i f relatively complex, inferential connection between the first and last proposition 
in the sequence. Owen rightly emphasises this general clarificatory function with regard to the 
case of demonstration, describing the latter as a 'process whereby we become aware that one 
idea stands in a relation to another' (2000, p91). But he fails to make it quite clear exactly what 
relation must hold in general between the terminal propositions in the context of apropositional 
proof that something is the case (whether demonstrative or otherwise). With regard to the 
demonstrative case, Owen simply says 
If the two ideas that stand in this indirect, demonstrative relation are themselves propositional, 
we will have a demonstrative inference from one proposition to another. (Owen, 2000, p91 
my emphasis) 
But what exactly is this 'from ... to' relation that is supposed to hold between the terminal 
propositions in the general context of a proof? In order to argue satisfactorily from a 
satisfactorily evident or otherwise uncontested proposition A to a categorical conclusion C 
initially under question, what must thereby be made satisfactorily evident^\ is that since A is the 
case, so is C - or more specifically (since A is already evident or granted)^^ //, A is the case, 
then so is C. Thus the crucial relation that ultimately needs to be shown to hold between the 
terminal propositions - in the case of demonstration as well as in any other kind of proof - is 
that //the initial proposition is true then the conclusive proposition wil l also be true." In other 
words the ultimate relation that needs to be established as holding between terminal 
propositions in the case of a demonstration is that of the respective conditional. 
For some ordered pairs of propositions the connecting conditional may be immediately apparent 
either from logical intuition ( i f the connection is logical) or from direct observation. In such 
cases there will be no need to explain how the two propositions are connected in the course of 
the argument - the implication wil l be immediately obvious, and the one may be directly 
inferred from the other. In other cases however the connection may not be immediately 
apparent, and in such cases a 'medium' or intermediate proposition (or sequences of 
That the material conditional A-»C is equivalent to ~(A&~C) is straightforwardly evident from the 
truth table for the material conditional, where A—»C is false i f f A is true and C is false (i.e. i ff A&~C) and 
hence it is true i f f it is not the case that A&~C. 
" In this case, sufficiently evident to warrant categorical assertion. 
I take it that 'Since A, C implies A in addition to if A then C. 
This will be the case even when independent assumptions are added in the course of the proof, although 
A—»C will in such cases be dependent on those additional assumptions, and consideration of that 
additional information in such an argument will be instrumental in making it evident that A— 
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propositions) needs to be provided which clarifies the link (or chain of links) between the initial 
proposition and the conclusion. 
In the case in question (above. Enquiry 4.2.5.) Hume leads up to the point with the observation 
that 
The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which 
may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and 
argument. {Enquiry, 4.2. para. 3) 
And it is precisely in context of the question of 'What that medium is' that the above reference 
to demonstrative arguments arises. Now i f I am right in suggesting that the medium is 
essentially a (satisfactorily evident) proposition (or a sequence of propositions) 'connecting' the 
two terminal propositions A and B, on consideration of which it becomes evident that if A then 
B, perhaps it might not be out of the question to suppose that the unmentioned object in Hume's 
statement about demonstration is actually supposed to be understood as this purported 
connection between A and B - or at least the required logical connection, which is basically that 
if A is the case then so is B. But i f this conditional were the unspecified 'something' the 
contrary of which is impossible in the case of demonstration, then, according to our analysis 
above, Hume's notion of'demonstration' as (partially) described here could after all be 
equivalent to 'deductively valid proof. 
Moreover, i f we examine carefully the context of the above account of demonstration in the 
Abstract, we find that, even in the same paragraph, Hume appears to suppose that i f there were a 
satisfactory relation of ideas between the terminal propositions in an experientially barren 
inductive inference, then we would have a case of demonstration: 
Here is a billiard-ball lying on the table, and another ball moving towards it with rapidity. They 
strike; and the ball, which was formerly at rest, now acquires a motion. [...] And when I try the 
experiment with the same or like balls, in the same or like circumstances, 1 find that upon the 
motion and touch of the one ball, motion always follows in the other. [...] 
This is the case when both cause and effect are present to the senses. Let us now see upon 
what our inference is founded, when we conclude from the one that the other has existed or will 
exist. Suppose I see a ball moving in a sfraight line towards another, I immediately conclude, 
that they will shock, and that the second will be in motion. [...] 
Were a man, such as Adam, created in the full vigour of understanding, without [prior] 
experience, he would never be able to infer motion in the second ball from the motion and 
impulse of the first. It is not anything that reason sees in the cause, which makes us infer the 
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effect. Such an inference, were it possible, would amount to a demonstration, as being founded 
merely on the comparison of ideas. (Hume Abstract, paras. 9-11, my clarificatory 
parenthesis) 
Hume's point here is that i f we imagine someone, in a position of having no relevant 
background experience, observing for the first time one billiard ball strike another, that person 
would be unable to predict,^o/w the fact that the first ball strikes the second, that the second 
wi l l begin to move. There is no suggestion here that the conclusion, i f it is drawn wil l be drawn 
without the initial (observational) information that the first ball strikes the second (hence my 
clarificatory parenthesis in the quote). The point concerns an inference from an (isolated) piece 
of observational information. So when Hume says here that 'the inference' would be 'founded 
merely on the comparison of ideas', he does not intend that to be interpreted as implying that 
there would be no observational premises: what he means is that the connection between the 
observational premise and the conclusion would be founded merely on the comparison of ideas. 
Likewise, when he goes on to say 
But no inference from cause to effect amounts to a demonstration. Of which there is this evident 
proof. The mind can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed any event 
to follow upon another: Whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: But 
whenever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction. 
There is no demonstration therefore for any conjunction of cause and effect. (Hume Abstract, 
para. 11) 
it is (or certainly should be) quite clear that Hume's point is not that such an inference must fail 
to be a demonsfration simply because there is no contradiction in supposing that ball 1 did not 
strike ball 2 at t| - in other words because the premise is not a necessary truth - which on 
Stove's account of Hume's view would be sufficient for an argument to fail to be a 
demonstration."*^ Nor is the point that it must fail to be a demonstration simply because there is 
no contradiction in supposing merely that ball 2 will not be in motion at ii, i e. because the 
conclusion is not a necessary truth. Hume's point here is surely that such an inference must fail 
to be a demonstration because it is possible that ball 2 be struck by ball 1 and not begin to 
move. In this case, the mystery item the contrary of which Hume claims here is not impossible 
(in other words possible) is the negation of the latter, and this interpretation conforms with our 
earlier hypothesis that the mystery item in Hume's account of demonstration might be the 
connecting conditional. To clarify this, it is apparent from the text here that what Hume is in 
38 I 
Hume meant by 'demonstrative argument' a '(valid) argument/rom necessarily true premises' ' 
(Stove, 1973, p35. Stove's emphasis). 
54 
fact claiming at this point is that it is not impossible that ball 2 is struck by ball I and ball 2 does 
not begin to move. In symbols, and applying double negation to the clause in brackets, this 
claim is equivalent to 
~0 ~~(A&~C) 
where A is the observational premise - that ball I strikes ball 2 (at ti), and C is the prediction or 
conclusion - that ball 2 will be in motion at t2. On this analysis of Hume's claim, the unstated 
item, the contrary of which Hume claims is not impossible in a demonstration is in this case 
equivalent to ~(A&~C) - which, as we have noted above, is logically equivalent to the material 
conditional A ^ C . Thus in this central example, despite the potentially misleading blanks in 
Hume's expression of the point, and despite Stove's dismissal of the possibility, it appears - at 
least in this particular instance, that Hume is in fact using the phrase 'demonstrative' in a sense 
that is compatible with the conclusion, and indeed the premises, being synthetic propositions (as 
they clearly are in this case). The point Hume is stressing, when he says that the inference in 
this case cannot be a demonstration because 'the contrary' does not imply a contradiction, does 
after all appear to be simply the point that this inference is not deductively valid, since close 
analysis reveals that it is the contrary of the connecting conditional (i.e. i f the stated premise(s) 
then the conclusion, or its logical equivalent) which Hume claims does not imply a 
contradiction - and that is just what would be required for an argument to be deductively valid. 
The trouble though is that this interpretation of Hume's concept of demonstration does not seem 
to be compatible with some other statements he makes about demonstration. In other cases it 
appears to be quite clear that Hume thinks that the contrary of the conclusion must be 
inconceivable in the case of a demonstration. For example, just a little further on in the same 
passage of the Abstract, Hume adds 
When a demonstration convinces me of any proposition, it not only makes me conceive the 
proposition, but also makes me sensible, that 'tis impossible to conceive any thing contrary. 
(Hume ^i!>5/rac/, para. 18) 
This would appear to suggest that the proposition that is supposed to be a necessary truth in the 
case of a demonstrative argument is that proposition the truth of which the argument is 
supposed to convince the audience - which we would naturally interpret as a reference to the 
conclusion. Consideration of this in conjunction with the previous example might incline us to 
suppose that Hume was somewhat ambiguous in this respect, sometimes using the term in the 
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one sense, and sometimes in the other. However this reference need not be interpreted in such 
an uncharitable manner, i f we bear in mind Hume's understanding of the primary function of 
argument as clarifying the connection between one proposition and another - the connection 
needs to be seen before and in order that the conclusion may be seen to be true (or acceptable). 
Since the connection in a propositional argument wil l itself take the form of a proposition, the 
primary function of a demonstration is to convince the audience of the connecting proposition. 
In view of this, this reference is quite compatible with the interpretation we have found to be 
appropriate in the details of the initial example. 
Although Owen is right to point out that, on account of the requirement of making the 
connection apparent, it would strictly be a mistake to suppose that 'any deductively valid 
argument with necessarily true premises is a demonstration' (p90) as Stove suggests, Owen is 
nevertheless wrong to suggest more strongly that 'any account of Hume's notion of 
demonstration that includes the notion of 'deductively valid' ... is ... anachronistic', since any 
argument with a premise P, a conclusion C, and a connecting conditional ' I f P then C whose 
negation implies a contradiction must be a deductively valid argument. However, it is also 
notable that it is not necessary for a connecting conditional (that is understood to be a premise 
of the argument) to be a logical truth (i.e. for its negation to imply a contradiction) in order for 
an argument to be deductively valid. So what Hume is arguing here is nevertheless not that our 
inductive inferences are not deductively valid, but merely that i f there is any satisfactory 
connection between our observational evidence and our predictions, it is not a logical truth. So, 
Hume argues, i f any satisfactory connection can be established by reason to be true, it must be 
established by the evidence of experience. 
Hume's analysis of inductive inference 
In addition to the problems outlined above with regard to Hume's concept of demonstration, we 
may note that Howson's interpretation of Hume's claim as implying a denial of the possibility 
of deductive induction is not in any case particularly plausible, since such a denial does not even 
seem to be a valid implication of the quotation. Even granted that, as Hume claims, it is 
logically consistent to suppose that the course of the universe may change, and moreover that it 
may do so in precisely those respects that we take to be relevant to our predictions, it does not 
appear to follow from that that we cannot construct a valid deductive argument to a conclusion 
about something we have not observed, on the basis of what we have observed. A simple and 
indeed quite plausible line of objection to the suggestion that we cannot would be the 
consideration that, in the context of our actual inferences from what we observe to what we do 
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not, our observational premises might well be supplemented hy further operative assumptions"*' 
which exceed the content of our observations. 
As a purely logical point this possibility is of course quite obvious, and the natural response by 
those who take the anti-deductivist position is that what they mean, when they say that it is not 
possible to argue deductively from what we have observed to what we have not, is simply that it 
is not possible to do so without any further assumptions. That of course is a point that no-one 
would want to deny, and on which Hume himself would undoubtedly agree: 
Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, ... proves not, that for 
the future, it will continue so. (Enquiry 4.2.8. my emphasis)'"' 
The important question though, with regard to Hume's view of the problem of induction, is how 
this point relates to Hume's understanding of the actual structure of inductive inference, and to 
the problem Hume had for the justification of induction as he understood it. Did Hume think 
that our presumption of the veracity of our observations is the only basic assumption that we 
make when we make inductive inferences? 
It is my view that on a careful and unbiased examination of the relevant texts it would seem to 
be quite clear that he did not.'" At the centre of his main argument on this issue in the Treatise, 
Hume sets out quite explicitly, and in some detail, his view that inductive inference is based on 
a further presumption of the continuation of the (apparently) hitherto constant conjunctions of 
events that we regard as cause and effect: 
The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions 
of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because 'tis the only one, on 
which we can found a just inference from one object to another. The idea of cause and effect is 
By (operative) 'assumption', in the context of an inference, 1 mean a proposition that is believed to be 
true (by the person or persons making the inference), whose own justification is taken for granted, rather 
than established or clarified, in the course of the inference, and without which the conclusion of the 
inference would not be inferred. 
*° I do not intend to insist here that Hume is employing a sense of'prove' that implies deductive validity. 
We may interpret Hume's point here as the broader claim that past regularity in itself is insufficient for 
any form of proof that it will continue - deductively valid or otherwise. 
It is interesting to note that in recent tutorials 1 have had the opportunity to present exactly this question 
to a number of groups of first year students of epistestemology and philosophy of science, shortly after 
their first lectures on Hume. Without any prior input from myself, presented with copies of the relevant 
section of the Abstract, and invited to examine the text in pairs and consider whether or not Hume 
claimed that we assume that observed regularities will continue when we make inductive inferences 
(along with other related questions) - the students were practically unanimous in agreeing that he did -
and included this proposition as a premise in their sketches of an example of a Humean inductive 
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deriv'd from experience, which informs us, that such particular objects, in all past [observed] 
instances, have been constantly conjoin'd with each other: And as an object similar to one of 
these is suppos'd to be immediately present in its impression, we thence presume on the 
existence of one similar to its usual attendant. According to this account of things, which is, I 
think, in every point unquestionable, probability is founded on the presumption of a [continued] 
resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which we 
have had none {Treatise 1.3.6.7. latter emphasis mine) 
This crucial presumption is referred to repeatedly by Hume in the course of his discussions of 
inductive inference, and is referred to by a variety of abbreviations, not all of which make their 
essential relation to causal regularity patently clear. ''^  Unfortunately, it is with reference to one 
of the relatively opaque variations - 'that the course of nature will/must continue uniformly the 
same' {Abstract, paras. 13/14) - that this assumption has perhaps most commonly been dubbed 
by commentators - as the 'principle of the uniformity of nature'. However, 1 think the relevant 
supposition is best understood when it is interpreted in the context of Hume's emphases (a) on 
continuation of the ^constant conjunction' (of types of object encountered, in our experience, 
under certain conditions) associated with the concept of causation, as made explicit in his more 
detailed accounts of the relevant presumption in passages such the above - as the defining 
feature of the 'uniformity', or 'resemblance' referred to in the more opaque abbreviations, and 
(b) on the logical status of the supposition within the inference as a founding presumption, or 
what in more modem logical terms we would call an 'assumption'. In view of these emphases, 
a more appropriate name might be something like the assumption of causal continuity^^ 
Despite the opacity of most of his abbreviated expressions of the relevant presumption, the same 
emphases are also clearly present in the contexts of the relevant passages in the other documents 
in which these expressions occur. For example in the Abstract Hume stresses that: 
inference according to Hume's account. (I did of course alert them that to the point that was not the 
traditional interpretation). 
''^  I discuss three variations, and the question of their equivalence, in the context of my analysis of a 
potentially confiising passage in the Abstract, in the Appendix. 
There is also an element of variation in Hume's representation of the content of the presumption. The 
minimal version of the assumption is simply that the constant conjunction (in the cases we have 
observed) of the types of object, event, or property or whatever that we regard as causally related will be 
maintained in cases we have not observed. However, Hume sometimes presents a variation that also 
appears to imply that the conjunction of the respective objects is indeed causally necessitated. This 
variability is reflected for example in Hume's treatment of the non-modal 'wil l ' and the modal 'must' as 
interchangeable in the abbreviatory form, 'that the course of nature will/must continue uniformly the 
same' {Abstract, paras. 13/14). Of course the basic condition of continuity is sufficient for the purpose of 
prediction with regard to the unobserved, but it is not implausible to suppose that Hume is right in 
sujDposing that we make that presumption only when we think the observed constancy of succession is 
due to a causal link of some kind. (Hume does not explicitly address the possibility of a common cause 
as distinct from a direct causal link in the case of constant conjunction, but in either case it is supposed to 
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This is the inference from cause to effect; and of this nature are all our reasonings in the conduct 
of life: On this is founded all our belief in history ... {Abstract, para. 10, my emphasis) 
that all reasonings concerning cause and effect are founded on experience, and that all 
reasonings from experience are founded on the supposition, that the course of nature will 
continue uniformly the same.''^  {Abstract, para. 13, my emphasis, my interpretation in 
parenthesis) 
Essentially the same view of inductive inference is maintained in Hume's account in the 
Enquiry: 
We have said, that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and 
effect; ... and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future 
will be conformable to the past. {Enquiry 4.2. para. 6, my emphases and interpretation.) 
It seems clear then that Hume thinks that our inferences about the unobserved are based not 
merely on what we presume from our experience to be observed, but also, and crucially, on a 
supplementary presumption of the continuity of (apparent or supposed) causal regularities. 
On Hume's account of induction then it would seem that it is this additional assumption of 
causal continuity that controls the inferences we draw from our other basic assumption of the 
veracity of our supposed observations. In this case, it is not unreasonable to suppose that i f 
Hume were equipped with our modem conception of'deductive' inference, he would have no 
particular difficulty in acknowledging that on the basis of these assumptions, the conclusions we 
draw in respect of similar outcomes, unobserved at the point of inference, may in fact be validly 
drawn. Hume's problem for inductive inference then does not rely on any supposition that our 
inductive inferences are not, or cannot be, deductively valid. 
be causal necessitation that is responsible for the constant conjunction, albeit in the former case joint 
necessitation by some other, possibly unknown, factor.) 
Hume continues: 'We conclude, that like causes, in like circumstances, will always produce like 
effects.' {Abstract, para. 13, my emphasis). In the Appendix 1 defend my view that despite the misleading 
terminology Hume also regards this proposition as a founding assumption in the context of our inductive 
inferences, that in fact he regards it as equivalent to the immediately forementioned 'founding 
supposition', and that his use of the phrase 'we conclude' here is therefore indicative of nothing more 
than tautological implication. 
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Hume's view of the problem for the justification of induction 
I f this analysis is right, i f Hume's problem for the justification of induction is not essentially a 
problem about the validity of inductive inference, then what is it? From Hume's account it 
would appear that his problem for the Justification of inductive inference is rather simply that a 
crucial assumption that we make when we make inductive inferences, namely the assumption of 
causal continuity, cannot be rationally justified: 
'tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason ...We suppose, but are never able to 
prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, 
and those which lie beyond ['which we call cause or effect'] {Treatise 1.3.6.11. [ref: 
1.3.6.4.], my emphases) 
It is with regard to this assumption of inductive inference that Hume claims, in the Treatise'"', 
that no 'demonstrative' proof can be had: 
there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, ['which we call cause or 
effect'] of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience. 
{Treatise 1.3.6.5. [ref: 1.3.6.4.]) 
and Hume rightly argues that claim on the basis of the consistency of supposing that past 
regularities wil l not continue. Hume's point here is simply that this commonly presumed 
fundamental connection between the observed and the unobserved is not a logical truth. This is 
not equivalent to a claim that our inductive inferences cannot be deductively valid. Indeed, as 
we shall see in the following section, granted Hume's view of the structure of inductive 
inference, as founded on this assumption in conjunction with the assumption of the veracity of 
our perceptions, it would appear that inductive inferences so construed will in general be valid. 
Hume's problem for the justification also of course involves consideration of the possibility of a 
non-demonstrative proof of this presumption of continuity. Thus in the Abstract he goes on -
Nay, I will go further, and assert, that he could not so much as prove by any probable arguments, 
that the future must be conformable to the past. All probable arguments are built on the 
The precise context of interpretation is however different at the point in the Enquiry from where 
Howson takes his similar quotation. We shall examine Howson's line of argument at that point shortly. 
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supposition, that there is this conformity betwixt the future and the past, and therefore can never 
prove it. {Abstract, 14) 
Here Hume again makes it quite clear that he sees this as a fundamental presumption that we 
employ when we make inductive inferences - something that we simply assume or suppose to 
be the case - which we 'take for granted without any proof {Abstract 14). And of course the 
problem on Hume's account, with such inferences, is not that the inference to the conclusion of 
the inductive inference isn't what we would call 'valid' - however Hume might have chosen to 
phrase such a claim i f he did indeed think that something like that was the case and wanted to 
make it - but quite simply that this fundamental presumption cannot itself be proven. 
A Humean, deductively valid, model of inductive inference 
The general structure of inductive inference, on the basis of the above-described account 
offered by Hume, with only modest interpretive speculations, would appear to go along 
something like the following lines: 
(1) An instance a of the particular type ['species'] (of object, event, or property of an 
object) F has been observed, but we have not observed whether it has been (or wi l l be) 
succeeded by an instance of type G.'" 
(2) In all of the many ['frequent'] cases where we have observed whether an instance of F 
has been followed by an instance of G, they hcrve always been followed by instances of 
G, and our experience of these cases has been of a kind (sufficiently numerous, suitably 
varied, etc) that inclines us (reasonable, and scientifically-minded people) to regard 
their succession as due to causation. 
(3) Whenever all of the many observed instances of A (whose succession or otherwise by 
an instance of another type B has been confirmed by observation) have been succeeded 
by an instance of B (and our experience of these cases has been of a kind that inclines 
us to regard their succession as due to causation), any observed instance of A whose 
succession or otherwise by B has not been confirmed by observation will be succeeded 
Note that this entails the presumption of the veracity of our apparent observation (with respect to a) 
Similarly for (2). 
by an instance of B. [The (general)'' assumption of the continuity of (apparently) 
causal regularities] 
(4) Therefore, object a wil l be succeeded by an object of type G. 
Whether this or something like it, as Hume appears to have thought, is an authentic 
representation of our actual inferences from the observed to the unobserved is another matter. 
But it is apparent from the passages we have examined that at least the main features of the 
model outlined above would need to be incorporated in any reasonable construal of Hume's 
view of the basic structure of inductive inference:- As we have seen, the key point emphasised 
and maintained by Hume is that in addition to the basic observational assumptions, as 
represented in my (1) and (2), there is also a founding presumption (whether general or 
specifically relating to the types mentioned in (1) and (2)) that [certain] types of object hitherto 
(in our experience) 'constantly conjoined', and regarded as being so by virtue of causal 
necessitation, wil l continue to be so - a presumption that is, in the context of the inference 
'taken for granted', and in that respect accorded the status of an assumption - an assumption 
which I have attempted to represent schematically, and in its general form, in my (3). The 
conclusion of a Humean inductive inference is of course the prediction that the expected but 
unobserved 'effect' will in fact occur, as represented by my (4). 
What is particularly notable about this Humean model of the logical structure of inductive 
inference is that it is deductively valid even if, as Hume argued, no 'proof or satisfactory 
argument can be provided in support of the crucial assumption (3). To clarify the validity of 
this form of inference we may first note that the particular implication of the general assumption 
of causal continuity (3), that applies to the particular types of object mentioned in any particular 
instances of the other premises, may be expressed schematically in the conditional form: 
(3a) IfaW of the many observed instances of F for which succession or otherwise by an 
instance of G has been confirmed by observation ha\'e been succeeded by an 
instance of G (and our experience of these cases has been of a kind that inclines us 
to regard their succession as due to causation) then any instance of F whose 
The idea here is that to obtain an instance of this argument schema, that employs the general principle 
of continuity, F and G will be substimted by specific values such as 'a body of like colour and 
consistence with that of bread which has been eaten' and 'nourishment', while (3) will be read as a 
universal statement applying in the case of these values as well as any others. Of course, Hume also 
conceives of particular versions of this generalised assumption. The schematic account of the particular 
version may be represented by the corresponding conditional, and is presented in (3a) below. 
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succession or otherwise by G has not been confirmed by observation wil l be 
succeeded by an instance of G. 
Since the antecedent of this conditional is equivalent to premise (2), the consequent 
any instance of F whose succession or otherwise by G has not been confirmed by 
observation will be succeeded by an instance of G 
follows (from (2) and (3a) by modus ponens). And from this in conjunction with premise (1) 
the conclusion (4) follows by universal elimination. 
The ontic status of the principle of continuity 
(3) does look somewhat odd once we spell out the pertinent details as 1 have in the above. In 
particular it looks odd because, once we are quite clear about what it implies, it doesn't look 
quite so innocuous as it appears (at least on the surface) in its abbreviated forms - 'the course of 
nature will continue uniformly the same', 'the future wi l l resemble the past', 'like causes wil l 
always produce like effects', and so on.'" In fact we know that sometimes such apparently 
causal constant conjunctions in our past experience are followed by exceptions. In other words 
we know that as it stands, this general assumption is sfrictly (and relatively obviously) false. 
The temptation of course is to interpret the principle in a more charitable manner, and the 
natural and simple amendment in this respect would be to rephrase the principle in epistemic 
terms - basically by adding some appropriate epistemic qualifier to the consequent, thus '// is 
reasonable to believe that any observed instance of A whose succession or otherwise by B has 
not been confirmed by observation will be succeeded by an instance of B. Furthermore, such an 
epistemic interpretation might appear to be suggested by Hume's own description of the 
situation in a particular instance, in the case of the nourishing powers of bread: 
If a body of like colour and consistence with that of bread, which we have formerly eaten [and 
by which we have always been nourished] be presented to us, we ... foresee, with certainty, like 
nourishment and support. {Enquiry 4.2.3., my emphasis). 
Now such an interpretation of the principle of continuity would be particularly appealing to me 
from a theoretical point of view, since I ultimately want to argue that our inductive inferences 
and arguments generally need to be represented in Just such epistemic terms. And it would be 
particularly helpful to my case i f I could find support for this further point about the logic of 
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induction in the arguments of Hume. However, I do not think the textual evidence conceming 
Hume's perception of the ontic-or-epistemic status of the principle supports such an 
interpretation. What is clear about the above-cited passage is that it is an account of Hume's 
view of the psychological situation when we engage in such inferences. But it does not appear 
to be intended to be read as a description of an instance of the presumed principle itself. Rather 
it simply appears to be, as it reads, a psychological account of the inference. When we look at 
the logical form of his unequicocal descriptions of the principle - 'the course of nature will 
continue uniformly the same', 'the future wil l resemble the past', 'like causes wil l always 
produce like effects', and so on - they appear in general to be straightforwardly ontic 
propositions. They are not, in any case, presented as epistemic propositions. 
Of course in the end Hume wants to argue that arguments based on this principle won't 
satisfactorily account for our confidence in their conclusions, since we cannot provide any 
justification for the principle. And in order then to account for our confidence he appeals 
instead to psychological 'principles of union among ideas' {Treatise 1.3.6.13.). But the two 
should not be conflated. In Hume's view then it would appear that (what we might call) the 
logical principle of continuity on which our arguments are based - that hitherto constant 
conjunctions in our experience will continue - is an ontic assumption. And this needs to be 
distinguished from the psychological principle - that we habitually presume that long standing 
conjunctions in our experience will be continued. 
A tempting response to Hume's view of induction, and Hume's rebuttal of it. 
As Hume acknowledges, and discusses at some length in the Enquiry, we might like to think 
that the cmcial presumption (3) (or some variant of it) 'may justly be inferred' from its 
observational antecedent (2), and indeed one of Hume's own comments in this respect might by 
some interpreters be regarded as supporting Owen's suggestion that Hume's problem of 
induction leaves open the question of justification: 
I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that 
other objects, which are in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall 
I am grateful to Jonathan Lowe for alerting me to the need to attend to this difficulty with my construal. 
This mirrors Hume's comments on other alternative proposals about the logical structure of inductive 
inference discussed and dismissed in the Treatise: 'Should anyone think to elude this argument; and ... 
pretend that all conclusions from causes and effects are built on solid reasoning: 1 can only desire that 
this reasoning may be produc'd, in order to be exposed to our examination.' {Treatise 1.3.6.8.) 
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allow if you please that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other. {Enquiry 
4.2.3.) 
However, close attention to the context confirms that this may most appropriately be 
interpreted, as indeed it appears to be phrased, as a 'for the sake of the argument' hypothetical 
concession relating specifically to the sake of the (broader) argument about the explanation of 
our inductive inferences, rather than a genuine concession on the (hereby momentarily set aside) 
issue of justifiability, as is illustrated by the continuation of his point: 
But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that 
reasoning. ... and it is incumbent on those to produce it who assert that it really exists. 
(Enquiry 4.2.3. my emphasis)^' 
In other words what Hume appears to be saying here is something like this: Let us set aside for 
the moment the question of whether our inductive inferences may somehow be justified. 
Suppose for the sake argument there is some justification for such an inference. Nevertheless 
the problem for the traditional explanatory view that we proceed in our inductive inference by 
reasoning remains: I f we did proceed by reasoning we should then be able to provide a 
satisfactory account of how our inductive inferences are justified, i.e. by what process of 
reasoning we do in fact justify the conclusion. 
In contrast Hume genuinely concedes merely that we make such inferences (whether or not 
justly) 
1 know in fact that it always is inferred (Enquiry 4.2.3., my emphasis) 
But what Hume means by this, in line with his earlier account of'inference' as a 'transition', is 
simply that the learning of the first proposition somehow causes, is followed by, or results in, an 
associated 'belief of the second. The process by which this transition takes place might or 
might not involve a process of reasoning or rational justification. Hume's view on this, as 
detailed above is that although the learning of the first proposition somehow causes or 'induces' 
us to believe the second, it does so only via a presupposition of continuity which is 'taken for 
granted' without justification in the context of the inference - and which is thereby properly 
represented within the logical structure of the inference as an assumption. 
What Hume does not mean by this, is that the inference is, or may justly be, drawn without 
association with any supplementary factors. In fact he goes on to insist that 
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There is required a medium [a 'connexion between these propositions'] which may enable the 
mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it is drawn by reasoning and argument. {Enquiry 
4.2.3., my emphasis) 
Such a connecting reason or 'medium' would consist in an additional intermediate belief which, 
in association with the initial proposition, provides us with a satisfactory reason for believing 
the second. 
The trouble that Hume finds with such a theory though is that, as he has already argued, there is 
no logically true proposition that will facilitate such an inference, and any inference to a 
proposition beyond the logical implications of our observational information must be founded 
on an assumption of causal continuity. 
You say that the one proposition is an inference from the other.^ " But you confess that the 
inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative: Of what nature is it then? To say it is 
experimental, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their 
foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with 
similar sensible qualities. {Enquiry 4.2.8. my emphasis) 
Once again Hume here reasserts his central claim (italicised) that causal continuity is in fact an 
indispensable and fundamental assumption of any inductive inference. The clear implication is 
that as such it is not (and could not be) supported by any independent (non-circular) 
justification 
It is in the context of this defence against the suggestion that things might be otherwise - that 
perhaps, on the contrary, we ca« justify the principle of continuity - that we find the quotation 
presented by Howson (2000, plO, as above): 
That there are no demonstrative arguments in this case seems evident; since it implies no 
contradiction that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those we 
have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. (Enquiry 4.2.5.) 
" The two propositions actually mentioned at this point {Enquiry 4.2.8.) are slight variations on the 
original propositions mentioned (above) at Enquiry 4.2.3. These later variations (4.2.8.) are ' I have 
found, in all past instances, such sensible qualities conjoined with such secret powers' and 'similar 
sensible qualities will always be conjoined with similar secret powers'. In each case I think that the 
representative expressions employed in the prose may reasonably be construed to encode something like 
the underlying logical structure and relations indicated by my (2) and (3). 
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As we noted at the outset, Howson (along with many others) appears to take this quotation to 
support the view, and moreover an attribution to Hume of the view, that our inductive 
inferences (as these were understood by Hume) cannot be deductively valid. But i f our analysis 
of the context of the quotation is correct, both that view, and the attribution of it to Hume, are a 
mistake. The assumptions that constitute the logical foundations of our inductive inferences, 
which according to Hume include a presumption of the principle of continuity as well as the 
content of our relevant observations, do in fact yield a valid argument for the predictive 
conclusions of those inferences. Hume does not raise any objection against that. He does not 
even raise that issue in the context of his discussion. What Hume has a problem with is the 
justifiability of our (alleged) assumption that the regularities we observe will continue. The 
point of the above quotation is simply to set out the straightforward point that this assumption 
cannot be justified on the basis of any proof that it is a logical truth - or in Hume's terms that it 
can be justified by a 'demonstrative' argument. 
As we noted earlier there is a related but crucially different point that Hume does hold - which 
is the obvious point that the premise, (roughly) that two types of object have hitherto been 
frequently and constantly conjoined, does not, on its own, imply that such hitherto conjoined 
types of object wi l l continue to be so conjoined. 
Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, ... proves not, that for 
the future, it will continue so. (Enquiry 4.2.8. my emphasis) 
But Hume here merely takes that to be part of the case for his rejection of the suggested 
response to his central claim - i.e. the claim that no justification can be had for the fundamental 
assumption of continuity on which all our inductive inferences depend. As Hume claims here, 
past experience alone is insufficient to prove the continuity principle, and as he has already 
argued, considerations of logical possibility don't prove it, and it cannot be proven by invoking 
the principle itself, as that would obviously beg the question. What proof then, Hume asks, 
could there possibly be? 
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Stove's response to Hume: Logical probabilities 
In view of this conclusion it would seem that Stove is mistaken when he attributes to Hume 
what he calls a 'Deductivist thesis' that 
all [deductively] invalid arguments are unreasonable (Stove, 1973, p50) 
Whether or not Hume might have been inclined to agree this thesis, it is an issue he does not 
address and on which he does not comment. 
HoweverStove ultimately interprets this thesis in terms of a concept of logical probability. 
My identification of [Hume's] argument [for inductive scepticism] (and in consequence my 
evaluation of it) involves the identification of Hume's sceptical conclusion, as well as some of 
his premises, as htmg statements of logical probability. (Stove 1973, p 1, Stove's emphasis) 
as the thesis that 'For all [deductively] invalid arguments from e to h, P(h/e&t) = P(h/t)' (where 
t is a tautology). He then goes on to employ an argument attributed to Von Thun to show that 
this does not hold when h implies e, and so concludes that this so-called 'Deductivist thesis'^ ^ is 
not true. 
Stove at first makes his account of logical probability sound innocuous: 
A statement of logical probability is made when and only when we assess the probability of one 
proposition in relation to another proposition, which picks out possible evidence for or against 
the first. (Stove, 1973, p7, my emphasis) 
However, despite the explicit biconditional, it would seem Stove is not content to settle with this 
relatively innocuous account and adds a further and highly contentious condition on what, on 
his interpretation of the term (following the tradition of Camap and Keynes), is to count as a 
statement of logical probability. Stove insists further that what determines the truth or falsity of 
a statement of logical probability, as such, is a particular kind of relation between the hypothesis 
and evidence statement. Specifically, he thinks that it is (what on a natural interpretation of his 
account amounts to) a semantic relation between the two propositions that determines the truth 
This equation is equivalent to an assumption of independence of h from e, and so in the context of a 
logical theory of probability will amount to an assumption that h is logically probabilistically independent 
of e. Typically deductivists will not even acknowledge a viable concept of logical probability, let alone 
define their own position in terms of such probabilities. 
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or falsity of the 'evidential' relation that is asserted when a proposition of logical probability is 
asserted: 
That relation is fully fixed once the content of each primary proposition is fixed; and what those 
contents are, is not a question of fact, but a question of meaning. (Stove 1973, p8, my 
emphasis) 
With these assertions 1 think everyone would agree (Stove 1973, p9) 
However Stove does not seem to realise that the logical theory of probability, even at his time of 
writing, was largely regarded as discredited: 
as a there seems at present little hope of successfiilly rehabilitating the Principle of Indifference 
logical principle. ... Altogether the difficulties in the logical interpretation had, by the 1920s 
reached such a level that the Bayesians really needed a new interpretation of probability 
(Gillies, 2000, p49) 
As we have seen, Hume's understanding of the then prevalent concept of probability looks a lot 
like the classical theory, so it is not entirely inconceivable that his comments on its significance 
in the context of probabilistic induction may have been intended in the closely related logical or 
semantic sense.'^  But in any case, even i f we do interpret his concept of probability in this 
sense, what Hume says about probabilistic inference does not appear to be anything like what 
Stove suggests he claims. 
There are two main aspects to the logical theory of probability, when it is taken to have any 
epistemic implications. The basic (logical) aspect is the analysis of the respective logical 
possibilities logically permitted by the evidence. The crucial epistemic aspect is the assignment 
of epistemic probabilities (degrees of belief or expectation) to the respective possibilities, 
generally in accord with some form of principle of indifference. This principle, in such 
epistemic application, tells us that i f there is no known reason for expecting one possibility 
more than another of several alternatives, then each of these possibilities should be regarded 
with equal expectation." But Hume's argument against such an approach is basically that the 
partition of the logical possibilities provides us with no rational basis for any such assignments 
of epistemic probabilities. For Hume we have a matter of chance when causation does not 
' For a comparison of the two theories see Gillies (2000, chs 1 and 2) 
c.f Gillies (2000, p35). 
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determine the matter, and there are various possibilities. Thus Hume emphasises that the 
question in hand is 
by what means a superior number of equal chances [or possibilities] operates upon the mind, and 
pronounces belief or assent {Treatise, 1.3.11.8, my emphasis) 
In this case, Hume's point is that not only do we never have any (non-question-begging) 
reasons for expecting one of the possibilities more than another (as is required for application of 
the principle of indifference) but nor do we ever have any non-question-begging reason for 
regarding all such possibilities with equal expectation (as the principle would then have us 
suppose). 
Conclusion 
Following the thread of Hume's analysis of inductive inference through the Treatise, the 
Abstract, and the Enquiry, we have seen that Hume insists throughout that the supposition of 
causal continuity is an indispensable and founding assumption of our inductive inferences. On 
this, Hume's, understanding of the logical structure of inductive inference, the justificatory 
problem for inductive inference is not that our inductive inferences are not or cannot be 
deductively valid. In stark contrast, on Hume's account of their logical structure, it would seem 
that in fact our inductive inferences are deductively valid. The Justificatory problem, as Hume 
sees it, is precisely that this is an indispensable assumption, and unfortunately one for which we 
are unable to present any non-question-begging justification, and for which, it would seem, 
none could possibly be provided.^^ Hume finds basically the same problem for probabilistic 
inductive inference as he does for causal inference, in that no non-question-begging argument 
This is to be distinguished from the Stove/Mackie view that Hume believes that the only authentic form 
of justification is deductively valid argument, and for that reason our inductive inferences must be 
deductively valid if they are to be justified. On that view, the justificatory problem that Hume is 
supposed to find for inductive inference is (in accordance with the common but mistaken account of 
Hume's view of the structure of induction that we have exposed) that inductive inference is not 
deductively valid (and therefore, on the Stove/Mackie premise, cannot be justified). In contrast we have 
seen that on Hume's view of the logical structure of inductive inference it is in fact deductively valid, and 
there is no reason to suppose that Hume would not have acknowledged that. 
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can be provided in support of the assignment of probabilistic expectations to the various logical 
possibilities permitted by the evidence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
WAS HUME RIGHT ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF INDUCTIVE INFERENCE? 
The main aim of my analysis of Hume's problem was to establish that, according to this 
classical account of (causal) induction, it would be a mistake to identify inductive inference 
with 'non-deductive' inference, or any particular type of non-deductive inference, and to clarify 
the point that Hume at least perceived the problem of induction as an issue concerning the 
ultimate justification of the presumptions underlying our inductive inferences, rather than any 
problem with their validity as such. We have established this much in our analysis thus far. 
However, despite the unquestionable importance of Hume on the issue of induction, we cannot 
take this to be the end of the story with regard to the issue of the logical adequacy of induction. 
One question we need to consider is whether Hume was (at least roughly) right about the basic 
structure of inductive inference and arguments. And although it is not my intention to attempt 
to address the epistemological issue of the justification for the basic assumptions and prior 
expectations we employ in induction (as distinct from the validity of the inferences granted 
those assumptions), it would be inappropriate to proceed without placing this issue in the 
context of some comment on the question of whether Hume might be mistaken in his view that 
we do in fact make such assumptions. 
In a recent article Samir Okasha (2001, p307) argues that Hume is mistaken in this regard, and 
although Okasha does not present any detailed interpretive analysis of Hume's text, his outline 
of the basic elements of the argument, as he understands it (p312) is in close agreement with 
that defended in my own justified analysis above. Although Okasha bases his analysis on the 
version in the Enquiry it is notable that his summary of the argument also appears to provide a 
good match with our analysis of the version of it which Hume presents in the Treatise^^ 
Hume's sceptical argument can ... be broken down as follows: 
1. Arguments from past experience, or 'probable arguments' proceed upon the supposition that 
nature is uniform*" 
in my (3) - (4), figure 1 summarising Hume's argument in the Treatise above, I have also presented 
some of Hume's background considerations underlying Okasha's (1) (my (5). 
Okasha makes it clear that he is using the phrase 'nature is uniform' to abbreviate the claim that Hume 
himself abbreviates (with a variety of expressions) after initial elaboration in the context of both the 
Treatise and the Enquiry, and which relates to the continuation of past regularities that we expect: 'The 
description is simple: we observe past regularities, and project them into the future. [Hume] expresses 
this by saying that all our experimental reasoning 'proceeds upon the supposition' that nature is uniform' 
(Okasha, 2001, p312). This phrase is clearly related to the second part of the clause as quoted in my (1) 
in figure 1. 
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2. Unless we have reason to believe that nature really is uniform, we have no reason to believe the 
conclusions of arguments from past experience 
3. The proposition 'Nature is uniform' cannot be established by demonstrative argument, as its 
negation is not self-contradictory 
4. The proposition 'Nature is uniform' cannot be established by probable argument, as we only 
have reason to believe the conclusions of probable arguments if we already have reason to 
believe that nature is uniform, as (2) says 
5. If a proposition cannot be established by either demonstrative or probable argument, then we 
have no reason to believe it 
6. So we have no reason to believe that nature is uniform [from (3)-{5)] 
7. So we have no reason to believe the conclusions of probable arguments [from (6) and (2)], i.e., 
past experience gives us no reason to believe anything about the future 
(Okasha,2001,p312) 
In particular it is notable that Okasha, in contrast to Howson (2000) appears (at least at this 
initial point of interpretation) to acknowledge that Hume's problem is essentially a problem 
concerning the justification for the presumption of continuity (or 'uniformity') that Hume insists 
we employ in inductive inference (rather than suggesting it is a problem with the validity of the 
inference as, we have seen, many authors do). Okasha then attempts to rebut Hume's argument 
for his sceptical conclusion by denying Hume's basic premise that inductive inferences 'proceed 
on the supposition that nature is uniform'. He claims in contrast that we might proceed by 
Bayesian conditionalisation rather than by any question-begging presumption of regularity 
continuity, or by any associated 'inductive rules' that might be taken to reflect such substantive 
presuppositions. Furthermore, Okasha concludes that on such a view of inductive 'inference' 
Hume's charge of begging the question would not apply. This conclusion stands in stark 
contrast to that of Howson's detailed discussion of Hume's problem, from a Bayesian point of 
view, that 
no theory of rationality that is not entirely question-begging can tell us what it is rational to 
believe about the ftiture, whether based on what the past has displayed or not. ... what 
[evidence] does tell us cannot be unmixed from what we are inclined to let it tell us. ... Hume 
was right. (Howson, 2000, p239-40, my emphases) 
While it is not my intention to discuss the various response that have been made to Hume's 
problem, I think it is worth giving some consideration to this particular line of response, 
particularly in view of the current popularity of Bayesian theory of probability, in order to 
provide some support for my agreement with Howson that Hume's broader problem for 
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inductive inference in general applies just as well to the view that we proceed in our inductive 
predictions by Bayesian conditionalisation. 
Okasha notes that it is generally acknowledged that Hume's account of our inductive practice -
of the presumption of the 'uniformity of nature' - is a considerable simplification ((b), p308), 
but that it is also commonly supposed that the basic line of argument does not depend on the 
finer details of that matter ((d), p310). He also notes that there are two fundamentally different 
views of the nature of our inductive practice. One is the view that we do employ some rules or 
'principles' in our inductive inferences, which may be regarded as equivalent (or at least 
correspond) to an empirical assumption which says 'The world is such that the rule of inference 
is truth conducive' (p314). Another is the view that we don't employ any such rules of 
inference at all. Okasha suggests that updating one's beliefs in the light of incoming evidence 
on the basis of Bayesian conditionalisation does not involve a commitment to any such rules or 
associated empirical assumptions. The crucial difference according to Okasha is that 
a rule of inference is supposed to tell you what beliefs you should have, given your data, and the 
rule of conditionalisation does not do that (Okasha, 2001, p316) 
Given the correspondence of such rules of inference with empirical assumptions, Okasha argues 
that whether or not Hume's problem would survive the correction of his account of our 
inductive practice would depend on whether we do employ such (I suggest we call them) 
'substantive' rules of inference (or their associated empirical assumptions). His basic argument 
goes as follows: 
Hume argued that the reasonableness of our opinions about the unobserved is conditional on an 
empirical assumption for which we have no non-circular justification. ... Hume's inductive 
scepticism would be quite right, if we did use rules of inductive inference [that correspond to 
empirical assumptions]. But if we do not, then a Humean sceptical argument will not go 
through. (Okasha, 2001, p320, my parenthesis) 
We shall examine his elaboration of the point shortly. Before proceeding though we may note 
that Okasha somewhat oversimplifies Hume's view of the empirical assumptions we employ 
when we engage in causal inference (which is the only part of Hume's broader argument that 
Okasha addresses) and completely ignores Hume's comments on the 'assumptions' we make 
when we engage in probabilistic inference. For the moment I shall leave aside Goodman's 
problem for Hume's alleged claim that we presume that regularities in general will continue, 
since this warrants a dedicated chapter. However, with regard to our current concern with the 
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exposifion of Hume's concept of induction and his problems or it, we should note here that it is 
by no means clear that Hume did intend to claim that we presume that all regularities will 
condnue. In fact it seems quite clear that he did not intend any such absurd suggestion. 
Hume's original description of the nature of causal inference in Treatise 1.3.6.2 may 
undoubtedly be interpreted as a description (whether or not simplified and recognised as such 
by Hume) of what takes place whenever we make causal inferences. But that does not imply 
that we make causal inferences whenever we make any observations that conform to Hume's 
(possibly simplified) description of certain observational conditions that hold whenever we 
make causal inferences. Furthermore, i f we suppose merely that Hume's account of those 
conditions is at least to some extent simplified and recognised as such by him, then he could not 
consistently also think that we make inductive inferences whenever those conditions hold. 
Add to this certain comments by Hume that appear to make it clear that he fully acknowledges 
that there is more to be said about the precise conditions under which we concede casual 
conclusions. In particular Hume makes a number of references to our 'experimental' 
conclusions, and makes his appreciation of the complexity of the conditions for projectibility 
quite clear: 
Nothing so like as eggs; yet no-one, on account of this appearing similarity, expects the same 
taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind 
that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. {Enquiry 4.2. para 
7) 
This would seem to place beyond reasonable doubt that Hume was fully aware that it is not 
merely the regularities that arise in our experience themselves that are relevant to causal 
inference, but the background conditions - notably, in the context of scientific investigation, 
controlled experimental conditions - under which those regularities are observed t\\ai are also 
relevant.*' In view of this it should be quite clear that Hume neither thought nor intended to 
suggest that all the regularities we experience are projected. 
One thing Okasha seems to fail to realise (going by his discussion of the 'popular opinion' (b) 
on p309) is that the suggestion that they are all projected was not an assumption of Hume's 
problem, and indeed that Hume's cavalier approach to the various and obviously simplistic 
It is for this reason that I insert the clause 'and our experience of these cases has been sufficient for us 
o regard their succession as due to causation' in my earlier account of the general principle of continuity 
(3) in my analysis of Hume's view of the logical structure of (causal) inductive argument 
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descriptions of the principle of continuity in the course of his presentation of the problem only 
serves to illustrate the point that Hume himself understood that the problem he was presenting 
was not dependant on the finer details of the projection conditions. In this particular respect 
Howson is more accurate in his interpretation than Okasha since he acknowledges that Hume 
intends merely that 
all inferences from past experience suppose as their foundation, that the future will resemble the 
past 
- in some way or other. (Howson, 2000, pi 1, my emphasis) 
and not in all respects. Okasha, seems to think that to say that would be 'to say nothing' since 
Nature ... cannot fail to be uniform in some respects if it is to be describable at all. (Okasha, 
2001, p309) 
But this is to fail to grasp the fundamental point of the 'uniformity' or (more to the point) 
'continuity' assumption. That nature has displayed some regularities or uniformities thus far is 
a condition that is necessary for nature to be describable. But the crucial feature of the 
continuity assumption is the implication that these regularities will continue to hold in the 
future. And, whichever regularities may be predicted to continue, that those particular 
regularities will continue is not a necessary condition for the fact that nature is describable. To 
illustrate the point, one of the implications of the continuity assumption is that the sun will 
continue to rise each day. But we are nevertheless perfectly able to describe the hypothesis that 
it will not rise tomorrow. 
Similarly, Okasha's purported counterexamples to Hume's claim that we proceed by a 
presumption of continuity illustrate the extent to which he has failed to grasp the considerable 
subtlety and relative modesty of Hume's actual assumptions in this regard. For example Okasha 
complains that 
AH of the Costa Ricans I have ever met are philosophers, but that does not lead me to believe 
that all Costa Rican's are philosophers, nor that the next Costa Rican I meet will be a 
philosopher. Expectation-formation takes place in the light of a vast store of information. 
(Okasha, 2001, p309, my emphasis) 
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But there is no reason to suppose that Hume would have intended that the limited kind of 
experience that underlies regularities such as this are of the kind that lead us to suppose that the 
regularity is the result of a casual connection. In fact there is every reason to suppose that he 
did not intend that regularities such as this are generally taken to be the result of causal 
connections. The above qualification relating to extensive experimental grounding {Enquiry 
4.2. para 7) makes that clear enough. 
Furthermore, Hume's problem does not depend, and is not supposed to be framed, on an 
individualist position with regard to what observational data is permissible in our inductive 
inferences. Hume makes no objection to the standard supposition that we share observational 
information. In this particular example then, in contrast to Okasha' suggestion, there is no need 
to appeal to 'a vast store of background information' to block the causal inference and 
associated universal projection (even i f it were a potential candidate for projection, which as we 
have noted above it is not). The only information to which we need appeal in order to block this 
universal projection is the common observation-based knowledge that some Costa Ricans are 
not philosophers. 
On the basis of this profound misunderstanding of Hume, Okasha goes on to argue as follows 
The inductive principle which [Hume] says we employ is one which we most certainly do not 
employ, as Goodman showed. We believe that some observed regularities will continue into the 
future, but not others. The first two premises of Hume's argument are therefore false. (Okasha, 
2001, p315) 
But all this shows is that Okasha has simply failed to realise that Hume did not deny that we 
believe that some regularities wi l l continue into the future, but not others, and furthermore that 
his argument does not depend on any such denial. Okasha has seriously misunderstood Hume's 
basic premise, and the point noted (and obvious enough without reference to Goodman) serves 
only to falsify an absurd claim (the claim that we believe that all observed regularities will 
continue into the future) which Hume did not make, and clearly enough did not intend. 
However Okasha also has a more serious contention to make. In genuine contradiction to 
Hume, Okasha wants to claim furthermore that some cases of causal prediction do 'not involve 
the extrapolation of a past regularity into the future' (p309, my emphasis). And he thinks that 
an example (which he attributes to Putnam) 'neatly illustrates' this: 
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Usually when you slam two small objects together, nothing in particular happens. However 
when you slam two high speed neutrons together, you get an atomic explosion. This is not a 
chance event: scientists predicted that it would happen. Their predicdon was entirely 'theory-
driven': it clearly did not involve the extrapolafion of a past regularity into the future, as per 
Hume's account. (Okasha, 2001, p309) 
But Okasha here appears to have failed to grasp Hume's preliminary clarifications in the 
Treatise of the depth of dependency of our causal predictions on assumptions of certain matters 
of continuity. To apply Hume's basic observations to this example, even the supposition that 
performing certain actions will result in two high speed neutrons 'slamming together' involves 
for example the presumption that the neutrons will continue to exist, and wil l remain in (an at 
least approximately continuous line of) motion throughout the 'slamming' process. Such 
background presumptions, explicitly acknowledged by Hume, are by no means 'entirely theory-
driven': Small objects in general tend to continue to exist when fired towards one another (at 
least up until the point of contact) and they also generally tend to follow a continuous line of 
motion (thereby ensuring that they collide i f the lines of motion converge on a single point in 
space-time). Likewise with regard to the outcome: Surely Okasha cannot expect us to believe, 
as he suggests, that scientists established their findings about atomic reactions entirely by 
hypothetical theory construction and without any employment of repeated trials of controlled 
experiments, as on Hume's account would be required. It is of course common knowledge that 
a great deal of repetitive experimental research went into the development of atomic theory. 
Particular rules 
Despite his former suggestion that to presume that some regularities wil l continue 'is to say 
nothing' (p309), it would seem that Okasha nevertheless wants to allow (what in fact Hume 
claims) that we believe, in advance, that some observed correlations between events wi l l 
continue to hold in the future (presumably since clearly we do). In defence of his position, then 
he needs to be able to maintain that a presupposition that any such particular regularities wil l 
continue does not amount to following a (substantive) rule of inference. (In fact what Okasha 
ultimately requires is even more basic and more obviously problematic than this - a point we 
shall follow up below. For the moment though let us consider his argument with respect to 
inductive rules.) On this point Okasha begins his argument as follows: 
If we believe that some observed correlations between properties will continue to hold in the 
future, that does not mean that we are using the inductive rule 'Infer that properties correlated in 
the past will be correlated in the future' (Okasha, 2001, p318) 
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A l l that this point shows of course is that a presumption of the continuation of some (particular) 
observed regularities does not correspond to the universal rule which says that all observed 
regularities should be projected, it does not show that such an assumption does not amount to 
following any rule. Okasha then proceeds to argue, via criticism of contrary suggestion by 
Jackson, that such a partial belief does not amount to 'following a rule' at all, and can be 
explained without any such implications, by reference to Bayesian conditionalisation. 
However, on Okasha's own account of the basic relation between substantive presumptions and 
rules of inference, the belief that some particular observed correlations wil l continue to hold in 
the future should be equivalent to the rule 'Infer that those particular (hitherto) correlated 
properties wil l be correlated in the future.', since it is an empirical assumption which 
In effect... says 'The world is such that the rule of inference is truth conducive'. (Okasha, 
2001, p314). 
Thus as far as Okasha's own account of this alleged relation is concerned, it would seem that 
such a presupposition is equivalent to following a rule of inference. 
However, Okasha has a conceptual point to make on the matter. Here he picks up on a turn of 
phrase employed by Jackson, and insists that 
talk of 'using a rule on occasion' stretches the concept of a rule beyond breaking point. One 
might just as well say that a heavy smoker obeys the rule 'Don't smoke' simply because he takes 
breaks between cigarettes. (Okasha, 2001, p318) 
But what Okasha fails to appreciate is that this is just a bad way of describing the use of a 
particular rule, since it is misleadingly phrased in terms that suggest occasional use of a 
universal rule. To illustrate the distinction, it is clear that a light smoker breaks the universal 
rule 'Don't smoke - at all'. But that doesn't mean he is not thereby obeying any smoke-
restriction rules. Clearly he is obeying the non-universal (or 'particular' - relative to 'smoke') 
rule 'Don't smoke heavily'. Similarly the rule of (limited) charity 'Make donations to some 
charity appeals' is a rule that may be either followed or broken, despite the fact that it is not a 
universal rule - it does not say 'Whenever there is an appeal for charity, make a donation'. That 
this is all that Jackson intends by his unfortunate turn of phrase in this context is sufficiently 
clear, not only by the absurdity of the interpretation favoured by Okasha, but also from 
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Jackson's own expression of the point, since he spells it out in explicitly particular terms, 
referring to an inference from certain Fs being G to certain other Fs being G'.*^ 
Furthermore, despite the potentially confusing phraseology employed by Jackson in the context 
of this initial statement, it is clear that the substance of his position in this article is supplied in 
the course of his argument. And in fact Jackson goes on to supply a typically insightful and 
invaluable defence of the common and plausible view that we do apply certain criteria as a 
matter of principle in our selection of the particular cases in which we project common 
properties from samples to populations, and that these standard criteria satisfactorily account for 
the puzzling cases of 'grue' and its like. 
In any case, what Okasha needs for his argument expressed in terms of rules to go through is 
that there will be no particular rules that correspond to a belief that some particular regularities 
wil l continue. But in this passage Okasha simply fails to observe the distinction between the 
legitimate concept of using a particular rule and the absurd notion of 'using a rule on occasion'. 
And by conflating the two while discrediting the latter he illegitimately dismisses the former, 
thereby making way for the unsound inference that (since clearly we don't use the (universal) 
rule '[Always] Infer that properties correlated in the past will be correlated in the future') 
'Jackson's 'undeniable fact' [that we all 'project common properties from samples to 
populations' on occasion (Jackson, 1998, p249)] lends no credence to the notion that we use 
rules of inference.' (p318). 
Is it irrational to follow an inductive rule? 
In an attempt to further support his argument that we don't follow rules in induction, Okasha 
goes on to argue that we certainly shouldn't because 
there is something inherently irrational about following an inductive rule: it deprives one of the 
flexibility needed for rationally adjusting one's opinion to experience. To use an inductive rule 
is to assume that the world is arranged in a particular way, as I have stressed. But, presumably, 
for any assumed arrangement of the world, it should be possible to imagine the world's not being 
like this - that is the nature of empirical assumptions. If such evidence materialized, the rational 
thing to do would be to give up the assumption that the world is arranged in the way in question, 
Clearly this is intended to make it clear that the described rule is only partially specified. The 
description implies that an inference is drawn under 'certain' conditions, but does not state exactly what 
those conditions are. The basic point of Jackson's article is to reject Goodman's view of one of the 
necessary conditions ('entrenchment'), and to clarify a condition that more satisfactorily accounts for our 
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i.e. to stop using the inductive rule. So following any particular inductive rule does seem less 
than fully rational. It embodies a fixed commitment to the world's being in a certain state. 
(Okasha, 2001, p321) 
However this argument is unsound, and the problem with it stems f rom a misleading 
interpretation o f Okasha's simplistic description o f the relation between empirical presumptions 
and inductive rules. To commit oneself to an inductive rule - which w i l l relate a variety o f 
possible bodies o f evidence with associated predictions - is not to commit oneself to an 
assumption about the structure o f the world that is insensitive to developments in the evidence -
which is what Okasha is arguing here. It is a basic and wel l -known feature o f inductive rules 
that they induce defeasible predictions. Even on the most simplistic interpretation o f Hume's 
principle o f continuity, it is clear for example that the universal projection that all ravens are 
black, based on an initial body o f evidence on which all observed ravens are black, w i l l be 
rejected when subsequently a white raven is observed. The rules themselves (whatever the finer 
details) cater for such adjustments in the light o f developments in the evidence, since the rules 
dictate under what evidential conditions certain projections w i l l be made. One o f the provisions 
for a universal projection that is clear enough in Hume's basic account o f the principle o f 
continuity is that there are no observed exceptions to the regularity.*^ Further and more 
sophisticated provisions for projection are identified by Jackson. What is clear though, on any 
conception o f the rules o f induction, is that when the evidential conditions change the 
predictions endorsed by the rules can and will change accordingly. 
Okasha comments on the Lewis/Teller diachronic Dutch-book argument which has been 
interpreted as showing that pre-planned violations o f conditionalisation are irrational (Teller 
1973, 218-58). Although he ultimately declines to take a position on that issue, Okasha 
mentions in support o f his argument for the irrationality o f inductive rules Van Frassen's 
argument (1989, Ch. 5) that it follows f rom the Lewis/Teller theorem that inductive rules 
actually violate the demands o f Bayesian rationality. I do not intend to discuss this issue in any 
detail here either, since the basic problem with Okasha's position does not depend on this claim. 
However it is worth noting that although it is relatively uncontroversial that overly simplistic 
rules o f induction could result in violations o f conditionalisation, or even synchronic 
probabilistic consistency. Van Frassen's inference would not hold for any rules o f induction that 
were sufficiently sophisticated to incorporate a requirement o f conditionalisation - or more 
basically, i t w i l l not apply to any rules o f induction that don't violate conditionalisation. It is a 
discrimination with regard to 'grue'. See Jackson's Summary section (1998, p267) for details. I have 
reserved my discussion of Goodman's problem and Jackson's solution for a later chapter. 
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basic principle o f probability assignment in general that initial rough estimates (reflecting 
relatively raw estimates o f relevant relative frequencies in our case) are 'adjusted' (c.f. for 
example O'Hagan, 1988) for consistency in order to ensure synchronic consistency. The 
(likewise practically limited)'''' requirement o f conditionalisation for the epistemic frequentist 
then operates in much the same way as it does for the subjectivist, in that in principle, the 
frequentist w i l l have anticipated the various possible ways that the frequency evidence w i l l 
unfold, and w i l l associate with each potential development in the evidence a corresponding 
conditional probability for a hypthesis. Thus the epistemic frequentist also aims to maintain 
diachronic consistency in the main (wi th the kind o f admissible exceptions cited by the 
subjectivist). O f course he is unlikely in practice to do so consistently, as indeed is the 
subjectivist, but his basic principles o f frequency-based probability evaluation need not offend 
the general principle o f conditionalisation, and should in principle be expected to uphold it.^' 
Furthermore, even i f we were to suppose that our principles o f induction may at least sometimes 
demand such violations, it might nevertheless be the case that rationality requires that in such 
situations the substantive rules should override the otherwise normal policy o f 
conditionalisation. In this regard it is notable that Dawid (1982) has advocated the aim o f 
generally endeavouring to maintain a reasonable level o f calibration over one's assignments o f 
probability, while noting that the adjustments that w i l l sometimes be made in an attempt to 
improve calibration (re-calibration') will invoke violations o f conditionalisation. 
To get back to the point o f real importance here, Okasha stresses that his crucial claim is simply 
that 
there is no need for rules of inference in order to get from data to opinions not entailed by the 
data, whether or not it is true that there is no room for rules. (Okasha, 2001, p317) 
provided one goes along with van Fraassen in supposing that we, at least usually, conditionalise. 
The trouble with this suggestion, as far as it goes, is that given only the rule o f 
conditionalisation, plus a growing body o f observational 'certainties', or in Okasha's ternis 
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C . f for example Treatise 1.3.6.4. for reference to the condition of the 'constant conjunction' of the 
respective properties in our experience. 
Van Frassen or Okasha, since they both take the view that some violations of conditionalisation need to 
be allowed, on the Bayesian theory, in order for example to cater for the invention of new hypotheses that 
we had not previously considered. 
I think this is basically the same point, albeit applied specifically to epistemic frequentism, as the 
comment made by Howson and Urbach (1993, pl03): ' i f the restriction to updated rates you currently 
think fair is imposed ... the Lewis-Teller argument is otiose.', 
i.e. beliefs or expectations that supplement our observational beliefs. 
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'data', we don't get to any opinions not entailed by the data. Something more is required. 
Whatever we might make o f Okasha's arguments for the suggestion that it isn't rules o f 
inference that take us there, quite obviously more needs to be said about the unmentioned 
ingredients that, on the Bayesian theory, are supposed to provide the essential substance that 
fuels our inductive predictions. And we need to see how well the Bayesian theory stands up to 
Hume's problem in the light o f these considerations. In order to approach this issue, it w i l l be 
worth first clarifying the key features o f Hume's argument, interpreting him charitably rather 
than insisting on any avoidable absurdities, and furthermore (since Okasha is now clearly 
talking about a probabilistic theory o f induction) taking into account Hume's extended 
argument relating to 'the probability o f chances' or 'that evidence which is still attended with 
uncertainty' (Treatise 1.3.11.). 
The basic problem 
To recap on the key points o f Okasha's argument so far, he has noted that Hume's (init ial) 
argument depends on the assumption that we presume that observed regularities w i l l continue. 
He observes that it would be absurd to suppose that all observed regularities w i l l continue, but 
accepts that we believe that some regularities w i l l continue. He rephrases Hume's problem in 
terms o f rules o f induction on the basis o f the supposition that a rule o f induction w i l l tell you to 
hold certain beliefs about the unobserved given certain observations, and so is equivalent to a 
substantive presupposition about what is not observed. He then aims to argue that we don't 
need inductive rules to make inductive predictions, and so Hume's claim that we depend on 
such substantive presuppositions about the unobserved in order to make our predictions about 
the unobserved does not hold. However, i t is d i f f icu l t to avoid the suspicion on reading 
Okasha's argument that the extended discussion o f inductive rules ultimately serves rather to 
cloud than to clarify the real issue at stake here - particularly in view o f Okasha's initial 
presentation o f the key feature o f Hume's problem precisely in terms o f our belief that nature is 
unif iorm. A belief that something is the case simply is not a rule o f inference - whatever other 
relations one might claim to hold between the two. 
The real issue becomes all the more clear when we place it in the original context o f Hume's 
expressed premise basically our causal inferences proceed on the basis of a fumdamental 
presumption that (long-standing, experimentally tested, etc) exceptionelss regularities will 
continue. Okasha then interpreted this in more modem terms as equivalent to a premise that we 
fo l low some related rule of inference. But clearly the basic issue here can be expressed quite 
straightforwardly in the original terms, and it is simply whether Hume was right in assuming 
that we proceed on the basis o f substantive presumptions about the unobserved when we make 
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inductive predictions. In this case the question about whether such a prior belief can or cannot 
properly be construed as equivalent to a rule of inference is, in any case, nothing more than a 
distraction f rom the fundamental issue. Hume didn't claim that it could, and his argument 
clearly does not depend on the presumption that it can. 
Let us then refocus on this basic issue - i.e. whether Hume is right in supposing that we hold 
beliefs that amount to substantive presumptions about the unobserved when we make inductive 
predictions, and consider whether Bayesianism saves us from this Hume's actual premise, 
rather than Okasha' distortion o f it. Moreover, since Okasha frames his objection in terms that 
relate to considerations o f probability ( in the modem sense of the term), for the sake o f fairness 
to Hume, we should take into account the suplementary details o f his argument relating to the 
probability of chance {Treatise 1.3.11). In this regard we may frame the key points o f Hume's 
more general problem with reference to probabilistic expectations as well as outright beliefs (or 
those matters we regard as 'most certain'). 
Hume's general justificatory problem o f induction is not merely to explain how some o f our 
beliefs and expectations about the future might be just if ied - granted the assumption that other 
o f our beliefs and expectations about the unobserved are justif ied. The problem Hume is 
tackling is an (almost) global one (he is allowing us to leave aside any problem concerning the 
justification o f our observational 'certainties'). In the context o f the justificatory problem o f 
induction the justification o f any belief or expectation about the future (or more generally the 
unobserved) is part of the problem and therefore something that is in question. Hume's general 
problem for induction then goes something like this: 
Hume's general problem for induction 
Any predictions, beliefs, or expectations we form about the unobserved, on the basis o f 
what we have observed, depend on supplementary*' background beliefs and/or 
expectations about the unobserved. Our predictions w i l l not be just i f ied unless these 
supplementary beliefs and expectations, on which they depend, are just i f ied. Simply to 
assume that any o f these underlying beliefs and expectations are just i f ied is to beg the 
question, since whether or not any o f our non-observational beliefs or expectations are 
justif ied is the fundamental epistemological issue. 
Okasha thinks that i f in fact we proceed in our inductive inferences by conditionalisation then 
we are exempt f rom Hume's problem. But once we acknowledge that the particular aspect o f 
Hume's problem that is relevant to probabilistic judgement is not so much his primary argument 
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concerning causal induction, but his extended argument as applied to probability, then it is clear 
how his basic point, despite its formulation in terms relating to the classical theory o f 
probability, would apply just as well to the probability judgements based on Bayesian 
conditionalisation. When I update my initial (unconditional) probability for an event P(A) in 
the light o f new evidence E, in accord wi th conditionalisation, what 1 do is to set my new 
unconditional probability P'(A) to a value r previously determined by my prior conditional 
probability - relating precisely to the contingency that just such evidence turn up P(A|E) = r. 
Now in order to appreciate the significance o f Hume's problem in this context, we do not need 
to question the justification for maintaining such a probabilistic principle for updating our prior 
credences in this way - just as we do not need to question the logic o f the move f rom our 
observational evidence plus the assumption of continuity to the predictive conclusions o f our 
inductive inferences in order to appreciate Hume's problem for the justification o f our 'most 
certain' causal inferences. The problem in the latter case concerns the justification for my 
founding belief i\\?AX\\Q exceptionless law-l ike regularities 1 have observed w i l l continue. The 
corresponding problem in the former case is basically the problem cited by Hume wi th respect 
to 'the probability o f chance' - and is simply the problem o f how we jus t i fy any such prior 
credences {degrees o f belief or expectations) in the first place. Conditionalisation doesn't 
jus t i fy them - as De Finetti pointed out (1969) ' ini t ial probabilities' are an 'essential pre-
requisite' for conditionalisation.''^ In this case subjective conditionalisation provides no escape 
route f rom Hume's problem. On the contrary, it affords a prime modem example o f Hume's 
basic contention with regard to probabilistic induction - once the proper interpretation o f 
Hume's problem, as illustrated above, is understood 
Having clarified this problem with Okasha's line o f response to Hume's problem, as mentioned 
in my earlier discussion o f the interpretation o f the principle o f continuity, I am nevertheless 
inclined to agree with Okasha that Hume was not quite right in insisting that we rely in our 
inductive inferences on a straightforward assumption o f the (ontic) principle o f continuity. As 1 
suggested at that point, I think it is considerably more plausible to suppose that we are inclined 
to agree and employ an epistemically qualified version o f the principle - basically that under the 
evidential circumstances described we ought to expect the observed regularity to continue. 
However it is not d i f f icu l t to see that there w i l l be a corresponding problem for any attempt to 
'prove' or establish by any non-question begging argument that this is the case. In fact we may 
Of course De Finetti might well disagree with Hume that we neeJ to justify our prior credences in order 
to justify the posterior credences that depend on them. But then an ardent subjectivist might not even feel 
the need to maintain the view that our posterior credences require any justification in any case, since these 
are in any case generally regarded on the subjectivist view merely as matters of subjective opinion. 
Hume's problems for the justification of any kind of prediction will of course only be a problem for those 
of us who seek justification for our beliefs and expectations - and particularly for those of our beliefs and 
expectations on which many others depend. 
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interpret Howson's recent analysis o f Hume's problem (2000) which discusses the 
epistemological significance o f Hume's problem in considerable detail, as a critique o f just such 
an epistemic construal o f Hume's problem, on which he concludes that 
no theory of rationality that is not entirely question-begging can tell us what it is rational to 
believe about the future, whether based on what the past has displayed or not. ... Hume was 
right. (Howson, 2000, p239-40, my emphasis) 
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C H A P T E R FOUR 
AMPLIAXrVITY AND T H E MODERN CONCEPT O F INDUCTION 
Anti-deductionism*' and ampliativity 
We have seen that Hume's characterisation o f inductive inference, properly understood, may be 
contrasted with other more modern accounts where the emphasis on observation reports as 
essential and characteristic premises is absent, and is replaced by an emphasis on conditions 
relating to the logical relationship between premises and conclusion. In these cases inductive 
inference is characterised explicitly, more or less simply, as arguments in which the premises 
provide non-deductive justification for believing or accepting the conclusion (or regarding it as 
l ikely). For example: 
1 shall say that an inductive argument is an argument which is not deductively valid but one in 
which, it is claimed, the premises 'make it reasonable' for us to accept the conclusion. 
(Swinburne 1974, p2, my emphasis) 
When an argument is not deductively valid hut nevertheless the premises provide good evidence 
for the conclusion, the argument is said to be inductively strong. (Skyrms 1975, p7, my 
emphasis) 
What is notable about these definitions is that they omit any explicit reference to foundation on 
observational premises™ and, in particular, that they presuppose (or stipulate) that an inductive 
argument cannot, by its nature, be deductively valid. Jonathan Lowe for example, 
acknowledging Kneale (1949) insists that 
'inductive' reasoning is no«-deductive: this much almost everyone would concede - provided it 
is understood that we do not have in mind here such procedures as so-called 'mathematical' 
induction, but rather only what is sometimes called 'ampliative' induction. The premises of an 
inductive argument do not entail its conclusion. (Lowe, 1987, p325) 
I use this term 'anti-deductionism' in this context to refer to the view that no inductive arguments can 
be deductive, in preference to 'anti-deductivism' which more naturally suggests a view that is opposed to 
deductivism (which latter in its simplest and most extreme form is the view that all good arguments are 
deductive). 
™ The term 'evidence' as employed in Skyrms' characterisation is sometimes taken to imply that any 
information so designated is of an observational nature. However there is a broader sense in which it is 
simply taken to mean information that makes some proposition 'evident' in the sense of Qustly) perceived 
to be true (or likely). Moreover Skyrms appears to intend something more like the latter interpretation 
since he immediately paraphrases his characterisation simply in terms of the probability of the conclusion 
granted the premises (Skyrms 1975, p7). 
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The motivation for the former, i.e. the relaxation o f insistence on observational premises, is 
relatively straightforward. We are not always engaged in examination or hypothetical 
questioning o f the epistemological foundations o f our beliefs. In contrast to Hume's chosen 
epistemological remit, we commonly take for grantedheWeh that, while not directly verified by 
observation, are nevertheless regarded as legitimate assumptions in the context, and proceed to 
make further inferences on the basis o f those assumptions. Many such inferences are commonly 
regarded as inductive inferences, in a sense that we associate with the term 'ampliative', which 
we shall examine in the fol lowing - even i f none o f the premises would be regarded as 
observation reports. Thus for example Salmon identifies ' induction' wi th (logically correct) 
ampliative inference.^' 
Any type of logically correct ampliative inference is induction ... the problem of induction is to 
show that some form of ampliative inference is justifiable (Salmon 1966, p20, my 
emphasis) 
Similarly, L . J. Cohen says that 'ampliative' induction 
amplifies our knowledge. And it contrasts with the 'summative' induction that, rather 
unproblematically, establishes a generalisation on the basis of what are known to be all its 
instances (Cohen 1989, p l - 2 , my emphasis) 
Rescher (1980) describes the ampliative role o f induction as follows: 
Questions arise most pressingly where the information-in-hand does not suffice - when they are 
not answerable in terms of what has already been established. ... The definitive task of induction 
is to provide an ampliative methodology for acquiring information in the domain of "matters of 
fact and existence" extending our informational horizons ... The crucial thing about induction is 
its movement beyond the [information] in hand Rescher (1980, p6-7) 
We may qualify this slightly in respect o f the fact that the primary function o f rational 
arguments would not appear to be simply a matter o f belief acquisition, but is essentially 
concerned with justification for beliefs - whether in the context o f acquiring new beliefs in the 
light o f the respective justification for so doing, or clarifying or confirming that beliefs already 
held are indeed justif ied. In what fol lows we shall consider carefully exactly what are the 
^' although as we shall see below, we may find fault with his particular line of definition for the term 
'ampliative'. 
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essential characteristics o f the ampliative inferences we commonly describe as ' inductive' , and 
whether it is correct to think that, in virtue o f their ampliative nature, the corresponding 
arguments, i.e. the arguments that set out the purported justification for the inferences cannot be 
deductively valid. 
Why exclude deduction? 
In order to approach this issue we may first consider exactly why Skyrms, along with 
Swinburne, (and o f course many others) should have wished to insist that inductive arguments 
cannot be deductively valid. We have already examined in detail one prime contender for an, at 
least partial, explanation o f this - which is the common thought that inductive inference and 
argument, at least as classically characterised, according to Hume, cannot be deductively valid -
and we have established that to think so on that basis would be a mistake. 
O f course even i f that were Hume's claim, in the context o f his epistemological concern with 
the justification for any o f our beliefs about the unobserved (and even i f on that interpretation he 
would have been right in that context) it would not necessarily fo l low that the same would hold 
on a broader concept o f induction where that particular epistemological constraint is relaxed. 
But i f I am right and that was not Hume's claim - i f , as I have argued, the logical form o f 
inductive inference as Hume understood it was in fact deductively valid - then it would seem 
that any broader conception o f induction should at least be compatible with this supposedly 
paradigm case o f Humean induction, and therefore compatible with deductive validity. In view 
o f these considerations then it might seem peculiar then that neither Swinburne nor Skyrms 
appeared to feel any compulsion to provide a/?^ justification whatsoever for their stipulations in 
this matter. It is as i f they felt that the underlying reasons for the deductive exclusion clause are 
somehow obvious. Let us then consider whether there might be any other explanations for this 
supposedly uncontentious claim regarding the logical structure o f ampliative or inductive 
inference. 
Mill's extension of Hume's problem to syllogistic deduction 
On our understanding o f Hume's problem, it would seem that one philosopher who understood 
Hume's complaint quite well was M i l l . M i l l ' s complaint^^ about the epistemological usefulness 
o f syllogistic logic (or lack o f it) may be regarded as, in effect, an extension o f Hume's 
complaint about induction, since the paradigm case M i l l takes to illustrate his point - an 
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instance o f the first figure mood ' D a r i i ' , the traditional precursor o f universal elimination -
mirrors the problem that Hume raised against induction, on our understanding o f it. 
It must be granted that in every syllogism, considered as an argument to prove the conclusion, 
there is a petitio princippi. When we say. 
Al l men are mortal, 
Socrates is a man, 
therefore 
Socrates is mortal 
it is unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the syllogistic theory, that the proposition, 
Socrates is mortal, is presupposed in the more general assumption, Al l men are mortal: that we 
cannot be assured of the mortality of all men, unless we are already certain of the mortality of 
every individual man: that it be still doubtful whether Socrates, or any other individual we 
choose to name, be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty must hang over the assertion. 
Al l men are mortal ( M i l l 1843, p20) 
This is essentially the same problem that Hume identified with respect to inductive inference, 
since Hume believed that we make just such a general assumption about all cases, despite 
l imited evidence o f verified cases, and in particular including the unverified case o f the 
hypothesis, when we make inductive inferences. M i l l however wants to apply the same 
epistemological point to syllogisms in general, since when an argument is deductively valid, we 
cannot - or at least in principle should not - be certain about the conjunction o f the premises 
unless we are already certain about the conclusion. 
But o f course this does not mean that deductive arguments are useless, since it is nevertheless 
possible to have sufficient evidence to support a conclusion (and the conjunction o f a set o f 
premises that imply it) while still being in doubt about the conclusion. And this w i l l be so when 
we fai l to notice or realise that the evidence satisfactorily supports the conclusion. As Augustus 
DeMorgan pointed out in response to M i l l , 
the presence of the premises in the mind is not necessarily the presence of the conclusion 
(DeMorgan, 1847, p254) 
It is clear here that Mi l l does not suggest the complaint originates with himself, but attributes it to 'the 
adversaries of syllogistic induction'. Walton (1991, pI7-19) finds a lucid account of the same point 
presented by Sextus Empiricus (OP I I , 195-7), in the second or third century. 
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In other words we do not always live up to the logical ideal o f automatically believing all the 
logical consequences o f what we believe j o i n t l y " to be true. So deductive arguments can 
enlighten us about the conclusion o f a deductive argument even when we already Oustly) 
believe all the premises to be true.'"' O f course this point is particularly relevant to the case o f 
more complex deductive arguments, when the implications o f the premises may need some 
clarification. But even then the larger argument may be composed o f smaller steps o f inference 
for which each individual implication is relatively obvious, hence the seemingly trivial simple 
steps o f deduction can play a significant role. This point in itself seems to be sufficient to 
establish that an argument may be 'ampliative' in the important epistemic sense o f expanding 
our knowledge or justified belief - associated with the primary function o f argument - while 
nevertheless being deductively valid. Nevertheless, at least in the standard sort o f cases we are 
considering here, ampliative deductive inferences such as this w i l l not be inferences that have 
any particularly distinctive characteristics in virtue o f which we might want to call them 
'inductive' . The cases we are considering here are just those cases o f deductive arguments that 
happen to be opportunistically pertinent, presented in order to mend contingent failings in the 
audience's deductive analysis o f the evidence or assumptions. 
In view o f this, the fundamental motivation underlying the deduction exclusion clause would 
appear to be nothing more contentious than the simple point that we need to employ principles 
o f inference other than the relatively well understood principles o f deduction only in cases 
where the proposition at issue cannot be deductively inferred (or disproved) f rom what is 
already known or accepted, and it is precisely in an attempt to understand the principles 
involved in those problematic cases that we need to develop an alternative kind o f logic to 
deduction. On the surface then the underlying motivation for the deductive exclusion clause 
does appear to be quite unobjectionable and obvious. However, as we shall see, this line o f 
thinking, although based on an uncontentious point, is not in fact valid, and results in a 
summary dismissal o f important possibilities beyond the straightforward cases intended. 
For the moment, in order to clarify the point that there is an error in this line o f thinking, we 
may note simply that f rom the unobjectionable point that (a) we need to employ principles o f 
I use the term 'jointly' here in the sense that 1 jointly believe a set of propositions S i f f / believe that all 
the propositions in S are true - as distinct from the claim that I believe that member S| is true and/ 
believe that S2 is true, ... and so on. I take Kyburg's Lottery Paradox to illusfrate that the former is 
required for the epistemic adequacy o f a deductively valid argument, while the latter is insufficient. 
''^  There are of course further epistemological benefits of the use of deductive arguments. For one thing 
the premises themselves can provide new information to the Mdiehce wh¥n the a^^^^^ is taken on frust. 
And as Jackson has argued (1987, 104-7) presenting an argument to a conclusion in such circumstances 
may be of more use to the audience than simply asserting the conclusion, since for one thing the audience 
wil l typically learn more (relevant) information that way, and leam more about the nature of the 
evidential support for the conclusion. 
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inference other than the principles o f deduction only in cases where the proposition in question 
cannot be deductively inferred from what is initially accepted, it does not fo l low that (b) we do 
need to employ principles o f inference other than the principles o f deduction in cases where the 
proposition in question cannot be deductively inferred f rom what is initially accepted." The 
significance o f this erroneous line o f thinking in this context w i l l become clearer in what 
fol lows. 
Logical ampliativity 
How then are to understand the appropriate qualification that may be applied to the basic 
epistemic account o f ampliativify, as exemplified in Cohen's account above, in order to account 
for such exceptions in the case o f our simply having overlooked the fact that the hypothesis is a 
straightforward deductive implication o f our prior beliefs? The right way to approach this issue 
is to consider first how we may properly characterise our concept o f inductive inference, before 
we address the issue o f the logical structure o f arguments that are designed to explicate the 
justification for our inductive inferences. In order to approach this issue we may consider the 
case o f Hume's concept o f inductive inference for the sake o f comparison. In the case o f 
Hume's concept o f ' induction', the respective inferences may be regarded as 'observationally 
ampliative' in that the hypothesis in this case is not a deductive implication o f our observational 
assumptions. As we have seen, that does not imply that the hypothesis is not a deductive 
implication o f the f u l l set o f assumptions, since as Hume emphasised repeatedly, there is a 
' founding presumption' that is common to all our inductive inferences but which is not 
observationally verified.^^ The more modem conception o f induction, which has typically but 
mistakenly been seen as a 'broader' concept that encompasses Hume's as a special case, may 
more appropriately be understood as a distinct concept within a broader family o f concepts o f 
induction (including the Humean concept o f ' i nduc t ion ' as observational ly ampliative 
inference). 
On the modem concept o f inductive inference, which we might call ' logical ' induction, there 
has been wide-ranging doubt that deduction is even a candidate logic for proper representation 
o f the inference, and it is certainly the case that the concept with which we are dealing in this 
case is not intended to admit such straightforward deductne inferences as exemplified on 
Hume's account o f induction - even though, as we have noted, such inferences may in some 
contexts be epistemically 'ampliative' in the sense as described (above) by Cohen. More 
specifically we may admit that it is not intended to admit what we might call 'ontic ' deductive 
The logical point here is simply the platitude that 'P only i f Q' does not imply ' I f Q then P'. 
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inferences, where the premises and conclusion consist o f unqualified factual (or more precisely 
non-epistemic) statements. We may also note that this is in any case how arguments by 
tradition are commonly construed, since epistemic qualifiers and connectives in a natural 
expression o f an argument are typical ly" interpreted, in the process o f construal, as merely 
indicative o f which o f the more basic 'ontic' or 'object' propositions that they qualify or 
connect are to be counted as 'premises' or 'conclusion', or in some cases - for instance when 
the connective is relatively weak (e.g. 'This inclines me to suspect that . . . ' ) - as an indication o f 
whether the argument is to be construed as deductive or inductive. 
However, i f we observe the distinction between the respective concepts o f the 'hypothesis' (i.e. 
the proposition toward which some epistemic attitude is supposed to be just i f ied in the 
inference) and the 'conclusion' o f an argument that is presented in supposed clarification o f the 
supposed justification (i.e. the proposition that occupies the respective place as indicated by the 
main inferential connective, or ' i l lative particle','* in the argument) - and i f we likewise 
distinguish between the stated premises o f a presented argument, and the pertinent assumptions 
o f the arguer - i.e. the ontic propositions accepted by the arguer, and appealed to by the arguer 
in their attempt to clarify the justoification for the hypothesis - then we may more appropriately 
characterise what would commonly be taken to be an 'inductive' inference in the modem sense 
(which we might call ' logical ' induction) as an inference in which the hypothesis is not (and is 
not purported by the arguer to be) a deductive implication o f the assumptions on which the 
perceived justification for the inference is based. For inferences other than logical inductive 
inferences in this sense, there need not in general be any particular problem about how we ought 
to construe the logic o f the respective inferences. Typically such inferences may be 
straightforwardly construed as deductive inferences where the conclusion is the hypothesis and 
the premises are just the justificatory assumptions. M y central aim in this thesis is to illustrate 
how we ought to construe those inferences where the question o f the appropriate logic is 
generally regarded as more problematic, where there is no such deductive connection between 
the assumptions and the hypothesis - namely cases o f what I have called logical induction -
where the inference is, in this respect logically ampliative. 
even though, in Hume's view, it is experience that, by force of habit, 'induces' us to believe it. 
Typically but by no means always; In episfemic logic and episterndlogy, in particul^ 
qualifiers and such-like are often essential to the topic of argument, and are not in such cases 'construed 
away'. 
'* e.g. 'Therefore', c.f Lambert and Ulrich (1980, p49). 
I paraphrase somewhat liberally here. 
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Swinburne's account o f induction applies directly to arguments (as distinct f rom psychological 
inferences) and stipulates that only arguments that are not deductive in form^° can be ' inductive' 
arguments in his sense o f the term. For the sake o f a suitable terminological distinction while 
acknowledging the popular tradition o f using the word 'inductive' in such application, we may 
call such arguments, i.e. arguments that (are supposed to) offer some support for a hypothesis, 
but which are not deductive in form, 'formally inductive'. However, in what follows I shall 
argue that it would be a mistake to suppose that arguments that are designed to explicate the 
justification for logically ampliative inferences, as defined above, should properly be construed 
in the form of formal ly inductive (i.e. non-deductive) arguments. It can seem to be a platitude 
that in fact they should be so construed, because it is not uncommon to use the terms 
'conclusion' and 'premises' relatively loosely, presumably more or less as synonyms for 
'hypothesis' and 'assumptions' in the context o f describing a psychological inference. For 
example Salmon uses the former terms, despite their primary association in the context o f logic 
wi th formal analysis o f arguments, to define an ampliative inference, thus: 
an ampliative inference ... has a conclusion with content not present either explicitly or 
implicitly in the premises. (Salmon 1966, p8, my emphases) 
A n d i f we adopt that way o f talking about the respective features o f a psychological inference 
(i.e. calling the hypothesis the 'conclusion' and the (ontic) evidential propositions the 
'premises') then it might seem to go without saying that in an appropriate propositional 
explication o f the justification for the inference, in the form o f an argument, the conclusion o f 
the respective argument should properly be construed as the 'conclusion' o f the inference, and 
the premises o f the argument should be the 'premises' o f the inference. However i f we bear in 
mind that epistemic qualifiers (and indeed connectives) in the natural expression o f an argument 
(or implici t in the supposed justification o f the psychological inference) w i l l in some cases play 
an essential role in the justification for the respective inference, and w i l l in such cases need to 
be properly represented in an appropriate construal o f the argument, then it would be a mistake 
in such cases to stick to such a simplistic policy o f construal. 
In what follows I shall argue that such epistemic qualifications and connectives do indeed play 
an essential role in the justification o f logically inductive inferences, and that such arguments 
generally ought to be construed in epistemic form. Furthermore it w i l l become apparent that 
when the supposed justification for a logically ampliative inference is thus f u l l y and properly 
explicated, the resulting construal w i l l be an argument which is deductively valid in form. The 
view that this is the right approach to the construal o f logically ampliative arguments may be 
termed epistemic deductivism. I f this view o f induction is right, then there is no place in the 
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logic o f induction for the formally inductive (i.e. non-deductive) arguments defined by 
Swinbume.*' As we shall see, logically inductive arguments, properly construed, do in fact 
have a quite simple deductive structure that properly reflects, as it should, whatever epistemic 
connection is purported by the arguer to hold between the evidential data and the hypothesis in 
question. 
Summary and conclusion to Part One 
As we have noted, it is uncontroversial that deductive inferences and their associated arguments 
can extend our knowledge, or just if ied beliefs, by helping us to acknowledge initially unseen 
logical implications o f our initial beliefs, and in this respect might be termed ^epistemically 
ampliative' even though their conclusions are logically entailed, albeit covertly, by the 
premises, or in other words logically ' impl ic i t ' in the premises. But in contrast to such 
unexceptional deductive inferences, we might say that inductive inferences are intended to be 
'logically ampliative', in that the particular type o f extensions to our beliefs that we seek to 
jus t i fy (or justifications for pre-existing beliefs) in the case o f induction are extensions (or 
justifications) where the belief that is intended to be added (or just if ied) - i.e. the 'hypothesis' 
or 'target proposition' - is not deducible f rom our initial beliefs (or at least in the latter case not 
f rom our other initial beliefs, besides the hypothesis). O f course, when the proposition o f 
epistemic concern, can be deduced f rom a given set o f categorical (unqualified) assumptions, 
we do not have a problem with regard to a suitable logical form for representation o f the 
argument. A simple (non-epistemic) deductive argument w i l l do the job , and the basic 
principles o f deduction are relatively wel l understood. On a superficial comparison o f such 
logically unproblematic cases wi th the more problematic case o f logically ampliative inference, 
it can appear that logically inductive arguments must employ logical principles other than those 
o f deduction. However we have seen that this is a mistake - albeit an easy and common 
mistake to make - to the extent that just such a misconception o f induction has practically 
became textbook tradition, exemplified for instance in Salmon (1966), Swinbume (1974), 
Skyrms (1975), and more recently in Bird (1998) and Howson (2000). 
On our earlier analyses o f Hume, it would seem that in Hume's view, the kind o f inductive 
inference with which he was concemed - what we might call'observationally ampliative' 
inductive inference - is not o f the logically ampliative kind: Hume's notion o f induction 
requires only that the hypothesis is not deducible f rom our observational assumptions. But 
' Except perhaps i f interpreted as truncated expressions of some standard form of epistemic deductive 
argument, e.g. where it is supposed that the evidential propositions are 'certain', that there is no fiirther 
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Hume insists that we employ an additional and indispensable presumption when we make such 
inferences, and moreover on his apparently ontic account o f the additional general assumption 
that is made, it would seem that the hypothesis is then deducible f rom the f u l l set o f 
assumptions. From close examination o f the immediate context o f Hume's problem, we have 
eliminated the theory recently advanced by Owen that Hume's is not a justificatory problem at 
al l , but merely an explanatory problem, and we have clarified the fact that Hume's problem for 
causal inference is more specifically the problem that the 'principle' o f continuity, that he 
claims to be an fundamental and indispensable assumption o f our inductive inferences, cannot 
be proven or ' just if ied ' - in the sense that no argument, that does not rely on the general 
principle, or some particular instance o f it, could possibly be provided that would satisfactorily 
establish that the same proposition is true. 
We have also examined Hume's associated problem for the justification o f probability 
judgements or partial expectations, and I have argued that Hume's problem cannot be so easily 
overcome by consideration o f modem (Bayesian) theory o f probability as Okasha (who at least 
appears to acknowledge the proper interpretation o f Hume's problem for causal inference) has 
recently argued. However we may concur to some extent with Okasha in that Hume's (ontic) 
representation o f the general presumption that he claims we employ when we make (causal) 
inductive inferences does not seem to be entirely plausible. I have suggested that this might be 
better represented as an epistemic assumption to the effect that in evidential circumstances o f 
the relevant kind we ought to believe that the respective regularity w i l l continue. I f we modify 
Hume's account o f inductive inference in this regard, we w i l l then an account o f observation-
based induction that yields a logically ampliative inference, in the sense described above, since 
the hypothesis - that the regularity w i l l continue - w i l l not be a deductive implication o f the 
assumptions. Such a move however w i l l not save us from Hume's problem for the justification 
o f the non-observational assumptions that we make in our inductive inference, since his 
problem is equally well expressed in relation to the question o f justification for such an 
epistemic assumption: 
even after experience has inform'd us of their constant conjunction, 'tis impossible for us to 
satisfy ourselves by our reason, whv we shou'd extend that experience beyond those particular 
instances, which have fallen under our observation {Treatise, 1.3.6.11, my underline) 
relevant information, and the implicit claim is that since all that is the case then the hypothesis ought to be 
'accepted', in some standard sense of the term. 
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in other words, we cannot justify the supposition that, when we know that every F that has been 
observed has been followed by a G, we should expect that the next F that is observed will also 
beG. 
Some of the comments Hume makes on the implications of his problem of unprovability seem 
to indicate that Hume thinks that i f we cannot comprehend any satisfactory rational explanation 
as to why we ought to believe P, then that should at least shake our confidence that indeed we 
ought to believe P.*^  We may regard this as related to a rule of thumb employed in everyday 
reasoning, that we generally suppose to constrain the limits of rational credence, dividing 
reasonable belief from credulity - that we should believe only what we are able to provide 
satisfactory reasons for believing. But, even i f Hume's unprovability argument is correct -
taken in conjunction with his additional arguments in the Enquiry, simply that that we don't 
comprehend any rational justification for our basic non-observational assumptions - this line of 
argument could he regarded as a reduction ad absurdum of the view that such a practical rule of 
thumb (for application to the kind of hypothesis typically under consideration in the context of 
everyday reasoning) should be understood to apply just as well to the very basic beliefs that 
may be called into question in the context of philosophical epistemology. In other words, the 
mere fact that I cannot establish by rational argument that P - or that I ought to believe that P -
does not in general mean that it is not the case that I ought to believe that P.*'' In particular this 
does not hold with regard to the basic and common beliefs which, along with our observational 
beliefs, make up the fundamental assumptions on the basis of which we make the inferences and 
predictions we do in everyday reasoning. The issues which are generally at stake in practical 
applications of induction, for example in the context of weather forecasting or weighing of 
evidence in the process of law, do not preclude the employment of various assumptions 
representing prior knowledge of relevant causal principles which are not under examination. 
Such assumptions wil l entail more than the strict implications of any actual observational data 
For example: 'The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason 
has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that 1 am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can 
look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another.' {Treatise, 1.4.7.8). and 'let men be 
once fully convinced of these ... principles, and this will throw them so loose from all common systems, 
that they will make no difficulty of receiving any, which may appear the most extraordinary.' (Treatise, 
1.3.12.20) 
Although, as I have argued, Musgrave was mistaken in his account of Hume's argument for 
unprovability, he does (in my view rightly) observe that Hume seems to think that more profound 
problems arises as a consequence of this basic problem. Hume seems to think that 'a belief is only 
reasonable if we can prove or justify or give a reason for it.' (Musgrave, 1993, pi 52). 
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that might be employed in the inference. And some such non-observational assumptions, or at 
least underlying presumptions, will be pragmatically necessary in most or all practical 
applications of induction. 
No doubt, i f Hume was wrong and it were possible, a good understanding of some justification 
that would help to identify, and rationally to account for, those non-observational basic beliefs 
that we ought to hold, would be most helpful in illuminating the further questions of 
justification which are our practical concern granted those beliefs. But whether or not Hume 
was right, what we need as a practical priority is an understanding of how in general to ensure, 
and to demonstrate, that the ampliative extensions we make to whatever initial beliefs we 
presume to be just, are justified granted the justness of those initial beliefs. In Gambling with 
Truth Levi (1967, p3-6) comments on 'a rather delicate division of labor' between philosophers 
and scientists, suggesting that although in science the issue of justification only arises ' in the 
context of specific enquiries', philosophers tend to be more concerned with the '"global" 
justification of the totality of beliefs held at a given time'. However he goes on to point out that 
scientists require appropriate criteria for the determination of their "local" justifications, and 
that it is the proper task of the philosopher of science to establish appropriate criteria for this 
purpose. In a similar vein, Arthur Burks (1980) has argued, following Pierce, that learning and 
induction involves a hierarchy of interrelated systems, in which case the 'locality' of an issue or 
justification may be a matter of degree, depending on the depth of the justification sought within 
the hierarchy. My primary concern in this analysis is with justifications relating to questions 
that we would ordinarily take to be straightforward matters of fact under conditions of 
uncertainty - as is generally the situation in the context of relatively high order or 'local' 
enquiries such as judgement of fact in criminal trials - rather than, for example, in the 
epistemological context of scientific theory choice. 
Of course there is no sharp dividing line here; some beliefs are more common and more basic 
than others. But it should nevertheless be clear enough to most of us that we should not allow 
Hume's problem to significantly shake our confidence about the common predictive inferences 
that govern our everyday interaction with the world. Of course that does not solve the problem 
of the inductive inferences and assumptions that we disagree on. Moreover, as we have seen, 
there is an outstanding question to be raised about the precise content of the presumptions we 
employ when we make predictions. We have noted that the ontic representation of the principle 
of continuity that appears to be implicit in Hume's account in view of its overt ontic form does 
not seem to be quite right. I have suggested an epistemic modification would appear to remove 
the most obvious problems with it. But even i f we are relatively untroubled by Hume's problem 
of unprovability, Goodman's more modem 'new riddle' of induction can appear to threaten the 
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viability of even the most superficially innocuous accounts of the basic principle of induction. I 
shall turn to such more troublesome issues in the final part of the thesis. 
But for the moment I shall focus in Part Two on the central issue of the logical structure of 
(logically ampliative) inductive argument. Here 1 shall examine in more detail the justificatory 
function and structure of argument, and illustrate how logically inductive arguments, properly 
construed are in fact deductively valid in form. We shall also see how this analysis seems to 
clarify the applicability of Hume's problem in the general case of logically ampliative induction. 
This wil l also help us to settle the question of the appropriate conditions for premise-adequacy. 
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PART TWO 
THE DEMONSTRATIVE FUNCTION OF ARGUMENT, 
AND THE CASE FOR EPISTEMIC DEDUCTIVISM 
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C H A P T E R F I V E 
T H E DEMONSTRATIVE FUNCTION OF ARGUMENT 
The natural concept of argument 
In order to approach the issue of the basic conditions for the cogency or goodness of an 
argument, we need to first to make some preliminary points on the nature and function of 
arguments. In this chapter I shall discuss a natural concept of argument, the basic or primary 
function of which is the propositional clarification (or, in the natural sense, 'demonstration') of 
justification for (typically) belief or a degree of belief that a hypothesis is true on the basis of 
some assumptions. My concern in this thesis falls within the subject of informal logic, or what 
might be called the philosophy of argument, where the term 'argument' is interpreted in a 
natural rather than a formal sense. As Terence Parsons notes in the leader to his essay 'What is 
an argument?' the frequent comment 
" I see what your premises are," says the philosopher, "and I see your conclusion. But I just 
don't see how you get there. 1 don't see the argument." (Parsons 1996, p 164) 
Parsons suggests that such comments indicate the fact that 'there is a notion of argument in 
philosophy which does not consist just of premises and conclusion; it has additional structure' 
and that this to be distinguished from the technical notion commonly employed in logic texts, 
where the term 'argument' refers more minimally just to 'an ordered pair consisting of the 
premises and the conclusion' - or more formally (c.f Sinnott-Armstrong 1999) - consisting of 
a set of propositions and a proposition. I shall have more to say about the general structure of 
natural arguments in Chapter six. But for the moment we may note that Parson's elaboration on 
the more natural concept (which he calls the 'philosophical' concept) indicates certain features 
the significance of which I shall consider in more detail. Parson's suggests that 
The philosopher's argument is something ... more akin to the logician's notion of derivation: a 
series of statements with intermediate steps providing the transition from premises to conclusion. 
(Parsons, 1996, pi64) 
Of course it is not always the case that there are intermediate steps in an argument. In relatively 
simple cases the conclusion may be immediately drawn following a statement of the premise or 
premises.^' But Parson's characterisatioh'here (regardleiss of the legitimacy of the analogy in 
And in any case, it is generally acknowledged that intermediate steps of inference within a larger 
argument may themselves be regarded as small sub-arguments. 
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the pertinent respects with the logician's notion of derivation) reveals certain other points of 
significance. Notably natural arguments consist in a series of statements, as distinct from 
abstract entities such as propositions, and some of these statements in some sense 'provide' - or 
we might alternatively say 'explain' or 'clarify' - the 'transition' from premises to conclusion -
the latter presumably referring to the inference, or the justification for it. I shall discuss the 
significance of these points in more detail in what follows. 
The broader context of our concern in these matters is with those particular speech and thought 
acts that people perform when they are discussing and thinking about the justification for their 
beliefs and judgements, which we naturally refer to respectively as 'arguments' and 
'inferences'. But there are a number of reasons why we should want to focus on the more 
tangible case of the speech acts that we refer to as 'arguments': One reason for this is ease of 
identification. The underlying assumptions of an inference in the psychological sense, whereby 
an inference is a process of thought, may be difficult to pin down. For example it might be clear 
that a certain proposition P I believe is part of the support for the conclusion of an inference I 
make, but it might nevertheless be unclear whether other propositions that perhaps form part of 
my justification for believing P are also to be regarded as premises of the inference. In the case 
of an expressed argument this problem need not arise, since of course so long as an argument is 
clearly expressed it should at least be clear what the premises are. Thus, on my intended sense 
of the term, an actual argument is (basically) a series of assertions of suitably related statements 
(along with any of their intended and relevant conversational implications) asserted with the 
intent of making it clear to an audience, that some particular proposition, the hypothesis, ought 
to, or may reasonably, be believed, or regarded as likely, to be true. (This basic account will 
receive some qualification in what follows, although 1 take it that this initial account is 
nevertheless fairly representative of the paradigm case of argument in the natural sense of the 
term.) 
I do not of course deny that there are different conceptions of argument, or that a different 
concept wi l l be more appropriate in the theoretical context offormal logic. It is simply that our 
particular concern here is with the more natural concept under which an argument is a series of 
assertions, made in a context with the purpose of clarifying justification for regarding a 
hypothesis with some epistemic attitude. But how does this concept relate to the theoretical or 
hypothetical arguments that no-one necessarily asserts which are commonly the subject matter 
of examples in the study of even informal logic? A hypothetical or possible argument is a 
possible (as distinct from actual) assertion of such a sequence of propositions with such intent. 
Such hypothetical cases provide a convenient resource for the theoretical logician who neither 
wishes nor needs to concern himself with the question of whether the 'examples' he discusses 
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have been, or ever will be, actually asserted as an argument, as distinct from being merely 
mentioned or described and analysed as they often are in logical texts. However, since the 
distinction is irrelevant to much of our concerns about general principles of argument appraisal, 
I shall, where unproblematic, follow the standard practice** of employing the unqualified term 
'argument' to refer to anything that is either an actual assertion of such a sequence of 
propositions, or a possible assertion of such. 
Clarity - a primary condition of cogency 
Generosity requires that when interpreting an argument we take into account any pertinent 
points that are somehow clearly implicit or clearly taken to go without saying. But generosity 
only requires us to go so far in taking responsibility for identification of what is intended by the 
arguer to be understood by an argument he or she presents to us. And the bounds of our 
responsibility in this respect are defined basically by what is clear from what is said in the 
context of presentation. I f it is not clear from what is said in the context what is intended to be 
understood by an argument, then the argument as it stands will fail to set out clearly any 
purported justification for a certain epistemic attitude toward the hypothesis, and wil l thereby 
fail the first test of cogency. On this approach then the proper interpretation or construal of an 
argument may be taken to include any (clear) conversational implications of what is expressed*^ 
that are pertinent to the supposed justification, as well as (or in some cases possibly instead off^ 
the proper logical implications of what is actually said. Thus on this approach an argument wil l 
include at least what is logically or conversationally implied in what the arguer actually says, or 
otherwise clearly and unequivocally intended given what the arguer actually says, in the context 
within which it is uttered. In this case we might be inclined to say that an argument consists of 
a core of actual statements, plus certain supplementary propositions, that are one way or another 
implicit in what is actually said in the context. For the sake of simplicity though we may 
If the reader does not agree that this is a fair representation of standard practice, they may ignore the 
word 'standard' here, since that implication is peripheral to my concern. 
For example, if one of my expressed premises is 'Mega-route X is complete much more often than The 
Shroud', that does not logically imply but nevertheless usually conversationally implies that / believe 
Mega-route X is complete much more often than The Shroud. If I make that assertion without believing 
it there is something amiss or at least unusual about the context of the assertion, for example it might be 
the case that it is not intended as a genuine piece of information at all, but I am acting out a fictional 
episode of communication in the context of a play intended for your entertainment. 
* I have in muid here cases where, in accord with perceived convention, a conclusion might take the form 
of a categorical statement, when in fact the argument is actually understood merely to justify a relatively 
small degree of belief or plausibility for the supposition that the stated proposition might be tiaieT Skyrms 
(1975) for example seems to employ the policy of presenting an argument as a list of generally, 
categorical premises followed by a categoricarcbhclifsion, presiimably even in the case where the 
'inductive strength' of the argument is very low, and understood to be so by the presenter, who might in 
fact be intending merely to put the case that the hypothesis is not entirely implausible. In such a case the 
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nevertheless regard the intended argument as, in principle, a series of statements, such as would 
be expressed by the arguer were he or she to fully explicate both what is explicit and what is 
implicit in the initial overt presentation of the argument. Of course, in practice, the best way to 
establish exactly what is intended by any initial presentation of an argument is precisely to elicit 
from the arguer an explicit account of exactly what is intended. The proper construal of an 
argument then may in principle be identified with the content of what is expressed in such a 
fully explicated version of it. 
In any case an argument will not be a good argument i f it is not clear what the arguer intends to 
be included in or understood by it. The onus after all is on the arguer to clarify whatever 
justification his argument is designed to clarify. So most of the rest of what we need to say 
about argument cogency may be related to arguments where it is clear what the arguer intends to 
be included in the argument. In practice we do not need to be overly dogmatic in this regard 
about a need for absolute clarity in the overt representation of an argument as it stands on initial 
presentation, since it will often be reasonably clear that there are certain implicit suppositions, 
and of course when certain pertinent points aren't particularly clear from the initial presentation 
of an argument, we will generally be able to ask the arguer for the respective clarifications. 
Live argument v textual analysis, and the question of missing premises 
In this regard there is a significant difference between the case of an old argument presented by 
a thinker now dead, and arguments presented by the living. The only chance I wi l l get to make 
clear the arguments I want to propound is while I am alive, and i f a first stab I make at 
presenting an argument is not satisfactorily clear to you, then you have the opportunity to 
enlighten me about what aspect of it is unclear to you. Perhaps you may be unsure whether 1 
am taking for granted a certain presumption, for example that the evidence 1 cite is all the 
relevant evidence I have, or whether one of the conditionals 1 include among my premises is 
supposed to be a claim of logical implication. An important factor in the pragmatics of 
argument is that in such cases you are free to ask me to clarify the respective points of 
uncertainty. As far as everyday argument is concerned where we are generally engaged in 
interactive exchanges on an issue, this point is of considerable importance in for example 
settling the concerns often raised about the identifiably of'missing premises', or concerning 
what kind or degree of support the premises are supposed to provide for the conclusion. Govier 
for example raises a number of points on this issue of missing premises - much of which may 
proper logical implication of the stated conclusion h is that h is true, while the arguer would not in fact 
intend any such assertion in presenting his argument. 
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be quite relevant when we are dealing with an issue of textual analysis of an argument of a dead 
philosopher, which leaves room for a question to be raised, and concludes that 
All of these considerations suggest that the problem of missing premises is much more complicated 
than it might seem at first. ... Confident statements to the effect that such and such argument 
clearly has some statement as a missing premise are inappropriate. Whether a statement is a missing 
premise in some argument depends on our theory of argument, our purpose in analyzing the 
argument, and much else. (Govier 1987, 102-3) 
However, my concern is with live argument and the interactive processes of reasoning in which 
it arises. And in this scenario all you need to do to find out whether a statement is a missing 
premise in argument - if that is not entirely clear from the context - is to ask the arguer. Of 
course in some cases the response might be uncertainty on the part of the arguer, possibly 
leading to a retraction of the original argument, and possibly followed by a modified version.*^ 
But in such cases, at least we have established that the original argument was not satisfactorily 
clear, and may thereby conclude the appraisal with result that that initial version of it was an 
unsatisfactory argument. Those who want to engage in textual analysis of old arguments wi l l 
naturally have much greater problems to face, as indicated by Govier. But as far as the 
interpretation and appraisal of live argument is concerned, within the everyday process of 
interactive reasoning, our situation is greatly simplified. And it is this kind of argument analysis 
which is my concern. This is not a thesis about textual analysis. 
Aspects of epistemic justification, and the variety of epistemic aims of argument 
We noted earlier that in introducing the concept of inductive inference, as they understand it, 
both Swinburne and Skyrms presented an initial account in terms of an epistemic relation -
'providing good evidence for' and 'making it reasonable to accept'. But what is also worth 
noting is that in each case this is immediately qualified in terms of probability. Skyrms 
suggests that 
89 I am not suggesting here that it will always be a straightforward matter to ask the arguer, particularly 
when the argument is encountered in print, or when the audience is large and only a few will have the 
opportunity to respond. However, with the benefit of electronic communication, it is generally not 
particularly difficult to put an interpretive query to an arguer. But the point I am making is also one of 
principle-The primary issues I am concerned with are how to make afgufhents (particularly inductive 
arguments) clear, and what are the criteria for appraisal of clear arguments - not how, to gp^  about 
interpreting an unclear argurneht when, for whatever reason, you are unable to communicate with the 
arguer in order to do so. 
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An argument is inductively strong if and only if it is improbable that its conclusion is false while 
its premises are true, and it is not deductively valid (Skyrms 1975, p7) 
Similarly, although he favours a more complex elaboration (also in terms of probability), 
Swinburne, in 1974, acknowledges as one possible interpretation of'inductive inference': 
that an inductive inference is one for which, it is claimed, the premises make the conclusion 
probable (Swinburne 1974, p5)" 
and more recently has offered a basic definition of'inductive probability' which appears to be 
equivalent to the relation that is supposed to hold between premises and conclusion in those 
earlier accounts of'inductive inference' or 'inductively strong argument': 
Inductive probability is a measure of the extent to which one proposition r makes another one q 
likely to be true. (Swinburne 2001, p62, my emphasis) 
Since in each case the probabilistic account is intended as an elaboration on an initial epistemic 
account of inductive inference, it would seem that a corresponding epistemic interpretation of 
the concept of probability would be appropriate in this context. Of course some theorists wil l 
prefer to present arguments in terms of physical rather than epistemic 'probabilities', such as 
long run relative frequencies, or 'propensities'. But even in such cases where an argument is 
presented in which it is supposed that the premises establish some physical probability on (or 
as) a hypothesis - we wil l still need to understand what epistemic attitude towards the 
hypotheses is, or is supposed to be, established by the argument. 
Thus, while the epistemic aim in general of an inductive inference will be to establish the 
appropriateness of some kind of epistemic attitude towards the hypothesis (granted the pertinent 
assumptions), different types of epistemic attitude may be appropriate (and aimed for) in 
different cases. An inductive argument may for example be designed to establish the 
appropriateness of a categorical belief that the hypothesis is true, a pragmatic 'acceptance' of 
'^ Susan Haack offers a similar probabilistic account of the inductive inferability relation in 'Philosophy 
of Logics': 'An argument is inductively strong if the truth of its premises makes the truth of its conclusion 
probable.' (Haack, 1978, p247) 
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Swmbume makes it explicit that 'r and q may be complicated conjunctions or disjunctions of other 
propositions' and thus this will mirror Haack's, and Swinburne's earlier acknowledged alternative 
account of mductive strength in the case where r is the premise or conjunction of the premises of an 
inductive argument and q is the conclusion. 
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the hypothesis within a particular context or for a particular purpose, or merely some (quantified 
or qualified) degree of belief that the hypothesis is true. Further complications may also arise 
with regard to arguments that might arise in the context of scientific or philosophical 
justification. For example a constructive empiricist may be less concerned with the truth of a 
hypothesis than with the reasons for believing it to be empirically adequate (within the context 
of an associated theory). Even a realist who places particular emphasis on the revisionary 
nature of scientific progress, or on the unspecified provisos that will in practice apply to the 
theoretical generalisations that are commonly employed in scientific judgements, may believe 
an expressed general hypothesis to be strictly false, but nevertheless wish to argue that it has a 
satisfactory degree of 'verisimilitude' or closeness-to-truth for practical purposes. Similarly a 
Popperian anti-inductivist might wish to argue that a general hypothesis has a high degree of 
corroboration, even though he denies that that provides any justification for believing the 
hypothesis - but of course in each case the respective argument, i f it is to be successful, wi l l 
nevertheless need to set out the purported justification for the claim that the theorist does wish 
to make, whether it be that the hypothesis is well corroborated, empirically adequate, or in some 
sense 'close to the truth'. 
Furthermore, it is not only the details of the supposedly justified epistemic status of the 
hypothesis that is relevant to the cogency of an argument, but also the presumed epistemic status 
of the information cited in the premises. Even i f an argument is clearly deductively valid, it will 
not be a good or cogent^^ argument i f no party to the argument has any reason to regard the 
evidence statements as true, to some degree likely, well corroborated, or close to the truth, or, in 
general, as having whatever epistemic status (theoretical or otherwise) they are supposed to be 
accorded in the context of the supposed justification. 
Problems with Govier's account of the possibilities 
With these considerations in mind we may note a number of problems with Govier's anaysis of 
the various views on argument cogency. On the basis of a literature survey, Govier (1992, 
p393) presents six different views as to the conditions for the two aspects of argument cogency 
(i.e. premise-adequacy and inferential or logical adequacy) as set out, with some modifications, 
below.'" 
By 'cogent' I mean an argument that is suitably constructed so as to be successful in legitimate 
achievementof its basic aim of justification^larificafioh; in the context of its occuirence. 
1 have reproduced Govier's list of the six different views, the descriptions of which are more or less 
word for word, with clarifications and simplifications indicated by parentheses and footnotes, albeit with 
headings that 1 think better refiect the content of the respective views, and Govier's headings in 
parenthesis. 
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An argument is cogent i f and only i f 
Explicit alethic deductivism: (which Govier calls 'Classical' deductivism) 
(1) its explicit'^ premises are true; and 
(2) its explicit premises deductively entail its conclusion. 
Enthymematic epistemic deductivism: ('Methodological' deductivism) 
(1) its premises (explicit and implicit) are acceptable (to the audience to whom 
the argument is addressed); and 
(2) its premises, explicit and implicit, together deductively entail its 
conclusion. 
Strict alethic inductivism: ('Classical positivism') 
(1) its premises'* are/rwe; and 
(2) Either its premises deductively entail its conclusion, 
or its premises lend strong inductive support to its conclusion. 
Strict epistemic inductivism: ('Pragmatic positivism') 
(1) its premises are acceptable (to the audience to whom the argument is 
addressed); and 
(2) Either its premises deductively entail its conclusion, 
or its premises lend strong inductive support to its conclusion. 
Liberal epistemic inductivism: ('Qualified spectrum view') 
(1) its premises are acceptable (to the audience to whom the argument is 
addressed); and 
(2) its premises are connected to its conclusion by an inferential link that is (at 
least) as strong as the argument claims it to be. 
Standard epistemic inductivism: ('Pluralist view') 
I add the term 'explicit' here partly because I take Govier's insertion of the qualification'explicit and 
implicit' in the specification of'methodological deductivism' to conversationally imply that that 
qualification does not apply in the case of what she intends by 'Classical' deductivism, and is thereby 
intended to mark one point of difference in this respect. This view is confirmed by Govier's subsequent 
complaint against Classical deductivism that 'few arguments are deductively valid as stated (Govier, 
1992, p396, my emphasis). 
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(1) its premises are acceptable (to the audience to whom the argument is 
addressed); and 
(2) its premises, considered together, offer sufficient or adequate grounds for 
(believing) its conclusion.^^ 
One of the problems with Govier's partition of the different views, as illustrated by my choice 
of headings, is that in some cases a number of logically independent differences are taken to be 
jointly essential to the discriminated views. For example, many philosophers think that it is the 
epistemic status of the premises, such as knowledge or reasonable belief that the premises are 
true, that matters with regard to the propriety of the premises. On Govier's account of the 
alternatives, "Classical deductivism' would need to be rejected in favour of clause (1) of 
'Methodological deductivism' by a deductivist who recognises this. Unfortunately though, 
Govier's division of the alternatives suggests that deductivists who do take this view also take 
the view that propositions that are not explicitly included (either directly or by logical 
implication) in the content of what is actually expressed in an argument can make a difference 
to its cogency. Thus, on Govier's account of the alternatives, a deductivist who insists that no 
presumptions that are not expressed in an argument can contribute toward the cogency of that 
argument^^ but who believes that it is the epistemic status of the premises, and not simply their 
truth that is required, does not fall into any of the positions set out by Govier. Admittedly 
Govier does claim that pertinent texts reveal at least six alternatives. Nevertheless, such a 
clumsy approach to what is purported to be differentiation between the various views hardly 
seems conducive to analytical clarity. 
Another problem with Govier's account of the alternatives is that all of the (four) 'views' that 
present epistemic conditions for premises adequacy share exactly the same account of the 
epistemic conditions required. On Govier's survey of the various views, it would seem that 
Govier does not make it clear at this point whether form here on, where inductive inference is 
concerned, 'premises' is supposed to refer to both explicit and implicit premises or only explicit premises. 
On Govier's account of the pluralist view, there is an 'addhional' condition that the premises are 
relevant to the conclusion. I take it that it is generally regarded as a norm of argument construction that 
no irrelevant premises should be included, although accidental inclusion of superfluous premises need not 
be a significant problem for the adequacy or cogency of an argument provided the intended support for 
the conclusion is apparent from the relevant premises. Since no argument theorist would want to deny 
that the premises of an argument should be relevant to its conclusion, to be fair we should regard this as a 
condition that is common to all views, and that the inferential connection required on each view is 
required to hold between the re/evawr premises and the conclusion, although we may take these 
qualifications for granted for the sake of simplicity of expression. 
as distinct from an inference, since this is the context in which Govier fraihes the issue. It is reasonable 
to suppose that Govier intends 'argument' to be interpreted in the sense in which this is commonly 
distinguished form 'inference' - as something expressed(dXbexX perhaps in conjunction with associated 
unexpressed connotations or presumptions) - since otherwise no sense could be made of her distinction 
between the explicit and implicit 'premises' of the argument. 
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everyone who takes an epistemic view of premise-adequacy thinks that this can simply be 
spelled out in terms of the acceptability of the premises (to the audience). Furthermore, it 
would seem, from Govier's subsequent treatment of this concept, that she intends 'acceptability' 
as 'a normative concept' (p407) and is related to a concept of acceptance that is synonymous 
with belief 
What counts is whether the audience has good reasons to believe [the argument's 
premises] true (Govier, 1992, p396, my emphasis) 
This would appear to conflict with subjectivist views on which it is simply what we believe that 
matters for the appraisal of premises, and that the normativity in an argument simply applies 
with respect to the conclusion granted belief of the premises. On this alternative view, 
disregarded by Govier, a good argument will show that we ought to accept the conclusion 
granted what we actually believe, and any question that might arise with regard to justification 
for the beliefs on which the argument is based will be quite independent of the appraisal of the 
argument in hand. Furthermore, it is sometimes suggested that neither truth nor belief nor 
justification for belief is necessary for premise-adequacy. Entirely unexceptionable generalities 
are hard to come by, and as we have noted it is often supposed that we reasonably 'accept' 
general scientific hypotheses, in the everyday context of practical inference and decision 
making, even though we might most reasonably believe that they are strictly false'^ Whatever 
one might think of that particular approach, it is clearly an unsatisfactory feature of Govier's 
account of the alternative's that no disagreement whatsoever about the epistemic conditions 
required for premise-adequacy is recognised between any of the acknowledged alternatives that 
interpret premise-adequacy in epistemic terms. 
The deontologicai aspect of epistemic justification 
In what 1 have said thus far I have taken it for granted that 'justification' may take either the 
weak form of mere rational permissibility, whereby the proposition may reasonably be believed 
(accepted, regarded as likely or whatever) or the stronger form of rational obligation to believe 
or accept the proposition. It is unfortunate that the common terminology of justification in 
epistemology tends to reflect the weak interpretation. To say that I am 'justified' or 'warranted' 
in believing a proposition P on the natural interpretation of these terms would appear to strictly 
imply nothing more than that it is rationally permissible for me to believe that P. An action or 
Maher (1993, pi37) for example argues that 'anyone reflecting on the history of science ought to give a 
low probability (less than V2) to any given significant current theory being literally correct. Yet scientists 
continue to sincerely assert significant scientific theories.'. 
attitude may be said to be 'justified' i f it is permissible, and the claim that one ought to adopt 
the respective attitude, or act as prescribed, is naturally taken to imply that it would be just to do 
so. But the mere claim that an attitude is 'just' or 'justified' is not, on the natural interpretation 
of that claim, generally taken to imply that it is obligatory. 
However, despite the traditional phrasing of philosophical discussions of the epistemology of 
credence in terms of 'justification' and 'warrant', in the normal dynamics of belief appraisal and 
debate in which arguments arise, there is not in general a presumption that the audience 
(typically the subject) to whom an argument is addressed wants or is naturally inclined to 
believe the hypothesis in question, and simply needs to acknowledge the permissibility of doing 
so. After all, even an ardent subjectivist might be inclined to insist that despite the subjectivity 
of his beliefs he has every right to hold the opinions he does. But, in the relatively simple 
paradigm case,of argument there is typically a conviction on the part of the arguer that the 
hypothesis is true, and that the evidence on which his or her conviction is based, and which is 
presented to the audience, is sufficiently compelling to render an attitude of indifference or 
agnosticism unreasonable. The basic aim of the argument in this paradigm case, in contrast to 
the natural associations of the concept of justification, is to make it clear to the audience that on 
rational consideration of the evidence they ought to believe the hypothesis - not merely that the 
evidence clarifies the option of their believing it. This strong justificatory objective is perhaps 
best exemplified by the criterion for conviction in criminal law, under which the hypothesis that 
the defendant is guilty as charged needs to be shown (to the satisfaction of the jury) to be 
established 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Thus, while it wil l sometimes be the aim of a 
(defensive) inductive argument merely to establish that the hypothesis may reasonably be 
believed (or accepted, or regarded with some degree of belief) granted the premises - rather 
than that rationality requires that it should be, it is the more challenging and pressing aim of 
endeavouring to show, when (in the view of the arguer) it is important, that the subject should 
adopt a certain epistemic attitude towards a proposition (in the evidential situation) that will 
demand the main focus of our attention. 
Justification v. Rational persuasion 
It is commonly supposed that persuasion to believe the hypothesis, albeit on the basis of 
rational considerations, is the basic function of an argument in the paradigm case. Dummet 
(1973, p296) for example (even in the context of the justification of deduction) simply contrasts 
'suasive' arguments - whose role is to 'persuade' the audience 'o f the truth of the concluison' 
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with explanatory arguments. Others, for example Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong (2004) are in 
my view closer to the mark when they regard justification as the primary function. Persuasion 
to reasonably believe might well be a common or even typical objective of the arguer when 
presenting an argument. But even in such a case - insofar as it is intended as essentially an 
attempt to convince the audience of the rationality of the respective epistemic attitude - in the 
hope that they might adopt the appropriate attitude on that basis - the primary function of the 
argument is to make it clear to the audience that indeed that is the rational attitude to take. 
While this aim of clarification of rationality or justification is essential to all cases of rational 
argument as such. The common albeit supplementary aim of persuasion by production of such 
argument is not essential. Ti illustrate the point, we can imagine a situation in which someone 
employs an argument with the intent of making it clear to his audience that rationality demands 
that they ought to believe a hypothesis h, say the atheistic hypothesis that there is no God - even 
i f the arguer knows fi i l l well that his audience, let us suppose a committed fundamentalist, will 
not conform with the demands of rationality but wil l most certainly continue along their chosen 
path of blind faith. The further aim of presenting such an argument in this case might be simply 
to fu l f i l what the arguer perceives to be his moral duty at least to inform his audience of what 
rationally demands they ought to believe. 
My intention here is not to dispute the importance of the persuasive power of rational argument, 
or the frequency of its employment as a means of persuasion, but simply to note that evaluation 
in respect of such application of logical argument as a means of persuasion is a matter for the 
psychologist rather than the logician. Our concern is with identification of the basic criteria of 
logical cogency rather than persuasive power. I f the presentation of the argument is suitably 
constructed so as to make it clear to the audience, or at least to make it satisfactorily easy for the 
audience to see (should they be willing to seriously consider the question) that rationally they 
ought to believe the hypothesis, but nevertheless they somehow fail to believe it, that is not a 
failing of the argument in respect of achievement of its essential function as a rational argument. 
That is merely a failure or unwillingness on the part of the audience to accept the clear 
implications of logical reasoning. But the fact remains that in such a case the original argument 
nevertheless provides clear propositional access for the audience to a satisfactory clarification of 
the fact that rationally they ought to believe the hypothesis. And as far as the merits of the 
argument is concerned - that is all we require for the argument to be a good or cogent argument. 
As a basic characterisation then, the essential function of an argument, at least in the paradigm 
case, is to make it clear to the audience that the subject (most commonly the audience 
themselves) rationally ought to believe the hypothesis, on the basis of the cited (or offered) 
assumptions. Thus an argument is cogent, in the sense of importance to us i f it is suitably 
constructed so as to make it clear to the audience that the subject ought to (or may) adopt the 
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epistemic attitude towards the hypothesis endorsed by the arguer (typically, belief, or some 
degree of belief). 
The need to ^^mo/t /^ra/e justification 
The initial account of argument I have set out is related to what 1 perceive to be the basic or 
primary function of arguments. The intended function of an actual argument, on this account, is 
to make it clear to an audience (typically an external audience, sometimes the arguer) by 
prepositional reasoning, that some party (the 'subject' - usually the audience) ought to (or may) 
believe a hypothesis or regard it as to some extent likely. This might be described as the 
'clarificatory' or 'demonstrative' function of argument, ahhough the latter needs to be 
interpreted in a natural sense of the term associated with 'showing' or making it clear that 
something is the case, rather than in the unfortunate and unnecessary interpretation of the term 
whereby it is has came to be commonly utilised basically as a synonym of 'deductive''™. 
Whatever our initial agreements might be, the crucial thing that we need to be able to do, in 
order to be able to formulate, effectively evaluate, and persuasively employ a cogent inductive 
argument is to judge correctly and indeed to demonstrate - for one's own confirmation, or for 
that of anyone else who needs to know - when those initial agreements really do make it 
rationally obligatory (or permissible) to believe, or accept, the truth of, some proposition of 
concern not entailed by the content of those initial beliefs.'*" This concept of demonstration is 
to be distinguished from the traditional technical sense, or the simplified variant of it 
exemplified in Salmon's definition: 
A demonstrative inference is one whose premises necessitate its conclusion; the conclusion 
cannot be false if the premises are true ... A demonstrative inference is necessarily truth-
preserving; a nondemonstrative inference is not. (Salmon 1966, p8. My emphases.) 
To use the term 'demonstrative' in such an unnatural technical sense in this way, when there is a 
perfectly adequate technical term for the concept defined, namely 'deductively valid', and 
particularly when there is significantly different and important condition for good arguments 
that would naturally warrant application of the term 'demonstrative' is, in my view, an 
unnecessary and regrettable distortion of the natural use of the term. 1 intend a more natural 
interpretation of'demonstrative', whereby an argument is successfully demonstrative of the 
acceptability of a proposition simply i f it satisfactorily shows us that the proposition of concern 
Or even sometimes more narrowly as a deductive argument with analytic or logically true premises. 
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should (or may) be accepted i f the premises are true (depending of course on wfiat it is intended 
to show us). This is after all what the essential fiinction of rational argument is supposed to be. 
In a situation where we cannot determine the truth of a proposition of concern for certain, and 
its acceptability is not immediately obvious from what is known, argument is required in order 
to enable us to see, or make evident, whether the proposition ought nevertheless to be accepted 
on the basis of the relevant information we have. 
In order to do this it is not sufficient simply to present a list of accepted premises which 
together, in the case of deduction, happen to entail the proposition in question or, in the case of 
induction, which are in some unspecified way supposed to 'make' the proposition in question 
acceptable (except of course in simple and unproblematic cases where there is no reason for 
anyone to question the suggested entailment or acceptability-making). Even in the case of 
deduction, it is not sufficient for a cogent deductive argument merely that the premises are 
clearly true and the conclusion cannot be false i f the premises are true. I f that were the case 
then any clearly true premise followed by a conclusion consisting of any analytical conjecture 
(i.e. a proposition that is necessarily false i f false or necessarily true i f true) which happens 
(without our yet having figured it out) to be necessarily true would constitute a cogent deductive 
argument for that conjecture. 
Clearly then, even in the case of a deductively valid argument, whose premises are clearly true, 
there is a further condition that needs to be satisfied in order for the the argument to a 
satisfactory or cogent deductive argument - and that is that the argument must satisfactorily 
demonstrate that the conclusion must be true i f the premises are. Similarly in the case of 
inductive argument, a satisfactorily demonstrative inductive argument needs to demonstrate or 
to show us (for example) that the subject ought to accept the hypothesis in view of the evidence. 
Often we are concerned with issues in situations where neither the truth of the hypothesis nor its 
inferability from our common assumptions are satisfactorily obvious to all concerned. In such 
situations, just as my mere intuition that a proposition is true is not sufficient to justify your 
acceptance of the proposition at issue (or indeed my acceptance of it in the latter case), my mere 
intuition that the proposition follows from certain agreed premises, or is made acceptable by 
them is not sufficient either. The fundamental purpose of argument, whether deductive or 
inductive, in such situations is to enable us to demonstrate (when it is the case) that a hypothesis 
ought to (or may) be accepted on the grounds provided. 
If our earlier analysis of Hume's core argument for unprovability is correct then in the context of 
everyday reasoning where we take it for granted that some non-observational assumptions, even if 
unproven, are just - then Hume's problem of unprovability will not be a problem for this. 
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We have sufficient technical terminology at our disposal for application to the concept of 
deductive validity without employing as an alternative a term of much wider and significantly 
distinct application, in particular when it's more natural interpretation has such direct relevance 
to the object of our analysis. Moreover, as we have seen, this basic interpretation of the term 
'demonstrative' is also important for the appraisal of deductive argument, and so needs to be 
clearly distinguished from the concept specified in Salmon's proposed use of the term. Despite 
this conceptual distinction between demonstrativity and deductive validity however, we shall 
see that, as it turns out, even in the context of inductive reasoning, deductive logic is the only 
logic we need in order to be able to demonstrate to an audience that a certain epistemic attitude 
ought to be adopted toward a hypothesis. 
We may note that this condition of demonstrativity (with respect to justification) may be 
distinguished from the less demanding condition of mere clarity of intention discussed above. I 
may present quite clearly an argument that is on reflection quite easily seen to be fallacious. In 
such a case, the argument clearly presented wil l fail to render satisfactorily clear the 
(mistakenly) supposed justification for the respective epistemic attitude toward the hypothesis, 
and thereby fail to satisfy the demostrativity condition for cogency. In this regard, we may 
distinguish two aspects of demonstrativity. In order for an argument to be satisfactorily 
demonstrative it must satisfy two conditions, as follows. 
An argument is demonstrative i f f 
(1) The argument makes it quite clear exactly what the purported justification for the 
hypothesis is supposed to be, i.e. what epistemic attitude towards the hypothesis is 
supposed to shown to be obligatory or permissible, and exactly how this is supposed to 
be shown. 
and 
(2) The argument is suitably constructed so as to make it clear to the satisfaction of the 
audience that the hypothesis « justified in the above respect. 
Interpersonal roles in the context of argument 
One respect in which the aims of different arguments may vary is with respect to the relations 
between the arguer, the audience, and the subject whose epistemic attitude towards the 
hypothesis is purported to be justified by the argument. Moreover, since the epistemic status of 
15 
a proposition is a relative matter, and is dependent on the epistemic position of the particular 
subject or subjects with respect to whom the attribution of the respective justification for 
believing the proposition is associated, this question of the epistemic status of the evidential 
information needs to be related to the question of the epistemic position of the subject of the 
argument (i.e. the party whose justification for a certain epistemic attitude towards he 
hypothesis is at issue) and to the epistemic position of the intended audience of the argument 
(whom the argument is intended to convince of the justness of the subject's recommended 
epistemic attitude towards the hypothesis). For example, even i f I believe am justified in 
accepting certain evidence claims, and make an inference that is clearly logically adequate to 
me, on the basis of that evidence, x^you don't think 1 am justified in accepting the evidence 
claims, I (as arguer) will be unable to employ a corresponding argument to convince yow (as my 
audience) that my acceptance (as the subject) of the hypothesis that I infer on the basis of that 
evidence is justified. 
Parsons (1996, pl74, fii. 13) commends Hamblin's (1970) survey of the traditional literature on 
fallacies, but admits that he ignores the literature inspired by Hamblin investigating fallacies 
defined within two-person dialogues 'because of my focus on argument'. This seems to be an 
odd reason to offer for ignoring a particular kind of fallacy, since of course what is meant by the 
term 'fallacy' in this general context is fallacious argument. Nevertheless, Parsons attempts to 
explain himself by insisting that he does not regard argument as a form of dialogue. The 
problem with this explanation though is that this literature does not presuppose that argument in 
general is a form of two person dialogue, only that arguments are sometimes presented within a 
context of two-person dialogue (and that the distinction between the two persons can be 
relevant to the function or purpose of the argument). Moreover, as we have noted even when 
this is not the case, the basic function of an argument that is prepared and constructed by myself 
for my own benefit may nevertheless be understood with reference to (at least) two personal 
roles being involved in the justificatory process."*^ On examining Parsons' introductory 
account of the nature of argument however, certain claims he makes there would seem to be 
inconsistent with a denial that there are two personal roles involved in arguments. Parsons 
claims that 'Arguments originate in texts, written or spoken.', which are then subjected to a 
process of interpretation yielding a 'refined argument' (Parsons 1996 pi65-6). But surely this 
commits Parsons to the implication that an argument has both an author, i.e. the author of the 
argumentative text or speech, generally termed the 'arguer') and an audience or receiver, i.e. the 
reader or listener, who interprets the argument. Moreover, some of the points Parsons wants to 
'"^ In such a case for example I may be the subject whose justification is sought for a certain epistemic 
attitude towards the hypothesis, and I may also be the arguer or in other words the author or presenter of 
the justification. 
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make, particularly on the structure of certain forms of argument (Parsons 1996, pi 68, fn. 5) 
seem to rely on the platitude that these two roles may (and often will) be taken by different 
people, with potentially differing normative perspectives, since these points make reference to 
both arguer (expressed in the second person) and an 'opponent' who might have a different 
view about what is acceptable. 
The significance of the multiple roles involved in the making of an argument is more clearly 
appreciated when we consider more closely than Parsons does, what is involved in the 'setting' 
and 'target' of an argument. Parsons (1996, pl67) suggests that a 'refined argument' (which is 
an interpretation of a spoken or written 'source' argument) consists of a reasoning structure 
propounded within a setting as a means of reaching a target. With regard to the notion of a 
'target' of an argument. Parsons is quite brief and has this to say: 
It is part of our notion of argument that it has a goal, which is to establish some particular 
proposition. That is all that I mean by a target - it is a proposition to be validated. (Parsons 
1996, pi68, Parsons' italics, my underline). 
But the need for more detailed analysis here is evident when we consider (a) what exactly is 
meant by 'establishing' (or 'validating'- which Parsons seems to regard as a synonym) a 
proposition, and (b) whether it is indeed always the goal of an argument to establish a 
proposition. As we have seen, the various combinations of variables that may be involved in 
the different possible justificatory functions of an argument, above and beyond the differences 
in the content of the 'object' propositions (which consist of the ontic 'evidential' propositions 
and the hypothesis) is considerable - and may be illustrated by the examples of various possible 
combinations of variables set out in the tables below: 
R O L E S IN A N ARGUMENT 
ARGUER AUDIENCE SUBJECT 
ROLE 
Clarifies (by production of 
the argument) that the 
subject has justification for 
holding some epistemic 
attitude towards the 
hypothesis 
Party to whom it is to be 
made clear (that the subject 
has said justification) 
Party whose 










ASPECTS OF E P I S T E M I C STATUS O F O B J E C T PROPOSITIONS 
EPISTEMIC 
OBJECT A T T I T U D E 
PROPOSITIONS'" : with which the 
A L E T H I C proposition is (or D E O N T O L O G I C A L 
E V I D E N T I A L S T A T U S ought to or may be) S T A T U S 
(E, - E„) of proposition regarded (by the of epistemic attitude 
& HYPOTHESIS subject) as having the 




Regard with: e.g. the subject 
E, • certainty ought rationally to 
E2 Verisimilitude • acceptance regard Ei as 
• belief certainly true 
Empirical 
• qualified/quantified or 
En point or interval Rational/epistemic 
adequacy degree of belief Permissibility 
H (expectation or e.g. the subject may 
'credence') reasonably believe 
that the hypothesis is 
empirically adequate 
This table is not intended to provide a comprehensive account of all aspects of the epistemic 
status of the propositions that may be relevant to the understanding and appraisal of an 
argument. Nor do I intend to suggest that each of the headings included will always be 
applicable'"'', or that they wil l always permit clear and distinct categorisations of the different 
possible aspects of the epistemic status of propositions. Rather the table is merely intended to 
provide an illustration of the different factors that may be involved in the interpretation of 
claims to epistemic justification, and to reinforce the inadequacy of a traditional purely ontic 
presentation of an inductive argument by mere specification of the supposed 'premises' and 
'conclusion'. The sheer variety of the possible epistemic relations that may be understood to be 
involved in the justification for an inductive inference mean that we cannot, in any particular 
case, possibly (propositionally) clarify the supposed justification for the inference (or for that 
Some of the object propositions might be statements of objective (or 'ontic') probability, such as 'The 
proportion of Fs among Gs is r' - as distinct from the epistemic probabilities, i.e. degrees of credence, 
with which such propositions might be regarded. 
'"^  For instance in the case of subjectivist argument it may be the case that there is no (or at least no 
intended, or intendedly relevant) presumption of any deontological status of the evidence statements - the 
presumption might be simply that they are believed, or accorded some degree of belief (although it would 
nevertheless seem that even here an argument will typically be intended to show that since the premises 
are believed the hypothesis ought to be too). 
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matter the nature of the inference that is supposed to be justified) unless we spell out clearly just 
what the supposed inference and justification is supposed to be. 
Epistemic justification, and other uses of argument 
Thus far I have said quite a lot about the importance of what I regard as the primary function of 
argument - basically demonstration of justification - but very little about other possible 
functions. I have suggested that an important function of argument is to enable us to 
demonstrate, for our personal confirmation or for the enlightenment of others, that a hypothesis 
ought rationally to be, or (alternatively) may reasonably be, accepted, or regarded with some 
degree of belief, on the basis of certain assumptions. However I do not of course wish to imply 
that this demonstrative fiinction is the only fiinction of argument. Let us now consider the 
relation of this to other possible functions of arguments. In Reason and Argument Peter Geach 
points out that 
Drawing conclusions from accepted premises in order to reach conclusions that you can accept 
and propound for acceptance is only one use of inference. (Geach 1976, p26, my emphasis) 
and he goes on to list various other uses of valid arguments. These include working out the 
logical consequences of theoretical or fictional scenarios for recreational or exercise purposes, 
demonstrating inconsistencies in certain sets of beliefs, in order to show that some revision is 
required, and determining the logical consequences of suppositions under consideration, in 
order to establish whether these are compatible with currently known or determinable facts. 
However, it may be regarded as implicit in Geach's analysis that the clarification of logical 
implication which is essential to the fundamental demonstrative function of deductive argument 
also enables these additional functions. Clearly i f the principles of deductive reasoning 
developed (primarily) for application to the inferential function of clarifying valid inferences 
from accepted premises did not also enable those additional applications, then they would 
simply not be regarded as additional functions of deduction. 
Analogous points equally apply in the case of inductive inference. The primary function of, for 
example, a relatively simple from of inductive argument - say to clarify that a hypothesis would 
be rationally acceptable or credible albeit, without being logically implied, on the basis of 
certain premises - may similarly be applied for example when we wish to investigate the 
inductive or probabilistic implications of certain suppositions, to assess the viability of possible 
credence states, to ensure credibility in our story lines, or for exercise of our reasoning powers. 
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As with the case of deduction, the conditions of logical adequacy for induction could clearly 
also be applicable in the context of such further functions in which we might not actually accept 
the premises, as well as to the particularly important cases in which we do and actually wish to 
establish the appropriate epistemic attitude toward the hypothesis. Likewise also, i f such 
additional functions were not facilitated by the same principles developed for the fiindamental 
inferential function, then such functions would not naturally be regarded as additional functions 
of induction. 
In any case, whatever additional functions may be facilitated by the principles required for 
satisfactory demonstration of justification for logically ampliative inference, our aim here is 
essentially to establish principles that will enable us to satisfactorily determine and to 
demonstrate when our initial beliefs and expectations do rationally oblige us to extend our belief 
or credence to certain propositions not entailed by the propositions initially believed or expected 
to be true. This function is of crucial importance in its own right so as to enable us to produce 
and appraise the inferences that we need to make and to make well, in the many circumstances 
where a hypothesis of importance cannot be simply established deductively from our prior 
beliefs. 
Horwich's objection to the justificatory function of argument 
It is possible to lose sight of, or even to dismiss, the significance of the basic justificatory 
function of argument in focusing on other aspects of the relationship that needs to hold between 
premises and conclusion, in a logically adequate argument. For example, in discussing the 
epistemic implications of a deductive principle of inference, Horwich argues as follows: 
(1) Modus Ponens does not require of someone who accepts p and p —» q that he should set 
about believing q as well. For (2) he might reasonably elect to abandon p. Rather, (3) its role is 
to legislate upon the rationality of certain combinations of beliefs. (4) It demands that, ideally, if 
his beliefs include p and p -> q, then q should already be included. (Horwich 1982, p74-75, 
my numbering and my emphasis) 
However (2), as it stands, does not support (1), as Horwich suggests it does, because i f someone 
did elect to abandon p then the condition of the requirement denied in (1), i.e. that he 'accepts p 
and p q', would not (or at least certainly should not) hold. The relation of logical implication 
between premises and conclusion in a deductive argument is synchronic. That is to say, that 
although it is possible for all the premises of a deductively valid argument to be true at t|, and 
yet the conclusion to be false at t j (provided of course that it is no longer the case that all the 
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premises are true) what is asserted in the claim of the deductive validity of the argument is 
merely that it is not possible for all the premises to be true and yet the conclusion to be false at 
the same time. This condition of synchronicity for deductive validity is likewise carried over 
into the epistemic implications of deduction. I f we follow Horwich in setting the point into a 
scenario where an agent is considering the implications of an instance of modus ponens for his 
future set of beliefs, the epistemic implication of the argument, considered at t i , is then that i f he 
does, at ta, accept that all the premises are true then he should (on the basis of deductive 
consistency) at t j , also accept that the conclusion is true. Consideration, at t i , of this 
requirement might disincline him to accept the premises at X.2, i f he has stronger reasons for 
believing the conclusion is false than he has for believing the premises. But the requirement 
itself is undeniable. 
The only potentially defensible reading of (1) would require us to attach different time 
references to the period over which it is suggested that the subject accepts the premises and the 
point at which it is proposed that that he should set about believing the conclusion. The point of 
importance is that, while a proponent of the relevant epistemic implication of modus ponens 
would want to deny (1) as it stands, such a differentially time-referenced reading is «o/the 
reading of (1) which any such proponent would want or intend to deny. Nor is it even a 
reasonably accessible reading of (1) as expressed. The force of the extension 'as weW in the 
phrase 'he should set about believing q as weir can be brought out by making explicit what 
would take the appropriate place in the expansion 'as well as To do this of course we 
simply need to look back in the sentence to find that this refers to 'believing (or accepting) p 
andp —>q\ But the suggestion that the agent should set about believing q as well as believing 
p and p —> q, is hardly compatible with an interpretation which assigns different time indexes to 
the believing of q and the believing of p and p ^ q. 
In contrast to Horwich's suggestion in (1), the role of modus ponens mentioned (but not 
specified) in (3) is normally construed as not merely forbidding the combination of p, p ^ q, 
and ~q, but indeed, as the very structure of the rule suggests, as positively requiring the addition 
of q (should one have failed to include q) to the set of beliefs of any agent whose beliefs (either 
newly, or continue to) include the combination of p and p -> q. 
The ideal demand expressed in (4) is not in itself objectionable as far as it goes, but it does not 
cover the requirement which is of real practical importance with respect to the common function 
of argument as a means of justifying belief extensions. Consider what the practical implications 
of an analogue of (4) might be in the case of a complex deductive calculation from a substantial 
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but reliable set of data, in conjunction with a set of uncontroversial mechanical and geometric 
principles, where naturally the conclusion is not apparent to you from the assumptions before 
you process the calculation. What of significance does the calculation, once followed, demand 
of you? In contrast to Horwich's suggestion, it does not merely demand that you accept that 
your initial belief-set was not ideal and that that past belief-set should already have included 
the conclusion. I f we seriously thought that that was all there were to the demands of logic then 
our arguments would never get us anywhere. The demand of importance is of course that i f you 
intend to continue believing that all the assumptions are true (as presumably you wil l unless you 
have some reason to believe that the facts might have altered since your observations were 
taken) then you should ensure that your new belief-set does include the conclusion - the 
analogue of which is exactly what (1) denies. 
Even in the case of simple examples like modus ponens, when indeed our initial belief sets 
would, not merely ideally, but actually be expected to already include the conclusion i f it 
included the premises, essentially the same point holds true. The crucial function of logic is not 
simply to let us know when we have made mistakes like such logical omissions. Although it is 
important to realise when we have made mistakes, the fundamental purpose of argument, in 
general, is for us to learn from our realised errors or omissions with regard to the justificatory 
implications of our prior assumptions. 
Such epistemic considerations are just as relevant to induction as they are to deduction. As 
with the case of deduction, having followed a satisfactorily demonstrative inductive argument 
for a rational obligation to accept a proposition p granted acceptance of the relevant set of 
premises, i f a rational agent A were to accept the truth of all the premises, then it should be 
apparent to A that he ought to accept p. Similarly in the weaker case of an inductive argument 
for the rational permissibility of acceptance of p: i f A follows a satisfactorily demonstrative 
inductive argument for the acceptability of p granted acceptance of certain premises, and 
accepts the truth of all the premises, then A should realise that he may rationally accept p. 
Having discussed the essential function of argument, and the variable factors involved, in the 
following chapters I shall argue that the standard formal account of the structure of argument 
fails to account for certain crucial components - components that are in fact essential to the 
identity of certain sequences of statements as arguments, oversight of which makes an 
unnecessary mystery of the criteria for the logical adequacy of inductive arguments. 
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C H A P T E R SIX 
T H E S T R U C T U R E O F ARGUMENTS 
In the previous chapter we noted that that there does seem to be a distinction to be drawn 
between the natural concept of argument, and the formal concept. However some theorists, 
notably recently Sinnot-Armstrong (1999) and Sorensen (1999) insist on employing the formal 
conception even in the context of philosophical discussions of fallacies that are commonly 
supposed to be fallacies of informal reasoning. Since my concern is with natural argument, and 
moreover I believe that certain central features of natural arguments are crucial to a proper 
understanding of the relatively simple logic of inductive argument (properly construed) I aim to 
reinforce in this section that the formal account of argument does not provide a satisfactory 
account of argument in the natural sense of the term. 
As a preliminary to his analysis of the fallacy of begging the question Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong (1999) notes that we need to get clear about arguments and their uses. However his 
account of arguments is somewhat ambiguous. On one possible and indeed quite natural 
reading (the formal interpretation) it is obviously wrong. And on a less formal interpretation, I 
shall argue, his account would still be quite mistaken. 
Sinnott-Armstrong opens his account of what constitutes an argument with the following pair of 
statements 
An argument consists in an ordered pair of a set of propositions (the premises) and a proposition 
(the conclusion). That is all there is to an argw/wew/... (Sinnott-Armstrong, 1999, pl74). 
There are two possible ways to read this claim. The ambiguity here turns on the interpretation 
of the prepositional content that is supposed to be read into the parentheses, and is basically as 
follows. 
The formal interpretation 
On one interpretation, the parentheses are not to be interpreted as qualifiers of the surrounding 
statement, and the definition could equally stand alone without the parentheses. On this 
reading, Sinnott-Armstrong appears to suggest that an argument consists simply of an ordered 
pair of a set of propositions and a proposi t ion,and insists that this is all there is to an 
This interpretation is explicitly endorsed by e.g. Sorensen (1999). 
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argument. On this interpretation, the parentheses would be taken simply to elaborate the point 
by adding that the premises and conclusion of an argument are nothing more than the respective 
elements of such an ordered pair. This would appear to be a natural reading of the opening pair 
of statements. 
The main problem with this interpretation is that, understood in this way, Sinnott-Armstrong's 
claim is obviously false. For one of countless possible counterexamples, the ordered pair of the 
set (P) of propositions expressed by a sequence of mile stones leading to London - {'The 
distance from here to London is ten miles', 'the distance from here to London is five miles', . . . } 
and the proposition (C) expressed by the subsequent arrival sign - 'Here is London', is an 
ordered pair of a set of propositions and a proposition.'"* But this ordered pair of a set of 
propositions and a proposition does not constitute an argument. The problem is not merely that 
it is a bad argument, which is the line of objection that Sinnott-Armstrong considers. The 
problem is rather that it is not an argument at all. This particular ordering of a pair of 
propositions and a proposition does not make up an argument, in the natural sense of the term -
it just makes up a system of information about distances from London. The elements of this 
ordered pair are not, in virtue of this ordering relation, a set of premises and a conclusion. For 
another example, consider the case of a set of news reports followed by a weather forecast. We 
can define an ordering relation Rxy such that x is the set of propositions expressed by the news 
report immediately preceding the proposition y expressed by the first weather statement. 
Likewise, it is patently obvious that such an ordered pair of a set of propositions and a 
proposition is not an argument, and that the set of news statements do not constitute a set of 
premises in support of the meteorological statement. 
The less formal interpretation 
In view of this extreme implausibility on the natural and strong interpretation of Sinnott-
Armstrong's claim as described above, we might then suspect that he actually intends some 
other interpretation by these opening statements. On a less formal interpretation, Sinnott-
Armstrong would not wish to commit himself to the extra-parenthetical statement pair but the 
parentheses may be taken to indicate that he would however go along with the statement formed 
by substituting the terms in parenthesis for their counterpart descriptions in the main body of the 
sentence. 
106 , ' Ordered by the relation 'Each member (P„) of {?} specifies the distance of the milestone expressing P„ 
from the place that C claims to be here'. 
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An argument consists of an ordered pair of a set of premises and a conclusion. 107 
On this less formal and less implausible interpretation,'"* the objections noted above against the 
formal account would no longer apply. But the fact that Sinnott-Armstrong did not choose to 
express his claim in some such relatively simple and more favourable terms, and instead chose 
rather to express the claim in a way that clearly facilitates the stronger interpretation, seems to 
suggest that he did in fact intend the stronger interpretation. Moreover, his subsequent 
concluding statement to this brief section appears to confirm his commitment to the formal 
reading of the initial statement pair, since here there is no qualificatory reference to premises 
and conclusion: 
there is nothing more to an argument than an ordered set of propositions ... (Sinnott-
Armstrong, 1991, pi 74, my emphasis) 
This then would appear to suggest that no significant work is being done by the parentheses in 
his opening statement pair (as we noted with regard to the formal interpretation) and thereby 
rule out any suspicion that the relatively informal interpretation is what he really intended here. 
However, things are not quite that simple. Immediately following the latter quoted statement -
which appears in the context of his earlier statements to commit him to the view that 
something's being an ordered pair of a set of propositions and a proposition is sufficient for its 
being an argument - Sinnott-Armstrong adds the much weaker claim that 
every such ordered set is potentially an argument (Sinnott-Armstrong, 1991, p 174, my 
emphasis) 
It is difficult to see how any significance could be attached to this weaker claim i f he intended to 
stand by the apparent implication of his opening claim (above) that an argument consists in such 
an ordered pair. One way that the apparent tension here might be eliminated is by supposing 
that actually Sinnott-Armstrong did intend the less formal interpretation aflter all, and that all he 
means by this latter claim is rather that every such ordered set (of propositions) may potentially 
be used as (or perhaps more plausibly ' in ' ) an argument. However this latter statement is to be 
'"^ Note that this is Parsons' account o f the technical notion most commonly found in logic texts' 
(Parsons 1996, pi64) 
I mean less implausible as a candidate account of argument in the natural sense. 1 acknowledge that 
this is not a particularly plausible account of Sirinott-Anhstrdng's intended ihtefpretatioh. As I suggested 
above the natural reading of the full account is that it is intended in the formal sense. I am only 
suggesting here that there is another way that an interpreter might take the significance of the parentheses 
(and that it gets us closer to the right account of the natural concept of argument - but as I shall argue, not 
close enough). 
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interpreted, it would seem that Sinnott-Armstrong's account of what constitutes an argument 
appears to be at best misleading and at worst quite implausible. On the most likely 
interpretation (the formal interpretation) of his initial claims there are clear and obvious 
counterexamples. But on an alternative interpretation of his initial claim, and more overtly in 
his concluding statements, he appears to invite a less formal interpretation when he suggests 
rather that what he initially claims to constitute an argument is only potentially an argument. 
Since we have seen that the formal interpretation of Sinnott-Armstrong's claim is a non-starter 
(as an authentic account of the natural concept of argument)"" let us consider the merits of the 
less formal interpretation of his claim - on which it is suggested rather that an argument consists 
of an ordered pair of a set of premises and a conclusion (on, we may suppose,"" a natural 
interpretation of these latter terms). In what follows, we shall see that even this more 
conservative list of constituents is fundamentally flawed - something more needs to be added to 
make an ordered pair of a set of premises and a conclusion into the larger structure that is an 
argument. 
The inferential connective 
Even on this less formal and less objectionable interpretation of Sinnott-Armstrong's account of 
what constitutes an argument, the account is still not quite right. The common informal account 
of an argument as consisting solely in a set of premises and a conclusion is somewhat overly 
simplistic. An essential part of what makes up an argument - and indeed that part which 
endows the other parts of the argument with their respective status as premises and conclusion, 
is an inferential connection claim. 
In informal representations of arguments the inferential connective generally occurs within the 
same sentence that expresses the conclusion (or the premises, or both) in the form of a word 
such as 'Therefore . . . ' , 'Thus or 'so . . . ' , or 'Since'. But of course in an analysis of the 
composition of an argument, the inferential connective needs to be clearly distinguished from 
the content of either. But i f we wish to make a distinction between the inferential connective 
and the conclusion (and indeed the premises) then it would seem, at least on the face of it, that 
we need to acknowledge that an argument is composed not merely of an ordered pair of a set of 
premises and a conclusion, but of an ordered triplet of a set of premises, something that is 
109 
no 
which admittedly it might not be intended to be. 
In order to maintain a distinction from the formal concept, and to facilitate authenticity as an account 
of the natural concept. 
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represented by an inferential connective, and a conclusion. In this case, even on the more 
favourable interpretation of his claim, Sinnott-Armstrong would still appear to be wrong to 
suggest that an argument consists only of an ordered pair of a set of premises and a 
conclusion."^ 
What then is the significance of the additional component - the inferential connective? In order 
to clarify this we may consider what exactly it is that an arguer is intending to express when he 
or she presents an argument 'P, therefore C . Whether or not the arguer intends his or her series 
of statements to entail both P and C,"^ it is clear enough that such an argument is not just a 
statement of Pplus a statement C. There is something more that an arguer intends to convey in 
expressing the argument 'P, therefore C , and that is the implicit claim that there is an 
inferential connection between P and C - as signified by the inferential connective - in other 
words that C (in some either general or more specific sense) 'follows' or 'may be inferred', 
from P. 
In fact in natural presentations of arguments it is not uncommon for the respective inferential 
connection claim to be spelled out in some such terms with phrases such as 'From this it follows 
that... ' , or 'We may infer fi-om this that... ' , or 'In view of this evidence it is highly likely that 
. . . ' , and the commitment to the conclusion itself (when the connection claim is strong enough to 
imply that there is such a commitment) is often simply taken for granted once the premises and 
the statement of the inferential connection have been given. This kind of example then provides 
a natural illustration of the fact that the common inferential connective 'Therefore . . . ' should be 
understood to signify both a claim that there is an inferential connection between the foregoing 
premises and the conclusion and a (perhaps respectively qualified)"^ claim of the conclusion. 
Inferential connection claims 
It is notable that Govier (1992) appears to acknowledge the presence of an inferential 
connection claim in her initial account of what it is to present an argument. 
Certainly as these are standardly understood: 1 say 'on the face of it', in the above because as we shall 
see, the inferential connective may be regarded as signifying an additional claim that is relevant to the 
supposed justification for the hypothesis, in which case this claim could be regarded as an additional 
(obscured if not strictly 'missing') premise of a special kind. 
We have seen in the previous chapter that it is not, or at least by no means always, quite as simple as 
that. 
1 shall discuss the interpretation of probability as a qualifier in Chapter 8. 
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In effect, an arguer putting forward an argument does these three things: 
(1) She asserts the premises. 
(2) She asserts that if the premises are true (or acceptable) the conclusion is true (or acceptable). 
(3) She asserts the conclusion. 
... What we call the challenge of argument is to construct and respond to arguments in ways that are 
appropriate to this basic structure. We must think through the premises and reasoning given and base 
our acceptance or rejection of the conclusion on this reflection. (Govier, Trudy, 1992, p61-2) 
It is clear enough that Govier is not claiming that these three things are explicitly asserted 
whenever an argument is put forward. She accepts that 'Either premises or conclusions may, on 
some occasions, be unstated.' (1992 p58). She also notes that 'not all arguments contain 
indicator words' (1992 p6) - whose significance is that of (2) in the above, since an indicator 
word (or phrase) 'indicates that the conclusion is being inferred from the premises supporting it' 
(1992 p4)."* It would appear to be in respect of these occasional omissions from the surface 
structure of an argument that Govier merely claims that these 'assertions' are made in effect 
when an argument is put forward. What Govier seems to be claiming here then is that these 
assertions are at least conversationally implicit when an argument is put forward. Unfortunately 
however Govier does not appear to make anything of this apparent acknowledgement of a 
commonly overlooked component of argument in her discussion of the issues of argument 
cogency, deductivism, and the logic of inductive inference. In contrast I shall argue that 
acknowledgement of this central component of argument provides the key to a proper 
understanding of the structure and logic of inductive inference, as well as the issue of 
deductivism 
' Govier lists a number of indicator words and phrases (1992 p5). What is notable is that some of these 
appear to indicate stronger inference claims than others (contrast 'proves that' and 'may be deduced 
from', with 'as indicatedhy'). However it seems to be a significant oversight on Govier's part that 
despite this, and despite listing twenty eight alternative indicator (or 'inference') words and phrases, 
Govier includes exactly none that are overtly probabilistic in character. Just in case Govier intends us to 
think otherwise, we should clarify that it would be quite implausible to suppose that when someone 
completes a detailed analysis of a body of evidence in defence of their opinion that P with a connecting 
phrase which says that P is 'highly likely' or 'most probable' on the evidence, they aren't putting forward 
any argument at all. 
i.e. intemal to the passage. We may allow that some sense can be made of reference failure in respect 
of external references, e.g. 'The present king of Fraiice is bald.', whlen a simple diffei^ ence in external 
facts could repair the failure - in other words the failure is not essentially a failure of the statement or 
passage in itself But when an (explicit or implicit) reference in a passage depends for its success on there 
being some other linking term or statement in the same passage, and there is no such linking term or 
statement then we cannot possibly make sense of the passage as it stands. 
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The plurality of infereatial connections 
Govier lists a number of indicator words and phrases (1992 p5). What is notable is that some of 
these appear to indicate stronger inference claims than others (contrast 'proves that' and 'may 
be deduced from', with 'as indicated by'). However it seems to be a significant oversight on 
Govier's part that despite this, and despite listing twenty eight alternative indicator (or 
'inference') words and phrases, Govier includes exactly none that are overtly probabilistic in 
character. But of course it would be quite implausible to suppose that when someone completes 
a detailed analysis of a body of evidence in defence of their opinion that P with a connecting 
phrase which says that P is 'highly likely' or 'most probable' on the evidence, they aren't 
putting forward any argument at all. Moreover, it would seem most reasonable to suppose that 
such variations in the inferential connection phrases do actually signify related distinctions with 
regard to the associated inferential connection claims. 
Because the word 'Therefore' (or even simply a premise/conclusion demarcation line) is 
commonly employed as an all-purpose inferential connective for informal or semi-formal 
representations of arguments, it is easy to make the mistake of thinking that in any argument the 
inferential connective carries a single common, and relatively vague, interpretation - tantamount 
to something like the following proposition 
From the preceding proposition the following proposition may be somehow inferred 
But while the connection claim resulting from the application of such a broadly interpreted 
connective to any particular pair of premises and conclusion would presumably be entailed by 
the connection claim of any argument employing the same premises and conclusion, it could not 
seriously be maintained that this broad connection claim is the only connection claim that is 
ever entailed by the inferential connection claim of any argument - or indeed that it is the only 
important one. Certainly in natural presentations of arguments we are often much more specific 
in our inferential connection claims. In some circumstances we may be concerned to stress that 
the conclusion follows deductively, employing appropriate terminology to make the deductive 
connection quite explicit. Similarly, in the context of an inductive argument we may for 
example employ a phrase such as 'In view of this it is highly likely that... ' . And similarly the 
point that this is specifically a claim of probabilistic connection might well be significant in the 
context. 
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In view of this plurality of inferential connectives, the acknowledgement of this additional 
component of an argument can play an important role in the individuation of significantly 
distinct arguments that might, on superficial representations (and in particular on the formal 
account), otherwise appear to be identical. For example, distinctions in the interpretations of the 
inferential connective, rather than between the respective ordered pairs of the premise set and 
the conclusion, are crucial to the distinction between a natural inductive version and the possible 
i f forced (and patently invalid) deductive version of the following argument structure. 
(E) A l l of the many emeralds that have been observed are green 
I f there were any non-green emeralds, it would be highly likely that some of them 
would have been observed by now. 
Therefore, A l l emeralds are green 
Although the deductive argument that results from a deductive interpretation of the inferential 
connective in (E) would be unlikely to be seriously employed, and would clearly be an invalid 
deductive argument, it is nevertheless an argument which could be expressed. It could quite 
easily be expressed in natural english simply by replacing the remainder of the argument 
following the premises with the words 'From these premises it follows deductively that all 
emeralds are green'. A natural account of one possible inductive interpretation of (E) on the 
other hand might read 'In view of this it is reasonable to believe that all emeralds are green'. 
On the former deductive interpretation the argument clearly implies a falsehood (namely the 
deductive inferential connection claim) and fails to set out clearly in whatever respect in the 
hypothesis might reasonably be supposed to be justified. On such an intended interpretation of 
the inferential connective the argument would clearly not be a cogent argument. In contrast, on 
an inductive interpretation, as exemplified above, the argument clearly does not entail that same 
falsehood, and does not so obviously (at least not in the view of an inductivist) fail to set out the 
respect (and sense) in which the inference may reasonably be supposed to be justified. Since 
the ordered pair of the premise-set and the conclusion in either case is the same, the formal 
account of argument composition and individuation fails to distinguish between these 
significantly different arguments. In view of the complex variables involved in inductive 
justifications as illustrated in the previous chapter, the sheer variety of inferential connections 
that might be implicitly (or explicitly) appealed upon in the context of a justification for an 
inductive inference makes it imperative as a condition of argument cogency that the content of 
the supposed inferential connections are, one way or another, rendered quite clear. 
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The significance of the sequence of propositions in an argument basis 
In a footnote to his account of the constitution of an argument Sinnott-Armstrong considers the 
possibility that the order of the premises in an argument matters to its identity. On our account 
it may be noted that the inferential connections linking basic assumptions to intermediate 
conclusions and ultimately to the final conclusion impose a logical order wherever it is required 
within the sequence of propositions in an argument. Of course in informal representations of 
arguments, some of the crucial elements are commonly taken for granted. These elements are 
often referred to as 'suppressed' or 'hidden' premises, although on our account we may note 
that these may also include suppressed or hidden inferential connection claims. The most basic 
representations of arguments merely list the premises, in an order such that it is reasonably easy 
to see the logical connections implicit in the line of reasoning, and present an explicit inferential 
connective of some kind only prior to the final conclusion. And we have already seen that in 
plain English representations of arguments it is in fact quite common to make the final 
inferential connection claim explicit and to take the conclusion for granted. 
To illustrate how the line of implication implicit in an argument may impose a partial ordering 
on the propositions composing the argument basis we may consider a simple example. 
(SW) 1. Socrates is a man 
2. Socrates is old 
3. Al l old men are wise 
Therefore, Socrates is wise 
In the line of reasoning that we would naturally take to be implicit in the argument represented 
by (SW) a number of key elements are suppressed in the representation presented. In this line 
of reasoning the suppressed intermediate conclusion that Socrates is an old man may be taken to 
logically follow premises 1 and 2, and this logical ordering is imposed by the suppressed 
inferential connection claim that 'Socrates is an old man' may be (deductively) inferred from 
the pair of premises 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is old'. The order within that pair of 
premises is unimportant to that intermediate inference, but the latter inferential connection claim 
makes that pair of premises logically prior to the respective intermediate conclusion. Similarly 
the pair composed of this suppressed intermediate conclusion and the explicit premise 3 is 
rendered logically prior to the final conclusion by virtue of the explicit final inferential 
connection, but the order within this pair is also unimportant to the inference. 
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Inferential connections and rules of inference 
In formal and semi-formal presentations of arguments it is often explicitly claimed that the 
connection between certain premises and an inferred conclusion is established by a particular 
rule of inference. Normative, as distinct from purely prescriptive forms of rules or principles of 
inference are generalised forms of inferential connection propositions. By a prescriptive rule of 
inference 1 mean a rule of inference of the form 'Given premises (of some schematic form) A 
infer the conclusion (of some schematic form) B' . This is to be distinguished from a normative 
principle of inference such as (for example) 'Given premises of form A the conclusion B may 
(or should) be drawn.' It is clearly the latter normative interpretation that is pertinent to the 
primary justificatory ftmction of argument which is our concern. 
A normative propositional principle of inference then is a general claim, such as that expressed 
by the following form of modus ponens: 
For all values of the propositional variables P and Q: from the premises 'P' and ' I f P 
then Q', the conclusion 'Q' may be inferred. 
And a specific inferential connection claim such as 
From the premises 'Holly is a springer' and 'If Holly is a springer then Holly will be loopy' the 
conclusion 'Holly will be loopy' may be inferred. 
is an instance of such a general inferential connection claim. The implicit line of reasoning then, when 
such a general principle of inference is employed in an instance of an argument such as, for example 
(H) Holly is a springer. 
If Holly is a springer then Holly will be loopy. 
Therefore, by modus ponens. Holly will be loopy. 
is that the implicit specific inferential claim that this particular conclusion follows from these particular 
premises via the deductive principle of inference modus ponens, since it is an instance of, and thereby 
implied by, that general inferential connection claim. 
Must an argument have premises? - A response to Sorensen 
Sorensen (1999) denies that an argument must have premises. He offers as a purported example 
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(MT) Therefore, there are arguments without premises. (Sorensen 1999, p498). 
But this certainly does not appear to be an argument in any natural sense of the term. In fact by 
the standards of ordinary English syntax a passage consisting of just an expression of (MT) 
without any immediately prior statements would not appear to make any sense whatsoever: 
Spelling out in longhand the significance of'Therefore' we have a reference to some 
'proposition(s) immediately prior in this passage'. And unless there are some, to discharge that 
implicit internal'^" reference of the term 'Therefore', the passage is syntactically ill-formed, and 
in that respect nonsense. 
Nor does this appear to be compatible with our basic characterisation of the natural concept of 
argument - on which an (actual) argument presents a propositional clarification of some 
justification for regarding a hypothesis with a certain epistemic attitude (typically believing or 
accepting that it is true). In other words, an (natural) argument sets out certain propositional 
considerations, which we call 'premises', in support of a certain view of the hypothesis. 
Sorensen's argument for his denial relates to the role that the formal notion of a premiseless 
argument plays in enabling various other formal (meta-logical) concepts and distinctions. 
Premiseiess arguments should be classified as arguments for the excellent reasons logicians cite: 
The empty premises set helps us distinguish proofs from derivations, it helps us define the 
concept of logical truth and lets us crisply contrast inference rules that require assumptions .. 
with those that require no assumptions .... In short, our best theory of argument is best served 
by this well-entrenched definition. (Sorensen 1999,499) 
In order to make sense of this argument we need to be sure we properly interpret the crucial 
term 'argument' in Sorensen's inifial clause 'Premiseless arguments should be classified as 
arguments' (his conclusion). Now Sorensen has made it clear from the outset that he is 
employing the standard formal concept of'argument' here. Paraphrasing his definition in a 
form amenable to a suitable abbreviation, an 'argument' in this formal sense may be defined as 
an Ordered Pair of a Proposition and a SET of propositions - and in order to avoid any 
misinterpretation or confusion with the natural concept of argument, as we have characterised 
it, we might refer to such a formal 'argument' accordingly as an 'OPPSET'. 
Now the reasons cited by Sorensen are no doubt good reasons for acknowledging the usefulness 
of acknowledging the existence of OPPSETS whose proposition sets are empty, in respect of the 
role they play in enabling the various other formal concepts and distinctions he mentions. And 
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of course, since the word 'argument' has traditionally been employed in formal logic as the term 
of choice for reference to OPPSETs, we might be inclined to concede that this may equally be 
regarded as a good reason for classifying such 'premiseless' OPPSETs as 'arguments' in that 
equivalent sense of the word (i.e. as OPPSETS). But of course that is presumably not a claim 
that an opponent of Sorensen in this matter would want to deny. When Sorensen says in his 
opening statement that 'Many sensible people think that an argument must have premises', he is 
presumably not talking about people operating in the context of formal (meta)-logic who are 
saying something about 'arguments' in the technical sense associated with formal logic (i.e. 
OPPSETs). He is talking about people who, operating in the context of informal logic, are 
expressing a view about arguments in the natural sense of term. But when he immediately goes 
on to say, in the context of his meta-logical proof of the conclusion of the conclusion of (MT), 
that 
MT has all the parts listed in the standard definition of'argument' (Sorensen, 1999, p498) 
he has switched, within two lines of dialogue, to talk about a quite different hypothesis, 
concerning something that is only an 'argument' in the technical sense. The definition he 
presents is not a standard definition of 'argument' in the natural sense of the term - which is the 
sense that is relevant to the initial point of contention. 
The substantive issue here then is whether OPPSETs whose proposition sets are empty should 
be classified as 'arguments' in the natural sense of the term. But as we have seen, natural 
arguments have important features that corresponding OPPSETS lack, and so the above-
mentioned considerations do not constitute good reasons for classifying OPPSETs whose 
proposition set is empty as 'arguments' in the natural sense of the term. 
Anticipating an objection along these lines, Sorensen adds that 
If you want to say that MT only qualifies as an argument under a 'technical' definition of 
'argument', then be prepared to say that the empty set only qualifies as a set under a technical 
definition of 'set'. (Sorensen 1999,499) 
But Sorensen does not offer any explanation as to why we should think that the latter should in 
any case be objectionable. In fact it seems to be a platitude, since the notion of the 'empty set' 
is a technical concept - specifically associated with a technical concept of 'set'. I f this is meant 
to be some kind of reductio ad absurdum of our response to Sorensen's initial argument, then it 
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clearly won't do, since there is nothing whatsoever absurd about the supposedly associated 
commitment. 
Nor does our disallowing premiseless natural arguments, prevent our making good use in 
informal logic, or practical reasoning, of the applicatory links with the formal concepts and 
distinctions mentioned by Sorensen. We can for example argue, in the natural sense of the term, 
that a certain statement expresses a proposition that is a logical truth - as formally defined - by 
pointing out that the proposition expressed can be derived in formal logic from no assumptions. 
Similarly we can argue that a statement expresses a proposition that is a logical falsehood by 
pointing out that the negation of the proposition expressed can be derived informal logic from 
no assumptions. In either case, i f our audience were disinclined to take such a premise on trust, 
then in preference to actually arguing the point in detail we might opt most simply to refer to 
some textbook derivation. Alternatively we could actually go to the other extreme and take the 
laborious line of arguing the point, for example by providing (or referring to) an appropriate 
truth tree diagram, and step by step, propositionally setting out exactly what should become 
clear from consideration of the pertinent features of it. A compromisory alternative, to either 
expressly arguing the point or merely referring, would be just to supply an appropriate diagram, 
without any associated explanation or argument, in the hope (or reasonable expectation) that the 
audience wil l be able to interpret it appropriately and thereby, on consideration of the pertinent 
points,y/gMr^ out for themselves that the proposition (or, respectively, its negation) may be 
formally derived from no assumptions. 
As i f to clinch the case in his favour, having presented the technical details of the proof in his 
opening paragraph, Sorensen notes that 
the conclusion of MT can be rigorously (though trivially) proved within meta-theory. 
(Sorensen, 1999, p499) 
But of course that merely emphasises the point that the conclusion of MT is to be interpreted in 
a technical meta-logical sense. And as noted above, we have no substantive objection to make 
against that trivial technical point. Having said that, it is worth noting that there is nevertheless 
a significant terminological objection that may be raised against (MT) as stated. The problem 
here is that by employing the common word 'argument' - a word whose natural usage in the 
context of everyday reasoning as distinct from formal logic is even more deeply entrenched - in 
application to such an (in some respects) si^ificahtly disanalbgous technical concept, we are 
inviting exactly the kind of confusion and potential for misunderstanding as we have seen 
exemplified in Sorensen's arguments above. Since we often want to talk about the application 
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of formal logic to the analysis and appraisal of natural arguments, and so both of these 
importantly different senses of the word 'argument' will often crop up in the same context, it 
would be preferable, at least when there is a danger of such conflation, to employ a more clearly 
technical term of reference for application to the technical concept, such as the respective 
definition abbreviation I have suggested. 
The logical status of inferential connection claims: A special kind of premise? 
To summarise thus far, we have observed that the standard formal and semi-formal accounts of 
what constitutes an argument, respectively as an ordered pair of a set of propositions and a 
proposition, or as an ordered pair of a set of premises and a conclusion, appear to be quite 
unsatisfactory - so long as they are interpreted in such a way as to ignore the inferential 
connection claim that is implicit in the inferential connective, and which makes a series of 
assertions (consisting of an inferential connection claim along with the surrounding statements 
it claims to be so connected) an argument. These implicit or explicit inferential connection 
claims also impose whatever relevant logical orderings there may be within the sequence of 
statements that compose the argument, and can determine the type of inference that is operative 
within the argument. Not only do the inferential connection claims comprise an essential part of 
the argument in itself, but they also play an important role in distinguishing between different 
types of argument, and even between distinct individual arguments that share the same ontic 
evidential propositions and hypothesis (traditionally identified as the 'premises' and 
'conclusion'). Moreover, as we have seen, it is clear that the particular interpretation of the 
inferential connective in an argument can be highly relevant to its appraisal. 
However, once the inferential connecfion claim is recognised as an essential component of the 
argument, and it is also recognised that, at least in the case of inductive arguments, the claim 
itself may be at least as open to question as the evidential premises it connects with the 
hypothesis - in contrast to the straightforward case of traditional ontic deduction when it will 
typically take the form of a logical truth'^' - then on reflection it would seem most appropriate 
In the case of an inference that is not logically ampliative, and where the hypothesis is directly asserted 
with the intent of unqualified commitment, i.e. an alethic deductive inference, we may be inclined to 
regard the pertinent inferential connection claim in the corresponding argument simply as an implicit 
appeal to a logical truth (basically of the form ' I f P (the conjunction of the premises), then C (the 
conclusion)' where C is a logical implication of P) - in virtue of which the statement series is an 
argument, but which, for the sake of simplicity, need not be counted as a premise that requires explication 
- at least not in the nonnal context where the standard pHnciples of dediiction are generally taken to go 
without saying. However, in situations where certain details of the logic of deduction are in dispute, such 
an exemption will not be admissible (or at least with respect to inferential connection claims to which the 
points of disagreement are relevant). Graham Priest (1987) presents an example of how someone who 
thinks that some contradictions are true will not necessarily be convinced of the falsity of a proposition by 
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to regard the inferential connection claim itself, at least in the case of induction, as a substantive 
presumption - and moreover a presumption on which the supposed justification for the 
hypothesis crucially depends. In view of this we may be inclined to regard the appropriate 
construal of the logical status of the inferential claim in the context of the argument as that of a 
premise along with the others (the evidential premises) - albeit of course a particularly 
important premise of a distinctive kind. In this case it would appear that the semi-formaX 
account of an argument as consisting of an ordered pair of a set of premises and a conclusion 
might seem to be compatible with our ultimate analysis after all - at least in application to the 
case of inductive (or 'logically ampliative') inferences - and so long as it is understood that at 
least one member of the premise-set is an inferential connection claim, and that it is the main 
(final) inferential connecfion claim within the premises that imposes the respective ordering on 
the pair, and in virtue of which the pair constitutes an argument. However I see this as more of 
a matter of terminological choice rather than a substanfive issue. What matters is that the 
hitherto traditionally unrecognised inferential connection claim be acknowledged as an 
essential part of an argument. In the following chapter I shall examine the implications of 
acknowledgement of the inferenfial connection claim as an essential part of the argument basis 
for the question of the logic of induction, and the issue of deductivism. 
provision of a reduction ad absurdum. We may suppose that the audience in such a case will not agree 
the associated inferential connection claim. 
Salmon also employs the more expressive phrase 'deductive chauvanism' for 'deductivism', coined by 
J. Alberto Coffa - in whose memory the volume is dedicated. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INDUCTIVE VALIDITY, AND THE CASE FOR EPISTEMIC DEDUCTIVISM 
A broad concept of validity 
In his introduction to The Limitations of Deductivism (Griinbaum and Salmon, 1988) Wesley 
Salmon suggests that 
Deductivism ... is the view that the only logical devices required in the empirical sciences are 
deductive. (Grunbaum and Salmon, 1988, p2) 
Salmon goes on to distinguish two qualified versions of deductivism - one being the view 'that 
the only admissible scientific explanations are deductive-nomological' - which he calls 
explanatory deductivism^^^\ Salmon distinguishes this fi-om deductivism with respect to 
inference, which he calls inferential deductivism, as 
the view that the only legitimate arguments are valid deductions (Grunbaum and Salmon, 
1988, p2, my emphasis) 
In the context of «o«-deductive arguments, Salmon refers to the corresponding inferential 
relation that is supposed to hold between premises and conclusion (by those who think there are 
'legitimate' non-deductive arguments) as 'logical correctness' (Salmon, 1966, p6). 
However, bearing in mind that deductive validity is in any case commonly referred to 
specifically as such (in order to eliminate any potential confusion with alternative informal or 
contextual concepts of'validity' , I see no particular difficulty in employing the term 'valid' in a 
general or broad sense, that covers the corresponding relations for non-deductive arguments ( i f 
there are any) in addition to the particular type of validity that is supposed to hold in the special 
case of deductive argument. In this case we may simply draw a distinction between deductive 
validity, which is generally understood to consist in the logical or semantic impossibility of the 
conjunction of the premises being true while the conclusion is false, and 'validity' in general -
as any relation whereby a conclusion is in some respect inferable from certain premises. This 
provides us with appropriately related terminology, while maintaining a simple and natural 
means of distinction between the two concepts. I f we then interpret Salmon's term 'legitimate' 
or 'logically correct' in terms of general validity as I have described it, i.e. in the broad sense 
applicable to both deductive and inductive arguments, then (inferential) deductivism on 
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Salmon's account, amounts to the view that there are no valid arguments other than those that 
are deductively valid. 
An apparently inferentially sound inductive argument 
Consider the following argument 
(RW) (1) Urn A contains exactly 999,999 white balls and one black ball (and this will 
continue to be the case at the time of the next draw). 
(2) The next ball to be drawn from urn A will be drawn at random. 
Therefore: 
(3) There is only a one in a million chance that the next ball drawn will not be 
white: 
Therefore: 
(4) The next ball to be drawn from urn A will be white. 
In particular, for the sake of simplicity, let us focus on the step of inference from (3) to (4). 
This step of inference is certainly not deductively valid. Moreover, the premise provided 
appears to constitute a perfectly good reason for believing the conclusion. It seems undeniable 
that this inference is broadly speaking 'valid' or 'inferentially adequate' in the sense that matters 
to us. And it certainly appears, at least on the face of it, to be deductively /wvalid. But is it 
really so? 
I have said that an argument is demonstrative i f f it clearly sets out the justification purported for 
the target proposition or hypothesis, granted whatever epistemic status (e.g.degree of belief) is 
supposed to be justly accorded to the premises. Although, following on our analysis thus far, it 
seems clear enough that argument (RW) is 'valid' in the sense that matters to us, there are 
number of reasons for saying that this argument as it stands nevertheless fails to set out clearly 
the justification that the premises are supposed to provide for the conclusion. As we noted, 
there are a variety of possible epistemic attitudes that might be taken towards the target 
proposition of an argument. One might, for examples, regard the target proposition as 
absolutely certain, virtually certain, simply 'believed', contextually 'accepted', more likely than 
not, with a 'high' degree of belief, or even with a specific degree of belief In a case of (RW) 
the arguer could intend to establish by this argument that the conclusion (in this case identical to 
the target proposition) is acceptable (i.e. may reasonably be accepted) - which is the kind of 
justification associated with the particular concept of epistemic validity on which we have 
focused. 
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However, as we also noted earlier, not all arguments are intended to be interpreted defensively 
or permissively in this way. In fact it is more common for arguments to be employed 
persuasively. Thus in another instance of (RW) the arguer might intend to (rationally) persuade 
the audience to believe the target proposition, by using the argument to show them that the 
target proposition ought to be believed (or regarded with a high degree of belief). Of course in 
many cases it might be quite obvious from the context that an argument is being used 
persuasively rather than defensively. But the point that needs to be noted is simply that as far as 
the demonstrative quality or clarity of an argument is concerned, it is in general better i f (at least 
wherever there is any room for doubt) it is made explicit within the argument exactly what kind 
of justification is intended to be understood as being claimed for the target proposition: whether 
the intended claim is for example that the target proposition ought to be virtually fully believed 
or, for one alternative, that it may reasonably be regarded as more likely than not. Once this 
justificatory claim is clear we may proceed to consider the cogency condition of 
demonstrativity : does the argument clearly set out in virtue of exactly what considerations the 
purported epistemic status of the hypothesis is supposed to be justified? 
Following on our earlier discussion of the structure of arguments, this point about the different 
types of justification that may be purported to be established for the target proposition may be 
related to the appropriate interpretation of the inferential connective 'therefore'. As 1 have 
argued, arguments entail truth-valuable claims other than those explicitly specified either side 
of the premise/conclusion separator. An individual step of inference is typically represented as 
consisting in a set of premises P and a conclusion C which may or may not be accompanied by 
reference to a rule or principle of inference by virtue of which the conclusion is supposed to 
follow or to be inferable from the premises. But regardless of whether any such rule or 
principle is mentioned, what distinguishes such an inferential sequence of statements from other 
ordered pairs of the same (sets of) assertions - and indeed what makes it an inference as such -
is that besides asserting both sets of propositions, when someone presents the respective pair as 
an argument or step of inference, they implicitly ( i f not explicitly) claim that the one follows, or 
is inferable, from the other. 
For a clear argument it will need to be clear in what sense the conclusion is supposed to be 
inferable from the premises, for example whether the implicit claim is that the conclusion is 
deductively inferable fi-om (a semantically necessary truth condition for) the premises or that it 
is (in some sense) inductively inferable. This of course relates to the type of validity that is 
supposed to hold between the basic premise set and the conclusion. Where a deductive 
inferability relation does not hold between these, the implicit claim might instead be that 
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something along the lines of the type of epistemic validity we have described above wil l hold 
between them. In other words, one possible interpretafion of the inferability claim in a non-
deductive case might be the claim that i f one were justified in fully believing that all the 
propositions in the premise set P are true, then one would be justified in believing or accepting 
that the conclusion C is true. 
However it is notable that in natural arguments the premises of an inference are often presented 
in epistemic terms. For example: 
(Ao) You know that John is an honest man. 
So you ought to accept that what he says is generally true. 
In this case the target proposition - i.e. the proposition whose epistemic status is intended to be 
established by this particular piece of argument - is 'What John says is generally true'. And in 
the process of informal or semi-formal argument analysis the target proposition is traditionally 
identified as the conclusion. What are taken to be the premises are likewise typically detached 
from the epistemic operators within which they might have been presented in the context of 
their natural expression. Thus a standard construal of the above natural argument would take 
the relatively simple non-epistemic form: 
(A| ) Premise: (Pi) John is an honest man. 
Conclusion: (Ci) What John says is generally true. 
However, even i f we were to accept that this simplified construal of the argument provides a 
satisfactory account of the respective contents of the premises and conclusion, it would still fail 
to provide a clear account of the nature of the inferential connection that is implicitly claimed to 
hold with respect to the premises and conclusion so construed. In contrast, the original 
expression of the argument (Ao) provides a natural indication of the inferential connecfion 
claimed by the proponent of the argument to hold between these propositions. By appealing to 
the audience's knowledge that John is an honest man, it would seem that knowledge P] is taken 
to be the relevant condition for the purported justification for Ci. And since the epistemic 
operator within which C| is enclosed in Ao is one of obligation for acceptance, it would seem 
that the underlying inferential connection claim is the claim that i f the premise is known then 
the conclusion ought to be accepted. 
This is subtly different from the permissive acceptance validity that we, following the line of 
Fox, have discussed above - on which certainty of the premises is merely taken to be sufficient 
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for rational permissibility of acceptance of the conclusion. This distinction characterises the 
distinction between an argument that is merely defensive - an argument which imposes no 
rational obligations relating to belief of the target proposition on the audience - and an 
argument that is persuasive or binding - rationally demanding some degree of belief or 
acceptance of the target proposition. Details such as this are essential for determination of the 
type of epistemic validity that is implicitly purported to hold by virtue of the appropriate 
interpretation of the premise-conclusion connective - and ultimately for the success or 
otherwise of the argument in demonstrating the purported justification for the conclusion, but 
can be lost in the traditional simplistic mode of representation that takes an argument to consist 
in nothing more than a set of premises and a conclusion, and commonly interprets epistemic 
terminology in the natural expression of an argument as merely providing an indication of their 
status in the context as a premise or a conclusion. 
Such simplistic representation is relatively unproblematic in the case of deductive arguments 
since the relation between semantic or logical implication that is fiindamental to deductive 
validity and the basic type of epistemic validity generally associated with it is relatively 
straightforward and taken for granted. Consider a semantically valid argument, employing what 
is appropriately interpreted to be a semantic inferabilify connective, such as an argument of the 
form 
(D|) ( l ) I f P t h e n R 
(2) I f Q then R 
(3) Either P or Q 
Therefore [i.e. a semantically (or logically) necessary condition for the truth of 
(all) the preceding assertions is the truth of the following assertion] 
(4) R 
Now it is conceivable that a sceptical reader of this argument, who was quite certain that all of 
the premises were true, and who was also quite certain that together they imply R (the 
inferential connection claim), might nevertheless fail to be certain that R, and even fail to realise 
that he ought to be certain that R. He might even offer in defence of his position the argument 
that personal certainty is not a guarantee of truth, in which case one of the premises could 
(logically possibly) be false despite his certainty (justified full belief) that it is not - in which 
case the conclusion might be false. However, a natural response to his position would be that 
considerations of probabilistic coherence demand that i f one is certain that a set of propositions 
are all true, and that they semantically imply another, then one ought to be certain that the 
142 
implied proposition is also true. Of course this epistemic principle is something that we 
ordinarily take for granted. 
A speaker has an obligation to be honest and responsible in his communications. Thus, while 
the proposition that the speaker believes what he says and that he is justified in so doing are not 
semantic implications of his assertions, they are nevertheless 'conversational' or 
communicational implications of his assertions. In other words i f the speaker is to be trusted 
then it may be taken from his assertion of a proposition that he believes what he says and that he 
has satisfactory evidential warrant for believing it. Similarly, a speaker has a responsibility to 
qualify his statements appropriately when he is significantly less than certain of their truth, i.e. 
when his evidence warrants only partial belief So an unqualified statement conversationally 
implies that the speaker is certain of it (or at least virtually certain). 
Furthermore, unqualified statements also carry communicational implications with regard to the 
appropriate epistemic attitude for the audience: Unqualified statements are made with the 
understood intent that they should be believed. The basic idea is that an audience who trusts me 
will believe what I say - on account of my word that it is so, and in trust of my honesty and 
responsibility - i f they did not already believe it on account of prior evidence. It is of course 
possible that my audience might have conflicting information from another (initially) trusted 
source. But i f that is the case then their initial trust in me, in this instance, wi l l be undermined, 
diminished'^'', or put on hold pending further investigation. 
One of the responsibilities on the speaker associated with this situation of trust, is to deliver 
information in such a way as to respect the freedom of the listener to decide for herself whether 
to believe something that she has no rational obligation to believe. In this case, i f I wish to 
express something that I choose or happen to believe, albeit justly, i.e. something that it is 
permissible to believe on the evidence, and which I do believe - but which 1 don't regard as 
something that my audience (or for that matter myself) necessarily ought to believe, then in 
view of the context of trust with respect to the communication of information, it would be (at 
least potentially) misleading to express such a belief as an unqualified statement of fact. Rather, 
I ought to qualify the communication of my premissible but non-obligatory belief that P with 
something along the lines of ' I believe that P', or 'It is reasonable to believe that P'. This is so 
In an ideal communicative situation, free from risk of deception, irresponsibility, or innocent error, I 
{and shm\A) fully believe the infonmation I am given. In the normal situation where therejs a degree 
of mistrust in most situations (even if the informer is entirly honest and responsible he or she may 
nevertheless mistaken) I will attach a degree of belief to what I am told. Even in an instance of receipt of 
information from a normally highly trusted source, if the information conflicts with information from 
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despite my genuine and justified belief that P is true, in virtue of my understanding that the 
evidence I know of does not obligate belief in P.'^ ^ In view of this, when I responsibly assert a 
proposition P without qualification, that conversationally implies that my audience (may and 
indeed) ought also to be sure that P. 
This may then be related to the common understanding that i f someone is (or at least ought to 
be) certain that the premises of a deductively valid argument are true, then they ought to be 
certain that the conclusion is true. This is the strong form of epistemic validity that is naturally 
and rightly associated with the semantic validity of a deductively valid argument. Just as the 
relevant normative epistemic qualifications of the premises of Di (such as 'You ought to be 
certain that i f P then R') are conversationally implied by the assertion of the unqualified 
premises, so the associated epistemic inferability claim is conversationally implied by the more 
basic semantic implication claim of Di. In this case the following epistemic implicatory variant 
on D, may be taken to be understood in the context of the employment of D|. 
(D2) ( l ) I f P t h e n R 
(2) I f Q then R 
(3) Either P or Q 
Therefore [i.e. i f you ought to be certain that the preceding assertions ( 1 - 3 ) are 
true, then you ought to be certain that the following assertion (R) is true] 
(4) R 
Moreover, as we have seen, on the basis of the normative conversational implications of the 
unqualified assertion of the premises ( 1 - 3 ) the audience may also take it that 
(5) You ought to be certain that assertions (1 - 3) are true 
on the basis of which, taking the epistemic inferential claim of D| as a second premise 
(6) I f you ought to be certain that the assertions ( 1 - 3 ) are true, then you ought to be 
certain (R) is true 
another normally highly trusted source, the usual High degree of belief will not, in that instance, be 
automatically accorded to the respective proposition. 
Jackson (1987 Ch.6) discusses some of the ways in 'The hearer may learn about the nature of the 
evidence which is up for borrowing ... from which premises are selected for presentation in the first 
place.'(pi 07). This might be regarded as one example of such responsibility on the part of the arguer. 
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a semantic argument (D3) may be made, via the semantic implication claim 
Therefore [i.e. a semantic implication of the preceding propositions (5 and 6) is the 
following proposition] 
to the epistemic conclusion 
(7) You ought to be certain that R 
In a situation where the epistemic aim of the argument is to rationally persuade the audience to 
be certain that R, and in the process to clarify that they ought to be certain of it, this implication 
ought to be perfectly clear and, in respect of that, ought ideally to be explicit. Likewise, since 
the key factors in the logical burden of support for this epistemic conclusion are the 
conversationally implicit deontic epistemic qualifications of the initial premises ('You ought to 
be certain that if P then R' etc) and the epistemic inferential connection claim (6) 
conversationally implicit in the semantic implication connective of the initial version of the 
argument, these too need to be quite clear if the epistemic function of the argument - including 
crucially clarification of the justification for the hypothesis (the initial conclusion) - is to be 
carried through satisfactorily. 
O f course, as we have noted, the communicational epistemic implications associated with 
semantic inference, such as those that we have drawn out here, are usually taken for granted, 
being too obvious and trivial to mention. For that reason, along with the relative simplicity of 
the basic semantic version of the argument, they are not generally made explicit in the context 
of straightforward deduction (where the target proposition is a logical consequence of prior 
knowledge). But that does not alter their crucial role in the all-important epistemic dynamics 
associated with the basic assertions and semantic implications expressed. 
Moreover, and more importantly for our purpose, in arguments where the target proposition is 
not deducible fi-om the set of propositions whose epistemic status is purported to supply 
justification for the target proposition - the 'evidential' or 'grounding' propositions (the 
premise-related counterparts of the hypothesis) - the presumed epistemic status of the 
grounding propositions and the associated epistemic implications that are supposed to relate the 
epistemic status of the grounding propositions to the justification for the target proposition will 
not always be obvious. In such a case, if the argument is to satisfactorily clarify the purported 
justification for the target proposition - in other words if it is to be satisfactorily demonstrative 
145 
- these (the presumed epistemic status of the grounding propositions and the associated 
inferential connection claims) will need to be made explicit. 
However, once these are made explicit, the result is a series of epistemic propositions - i.e. the 
specifications of the purported justificatory status of the grounding propositions, e.g. 
You ought to know that there is only one in a million chance that the next ball drawn 
will not be white. 
the inferential connection claim, connecting the latter with the justificatory claim for the target 
proposition, e.g. 
I f you ought to know that there is only one in a million chance that the next ball drawn 
will not be white, then you should be virtually certain that the next ball to be drawn will 
be white. 
and the justificatory claim for the target proposition, e.g. 
You should be virtually certain that the next ball to be drawn will be white. 
But once the argument is reconstructed in this way, the resulting series of epistemic claims will 
form a satisfactorily demonstrative and moreover deductively valid argument for the 
justificatory claim associated with the initial demonstratively inadequate version of the 
argument (in this case the step of inference from (3) - (4) in (RW)).'^^ Regarding the issue of 
premise-adequacy, it is clear enough that the truth of these premises is sufficient for the 
subject's heingjustijied(in the sense described in the conclusion) in regarding the hypothesis 
with the respective attitude. But we have seen that what is required for argument cogency is 
that the argument makes it clear to the audience that the subject is so justified (the requirement 
of demonstrativity) - in which case the argument will nevertheless fail in this respect unless it is 
clear to the satisfaction of the audience that all the premises are true. 
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Musgrave (1993, pi 70-5) presents a somewhat dubious argument for a view of inductive inference 
that he presents as Popperian, and which yields an example argument of the supposedly Popperian line of 
inference that has the logical structure of an epistemic deductivist construal as I have described it. Fox 
(1999, p455-6) presents some criticism of Musgrave's example, but (with some qualifications related to 
points that I have discussed above) approves of the basic strategy. 
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Is epistemic deductivism relevant to argument appraisal? 
Having noted the inferential connection claim as a key if commonly overlooked assumption (at 
least in the case of induction) on which the conclusion inferentially depends, and the fact that 
once it is taken into account among the premises, the logical structure of any argument thus 
properly explicated is revealed to be deductive, it would seem that this clinches the case for 
inferential deductivism. The only arguments that are valid (in the broad sense) are those which 
are deductively valid simply because all arguments properly explicated are deductively valid. 
But if deductive validity is thus trivially satisfied in all cases of argument doesn't this then 
make a nonsense of the notion of validity as a criterion for argument cogency? No. 'Validity' 
in the broad sense does not depend on the trivial deductive validity that applies to whole 
arguments, fully explicated. Recall that an argument is 'valid' in the broad sense, if and only if 
its inferential connection claim is true. In this case for example a fallacious (supposedly) 
deductive argument that would be traditionally counted as deductively invalid, will still be 
'invalid' in the broad (and important sense) on account of the falsity of its inferential connection 
claim. Furthermore, what is actually deductively invalid in such a case is not (as has been 
traditionally supposed) the actual argument (in the natural sense of the term) but the O P P S E T 
(i.e. the ordered pair of a proposition and a set of propositions) composed respectively of the 
proposition expressed by the conclusion and the evidential premises (which don't include the 
traditionally overlooked inferential connection claim of the argument). O f course the deductive 
validity or otherwise of the latter (the traditional OPPSET) is what is of particular concern to us 
in evaluation of the validity of straightforward (non-inductive) deductive arguments - not, as 
has been traditionally supposed, because that is (all there is to) the argument, but because the 
deductive validity or otherwise of that O P P S E T is what determines the truth or otherwise of the 
deductive inferential claim of the argument in such non-inductive cases. The general deductive 
validity of arguments in whole may indeed be regarded as relatively insignificant, in itself, to 
their evaluation. But the crucial point of epistemic deductivism, along with its essential 
acknowledgement of the larger (as it happens ultimately deductive) structure of arguments - is 
particularly significant in the analysis of induction, as it forces us to analyse the essential (in this 
case generally epistemic) content of the pertinent inferential connection claim - evaluation of 
which is the crucial determinant of the validity (in the broad sense of inferential adequacy) of 
indictive arguments. Moreover, as we have seen, even in the case of an argument that is 
presented in a traditional deductively valid form, the epistemic status of the premises may in 
some cases not be presumed to be certainty, and in such cases the presumed epistemic 
significance of the stated premises for the stated conclusion (granted their supposed epistemic 
status) may be of considerable significance for appraisal of the argument - in which case the 
presumed epistemic inferential connection will still need to be explicated and appraised (and the 
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truth or otherwise of that implicit inferential connection claim may well be underdetermined by 
the deductive validity of the associated OPPSET) . 
Quick counterexamples to deductivism? 
Fox (1999) has recently claimed to have refuted deductivism, by appealing to very simple 
apparent counterexamples which he calls 'epistemic syllogisms'- constructed simply by taking 
as a premise a statement of the acceptability of the conclusion. Examples of these are 
( E | ) One should accept that P. Therefore P. 
and 
(E2) It is reasonable for me to believe that P. Therefore P. 
are discussed by John Fox in a recent comment on deductivism (Fox, 1999, p450-l . Fox goes 
along with the customary restriction of the term 'valid' to the context of deduction and talks 
instead about the question of the 'soundness' of non-deductive arguments: 
Arguments (argument forms) such that given [the truth of] their premises, it is (always) 
reasonable to accept their conclusions, 1 call 'souncT. (Fox, 1999, p448) 
One problem with this as we have seen is that the aim of showing that it is reasonable to accept 
a hypothesis is just one of many possible aims for an argument.'^^ But, even granting (for the 
sake of other objections) his account of the appropriate relation of soundness, is Fox is right in 
suggesting that the cases he cites do indeed provide counterexamples to the strict deductivist. 
Do arguments from conclusion-justification beg the question? 
As a general characterisation of the significant features of such forms of inference, we may call 
such arguments 'arguments from conclusion-justification'.'^^ This description is indicative of 
the respect in which I would suggest such arguments may be regarded as 'question-begging'. 
O f course the conclusion is not specifically assumed outright. Most arguments that beg the 
question don't do so quite that overtly. Not all arguments are intended to provide an assurance 
Fox (1999, p448) does however acknowledge different kinds of purported merit for arguments, 
mentioning three and opting to 'deal with the third'. 
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of the impossibility of the falsity of the conclusion, granted the truth of the premises. When an 
argument is intended to establish some more modest epistemic objective (granted the premises) 
such as establishing or confirming that one ought to accept a conclusion P, then taking as an 
assumption the proposition that that epistemic attitude towards the conclusion is (as the 
argument is supposed to establish) an attitude with which one ought to regard the conclusion, 
effectively presupposes what the argument is supposed to establish, and in that respect such an 
argument may naturally be said to 'beg the question'. The practical problem with this is that it 
seems to disable such an argument from the performance of its intended clarificatory function 
(in any context where the argument is needed in order to perform such a function). 
Having considered the fallacy of begging the question, as apparently exemplified in these cases, 
it would appear in retrospect that we may have interpreted Salmon's use of the term 'legitimate' 
too narrowly in suggesting that this might be simply equivalent to 'valid' in our broad sense of 
the term. It is of course common to regard even certain types of argument that are undeniably 
deductively valid as, in a significant sense, 'illegitimate' or 'improper'. The particular cases that 
naturally spring to mind in this regard are precisely those that are commonly dismissed as 
question-begging. If we then incorporate this restriction into our interpretation of Salmon's 
notion of the 'legitimacy' of arguments, so that 'legitimate' implies 'valid, non-question-
begging' then the examples of what I have called 'arguments from conclusion-acceptability' 
that are taken by Fox to 'refute deductivism' would not after all appear to constitute 
counterexamples to (strict) inferential deductivism as described by Salmon, since they appear to 
beg the question. 
Moreover, the objectionability of question-begging is intimately related to the fundamental 
purpose of the requirement of validity. The basic reason why we require arguments to be valid 
is because we want to be able to use them, in their basic and central function - to establish the 
acceptability of propositions (when indeed they should be accepted) in situations of ignorance 
or doubt about those propositions (or at least about the rationality of their acceptance). It is 
precisely in such situations of fundamental concern, where the rational acceptability of a 
proposition needs to be established, that arguments which simply presume either the truth or the 
acceptability of the proposition in question are of no avail. Arguments from conclusion-
™ Fox called such arguments 'epistemic syllogisms'. I take it that my description, if less brief, affords a 
clearer indication of the pertinent features of the relevant kind of argument. 
Of course, in cases where a simplistic ontic argument is elliptical for something epistemic, as we have 
noted should often be the case in inductive arguments, the interpretation of the implicit inferential 
connective would of course need to be adjusted accordingly. 
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acceptability, like arguments from the conclusion, are inherently unfit to perform such a 
function. 
In these kinds of argument the acceptability of the conclusion is simply taken for granted, either 
explicitly (in the case of arguments from conclusion acceptability) or conversationally implicitly 
(in the case of arguments from the conclusion). Thus, despite their apparent validity, by their 
nature, such arguments will be unable to establish the acceptability of their respective 
conclusions, in any situation where that is not already acknowledged, respectively either 
because, in such a scenario, the premise is not acknowledged, or because the acceptability of the 
premise is not acknowledged. 
Problems for the appeal to question-begging 
However there are a couple of related problems with this line of defence for the strict 
deductivist. First, although philosophers sometimes make reference to a purported type of 
'question-begging' - typically in terms of'rule-circularity' - that is somehow supposed to 
relate to inferential adequacy, as distinct form mere premise adequacy - it is seems quite 
obvious that the cases Fox invokes here are merely cases where we have question-begging 
premises. And since the key claim of the strict deductivist must surely be understood as a claim 
about the logical correctness of arguments - relating to inferential adequacy - this appeal to the 
question-begging nature of these arguments might not after all constitute a satisfactory defence 
for the strict deductivist. Furthermore, this point would appear to confirmed when we look 
more closely at Fox's suggestions about the context in which such mini-arguments might be 
applied. 
With reference to an allegedly Popperian approach to 'Countering Hume on induction' 
Musgrave (1993, pl70-175) presents a somewhat dubious argument that is supposed to provide 
a justification for the epistemic conclusion that it is 'reasonable to believe' the hypothesis of his 
chosen example inference. Fox approves Mugrave's basic strategy exemplified here of arguing 
(dediuctively) to such a justification claim - albeit as a fundamental part of a larger form of 
inductive inference that he (Fox) endorses. Representing this portion of the overall inference by 
D, Fox endorses a construal of inductive inference of the general form 'D+E', where ' E ' 
represents the 'epistemic syllogism' - or what we have described as an argument from 
conclusion justification. In view of this, returning to the charge of question-begging against the 
epistemic syllogism, we can see that in such a context, where E only constitutes the latter part 
of a larger argument for the ultimate conclusion (i.e. the hypothesis itself) the charge of begging 
the question would appear to be defused, since there is an underlying justification (of whatever 
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merit) provided for the justificatory proposition (the premise of E ) . In other words the premise 
of E - which the strict deductivist might like to dismiss as question begging - will not fall so 
easily, since it is not actually an assumption of the ultimate argument in which E is to be 
employed, but is merely an intermediate premise, derived from prior assumptions. 
Are arguments from conclusion justification va//</? 
However, as we have already noted, what is in any case of particular concern to the deductivist 
as such is inferential adequacy or in our broad sense of the term validity. And in respect of this 
question, on the basis of our earlier considerations, we may nevertheless find fault with Fox's 
epistemic syllogism. We have noted that an essential and defining constituent of a justification-
clarificatory argument as such is an at least implicit inferential connection claim. Musgrave 
(1988b) and Fox (p455) both note that any cogent deductively invalid argument 'P therefore C 
can be transformed into a deductively valid argument by the addition of the (thereby acceptable) 
'validating conditional' - ' I f P then C - but dismiss the point as 'trivial' - presumably since 
such a transformation would be justified only if the original argument were (understood to be) 
cogent in the first place. However, so long as the stated argument is not intended to be 
somehow elliptical for a more complex epistemic argument (in which case it should anyway be 
reformulated respectively for clarity) the implicit inferential connection claim of the argument 
as stated will simply be precisely the validating conditional. As we noted earlier, what the 
inferential connective (that makes the sequence of statements an argument) 'P therefore C 
means is basically since P is the case so is C (or 'from P, C follows') - thereby implying UfP 
then C' . '^ ' Supposing then that the epistemic syllogism 
(E2) It is reasonable for me to believe that P. Therefore P. 
is intended exactly as stated - and is not elliptical for something more complex.'^^ If this is the 
case then the argument, via the connotation of 'Therefore' entails the inferential connection 
claim "P follows from 'It is reasonable to for me to believe that P'" which, at least in typical 
cases of P, will be plainly false. Fox himself notes (p455) that the generalised form of the 
corresponding conditional (in the case of our chosen example, 'For all A, whenever it is 
reasonable for me to believe that A, A ' will be simply false, and appears to conclude from this 
that epistemic syllogisms cannot 'be reconstructed as valid' by (justifiably) adding such a 
As an argument to an overtly ontic conclusion - in the context of argument where epistemic 
qualifications where applicable are explicitly being employed (notably in the expressed premise) the 
natural construal of such an argument is of course that the unqualified ontic conclusion is fully intended. 
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premise. However, what he seems to have failed to notice'" is that the validating conditional of 
the epistemic syllogism (E2) - 'I f it is reasonable to for me to believe that P, then P' - doesn't 
need to be added to the syllogism, since it is already implied by the inferential connective.'^'' 
This result yields two problems for Fox's approach to inductive inference and his purported 
refutation of deductivism. The first is simply that since the inferential connection claims of 
epistemic syllogisms will generally be false, they will not supply a satisfactory part of any 
general form of inductive inference - as Fox appears to hope they will. And more generally -
if, as I have suggested, we regard inferential connection claims (at least in the case of inductive 
inference) as substantive albeit special premises - epistemic syllogisms will in any case fail to 
constitute counterexamples to deductivism simply because on deeper analysis (revealing the 
covert inferential connection claim - which in conjunction with the primary premise deductively 
implies the conclusion) they like any other argument are ultimately seen to be deductive in their 
underlying logical structure. 
as indeed Musgrave seems to have failed to notice the corresponding general point that arguments 
imply the inferential connective 




EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY: QUALIFIER OR RELATION? 
I have argued that the proper way to construe an inductive argument is as an epistemic argument 
to a conclusion that consists in an epistemic qualification of the hypothesis. Kyburg, with 
reference to Hempel has argued that this is the wrong way to construe such arguments. In this 
chapter I shall attempt to defend the position I have endorsed against their objections, and to 
further clarify the concept of epistemic probability that is appropriate to the construal of 
probabilistic inductive arguments. 
Kyburg and Hempel on the proper construal of statistical inferences 
Claiming to follow Carl Hempel (1965), Henry Kyburg sets out two alternative views of the 
proper schematic form for an inductive argument, as follows: 
The schema for an inductive argument can take either of two forms (as pointed out by Carl 
Hempel [1965]): 
Premises 
Conclusion with hedge R 
or 
Premises 
======= R, characterising the inference 
Conclusion 
In other words, we may ask whether an inductive argument has the form: from this evidence, it 
follows that the hypothesis H is probable (plausible, supported, ...) or the form: from this 
evidence H follows with probability, plausibility, support... so and so? Or perhaps sometimes 
one and sometimes the other? 
(Kyburg, 1990, p60) 
Kyburg declares his own view on this matter, with reference to Hempel (1965), and offers an 
example in illustration of the point: 
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Hempel argues persuasively that the latter is the form we should adhere to - that is, that our body 
of scientific knowledge consists of categorical empirical statements rather than modally 
modified ones. The evidence we have supports (to some degree or other) the conclusion that the 
relative fl-equency of male births among humans is close to 0.51, not that it is probably close to 
0.51. (Kyburg, 1990, p60) 
Hempel does indeed argue that the latter is the interpretation we should adopt, but he does not 
do so in the patently fallacious way that Kyburg suggests here, i.e. by effectively changing the 
question.^^^ The question is not 'Does our body of scientific knowledge consist of categorical 
empirical statements rather than modally modified ones?'. Rather the question is 'How should 
we construe the form of non-deductive statistical arguments?' (c.f Hempel 1965, 57-8). In 
contrast to Kyburg's above-noted 'reformulation' of the question in terms of scientific 
knowledge, Hempel relates this more specifically to the interpretation of the concept of 
(inducfive)probability, yielding the question 'How should we understand the concept of 
probability: as a modal qualifier or relation?'. Furthermore, on closer examination of Hempel's 
understanding of the issue, it becomes apparent that he did not intend to maintain that 
categorical assertion of the hypothesis should even be one of the alternatives under 
considerafion here.'^^ 
Why is categorical assertion of the hypothesis not one of Hempel's options? 
Before moving on to Hempel's arguments though, we may first pause to consider why Hempel 
did not propose categorical assertion of the hypothesis as a feature of one of the options. The 
particular 'example' cited above by Kyburg may in fact be utilised in illustrating one of the 
basic reasons why such a form of construal would not generally be appropriate. First we may 
note that Kyburg's peculiar choice of conclusion, as essentially a statement of statistical 
'probability' is hardly apt in this context, particulariy in view of the specific type of argument 
discussed by Hempel in this regard. To appreciate just how inappropriate this example is, we 
may note that the issue addressed by Hempel is quite specifically set in the context of critical 
appraisal of statistical syllogisms or 'quasi-syllogisms' as Toulmin (1958, pi 09) describes the 
qualitative versions of them, i.e. arguments of the following kind of form: 
a i s F 
Or at least he does not do so by misrepresenting the question in this way, although he does appear to 
make the same kind of mistake, in another respect as we shall see. 
The only point in this passage where Hempel appears to condone the possibility of interpreting a 
certain form of argument in such a way 'so that we are entitled to assert [the hypothesis] categorically and 
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The proportion of Fs that are G is q 
Hence, with probability q, a is G 
a is F 
The proportion of Fs that are G is less than 2 per cent 
So, almost certainly (or: probably) a is not G 
a is F 
The statistical probability for an F to be a G [in other words, the relative frequency with which 
an occurrence of F yields an outcome G] is nearly 1 
So, it is almost certain that a is G 
(Hempel, 1965, p54-5, latter parenthesis mine) 
Thus, in the type of argument discussed by Hempel with regard to this issue, a statement of 
statistical probability or relative frequency, such as that mentioned in the example presented by 
Kyburg, would generally take the place of the statistical premise of such a syllogism, rather than 
its conclusion. We may also note that it is quite clear, particularly from consideration of the 
numerical example given, that in the type of argument discussed by Hempel the epistemic 
probability of (the 'credence rationally to be given to''") the hypothesis on the basis of the 
statistical evidence, as expressed in the conclusion of the statistical syllogism is appropriately 
related to the statistical frequency or proportion described in the statistical premise. If the 
former is not appropriately related to the latter, as for example in the following 
a is a new-bom human 
The relative frequency of males among new-bom humans is close to 0.51 
Hence, it is almost certain that a is male. 
then the argument will fail to conform to the general form endorsed by proponents of the 
statistical syllogism. Mismatches such as this between the statistic described in the respective 
premise and the degree of credibility claimed in the conclusion clearly result in a fallacious 
argument. Applying this point to the example in hand, one way in which the argument may be 
amended (or at least that particular problem may be eliminated) goes as follows. 
without qualifications' (Hempel 1965, p59) is with regard to a schematization of a deductive syllogism 
where the hypothesis is qualified in the conclusion by "certainly. 
Hempel 1965 p64, c.f. also the discussion, over p61-2, of Toulmin's interpretation of the epistemic 
probability claim in the conclusion. Note also that Kyburg acknowledges that what is at issue is the 
question of whether the hypothesis needs (at least sometimes) to be qualified in terms of epistemic 
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a is a new-bom human 
The relative frequency of males among new-bom humans is close to 0.51 
Hence, it is marginally more likely than not that a is male. 
In contrast to the categorical claim which it seems Kyburg would like us to agree on the basis of 
his partially specified example, it is patently clear that in the context of this argument we would 
not want to detach the hypothesis (in this case that a is male) from the probability qualification. 
Even if we have no doubt at all about the premises of this argument (and this is all the relevant 
information we have to go on with regard to the hypothesis - the 'total evidence' requirement as 
Hempel calls it) these premises would clearly not warrant a categorical assertion of that 
hypothesis. Thus it would seem, on consideration of examples like this, that we must admit that 
at least sometimes the hypothesis needs to qualified in terms of epistemic probability. More 
specifically, when the degree of credibility warranted by the statistical evidence (in conjunction 
with the singular premise) is not sufficient to support outright belief, acceptance, or categorical 
assertion, the hypothesis in the conclusion of an argument of this kind should not be detached 
from the respective epistemic probability qualification. 
In order to further illustrate the implausibility of such a policy of rejecting probabilistic 
qualification in favour of categorical assertion, we may also consider its implications in the 
context of'confidence' or 'credible' intervals, i.e. estimations of the probability, or degree of 
confidence, that a parameter under investigation falls within a specified interval. Neyman 
(1937), proposed just such a 'categorical-assertion' treatment of confidence intervals, whereby 
the statistician 'must state' that the true value of the parameter under investigation lies between 
the respective confidence bounds. However there are intuitive objections to this approach to 
estimative inference, particularly in cases where only a limited confidence coefficient can be 
established for any usefully narrow interval. As Howson and Urbach (1993, p237-8) object, if 
we consider narrower intervals, there will be a correspondingly smaller confidence coefficient 
that applies to the respective hypothesis that the parameter under investigation lies within the 
narrower interval (or more accurately the interval with the lower frequency of error). In 
principle these confidence coefficients will range from 1 to 0, but it would hardly be defensible 
to suggest that in cases where the interval is very narrow and the coefficient correspondingly 
low it would be reasonable to categorically assert that the parameter falls within that interval. 
probability, yielding 'statements involving "probably", "likely", and the like in their epistemic usage' 
(Kyburg 1990 p60). 
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In his defence, perhaps Neyman may have intended to suggest only that categorical assertion 
would be in order in application to intervals for which the confidence coefficient is quite high 
(traditionally levels of .95 or .99 are considered). But even then there are still dangers that may 
be associated with the detachment of even high confidence qualifications in the treatment of 
interval estimates as categorical assertions. For example, when such a statistical estimate 
constitutes only one factor in a range of consideration relevant to the judgment of guilt of some 
crime by a particular party, ignoring such a confidence qualification may decisively misdirect 
the judgment of guilt when the latter is subject to a high probability criterion. Aitken (2000, 
p9-14) discusses the importance of sampling estimates and associated confidence coefficients in 
the context of criminal law, noting for example how such estimates can be related to sentencing 
judgements. However he also observes that in many state courts in America the quantity of 
illicit material within what may be a very large consignment e.g. of pills, 'is an essential 
element of the possession charge and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.' (Aitken 
2000, pi2). This then leads Aitken to examine different approaches to the probabilistic 
interpretation of 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Suppose the court proposes a 95% probability 
criterion for conviction, and that a 95% confidence interval for the relevant quantify is 
established with the lower bound on the incriminating threshold. According to Neyman's 
criterion, the right policy is then to categorically assert that the consignment contains the 
critical quantify. Suppose however that there is also an issue of identity of the party responsible 
for the illicit consignment, and that a judgement is made that there is a 95% probabilify that the 
defendant is the owner (or the parfy responsible for the content) of the illicit consignment. 
Ignoring the degree of doubt about the critical quantify in the assignment, having taking that as 
'proven', on the proposed standard of 'reasonable doubt' the court must then find the defendant 
guilfy. But if we were to take into account the (5%) degree of doubt about the illicit content 
consignment and the degree of doubt about the identify of the owner (also 5%), then clearly we 
cannot consistently maintain only a 5% degree of doubt that the consignment contains the 
critical quantify and the defendant is the owner, in which case the defendant should be 
acquitted. 
Kyburg's own lottery paradox (1961, pi97 and 1990, p64-5) conveniently illustrates the logical 
difficulties that we can get into if we adopt the categorical assertion approach even in cases of 
extremely high objective probabilify. But, whether we are concerned with singular or statistical 
hypotheses, in cases of only modest probabilify, the importance of clarifying and maintaining 
appropriate probabilify qualifications that may apply to the conclusions of our inductive 
inferences (whether these be interpreted entirely subjectively or more objectively) can hardly be 
overestimated, and has accordingly became common practice in statistical and predictive 
inference. In view of the overwhelming practical and theoretical problems associated with 
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Neyman's policy of categorical assertion, it has been largely superseded by an explicitly 
qualified confidence approach to statistical estimation whereby the proposition that a parameter 
lies within any given interval will typically be assigned a certain degree of confidence or 
credibility on the basis of the evidence. It is generally acknowledged that in most cases of 
statistical or probabilistic inference only a limited degree of confidence in the hypothesis will be 
warranted on the basis of the evidence, and explicit acknowledgement of the respective degree 
of confidence in the conclusion of the inference will often be of considerable practical 
importance for the purpose of associated decision-making, as well as for application in the 
context of further related judgements, as illustrated in the simplified example above. 
Why Hempel's analysis is therefore not an option either 
We have already noted that the options as to the constmal of inductive/statistical inference as 
Hempel sees it do not appear to be intended to include interpreting the conclusion as an 
unqualified categorical statement of the hypothesis. However on reflection it is difficuU to see 
how the position he does advocate on the initial question (regarding the construal of inductive 
argumenty^^ can in fact be consistently separated from exactly this unacceptable option that he 
does not even consider entertaining. Let me explain. The trouble with Hempel's argument on 
this issue is that, like Kyburg (albeit in different respects) he also falls foul of the fallacy of 
changing the question over the course of his argument. Moreover a natural element of caution 
to this potential pitfall is conveniently invoked by the peculiarity that the title of the central 
section on his treatment of the question of the construal of inductive/statistical arguments is in 
fact a notably different question - namely the question of whether probability is a modal 
qualifier or a relation.'^' Now Hempel wants to argue that probability, at least in the context of 
inductive/statistical argument, is a relation.'''" Leaving aside for the moment whether we ought 
to agree with him on that, on the understanding that Hempel surely doesn't want to suggest that 
the conclusion of such an inference is properly to be construed as an unqualified categorical 
assertion of the hypothesis, we may then begin to wonder exactly how otherwise he does intend 
to construe the arguments in question, wherein he claims premises and hypothesis are connected 
by such a probability relation. If the conclusion is not to be constmed as an unqualified 
statement of the hypothesis, as in Kyburg's misrepresentation of Hempel's intentions, illustrated 
above, what exactly is the conclusion of such arguments supposed to be? In order to answer 
Or at least on any tenable construal of the position he advocates. 
The actual title at this point is 'PROBABILITY: MODAL QUALIFIER OR RELATION?' (Hempel 
1965, p57). 
In fact he concedes that there are uses of the term 'in ordinary discourse' where it is to be interpreted 
as qualifier, but doesn't think they are applicable to that employed in the arguments with which we are 
concemed. (Hempel, 1965, p61-2). 
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this quesfion we may look for an explicit account of what Hempel ultimately takes to be the 
proper construal of these arguments. We find that Hempel claims to provide such an account at 
the top of p60: 
Thus, in analogy to (3.3), the arguments which (2.2) was meant to represent might be 
schematized as follows: 
(3.4) 'a is not G' is almost certain (or: is highly probable) relative to the two statements 
F' and 'Less than 2 per cent of F's are G'. (Hempel, 1965, p60) 
a I S 
But the trouble with this is that (3.4) does not even remotely resemble a schematic construal of 
any form of argument. The sentence expressing (3.4) is a single (schematic) statement, and 
what it states is simply that a certain probability relation holds between certain other specified 
statements. How could Hempel possibly think that this is even a candidate schematisation for a 
particular type of argument? Clearly this cannot be the case. (3.4) is nothing more than a 
statement to the effect that a certain probability relation holds between two mentioned 
statements or propositions. That the respective propositions are merely mentioned and not 
themselves stated (or for that matter implied) is patently obvious from the logical form of the 
statement, and indeed is appropriately indicated by the standard practice of enclosure in 
quotation marks. Of course it is generally understood by those who want to interpret probability 
in the context of inductive argument as a relation that holds between premises and conclusion 
(as indeed it initially seemed that Hempel intended to argue) that the probability relation that 
thereby connects premises and conclusion is not itself the entire argument'''^, since of course the 
premises and the conclusion are generally understood to be essential components of any 
argument, regardless of whether any purported probability relation does or does not hold 
between them. But, as we can see quite plainly, these respective propositions are not even 
implicit in (3.4). 
Having apparently said, quite incredibly and without forewarning, that (3.4) is an (amended) 
schematization of the form of argument represented by (2.2), Hempel moves immediately back 
'"' In the analogous case, considered earlier by Hempel (1965, p58): 
(3.3) 'a is G' is certain relative to (i.e. is logically implied by) 'a is F' and 'All F are G' 
Hempel seems to acknowledge that this is an account of 'the logical relation between premises and 
conclusion of a deductive argument', expressing 'the logical force of the argument' (i.e. presumably the 
force of the implication connecting premises and conclusion) with the aid of a relatjyised interpretation of 
the term 'certain'. He does not at this point appear to suggest that (3.3) is or could be a proper construal 
of the corresponding deductive argument (as he implicitly suggests on p60). And of course it is in any 
case equally clear that to do so in this case would likewise be patently absurd. 
'""^  if indeed it is supposed to be any part of the argument at all, since of course the standard formal 
definition of an argument is that it consists in exactly the ordered pair of the premises and the conclusion. 
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to the less incredible talk of the surrounding context, again addressing 'The concept of 
probability here invoked' - as distinct from the target issue of the appropriate construal of the 
relevant type of argument. This might leave us wondering whether Hempel really meant to say 
what he just did. The trouble is of course that if 'm fact he only intended to say what he appears 
to be arguing for in the surrounding context - i.e. that (3.4) merely describes the probability 
relation that holds between premises and conclusion in a proper construal of argument (2.2), and 
that it would be inappropriate in this context to read the term 'probably' in the overt account of 
the conclusion as it seems to be represented in (2.2), i.e. as a qualifier of the hypothesis - then it 
would seem that this would imply that the proper construal of the conclusion in the kind of 
argument represented by (2.2) is that it is an unqualified categorical statement of the hypothesis 
(i.e. the unqualified statement that a is not G) - since it is difficult to see what alternative 
account of the conclusion there could possibly be. However, on moving ahead to his 
conclusion, we find (a) that Hempel is expressly resistant to such a suggestion (p.60-61), and 
(b) that in fact he seems to acknowledge, in contrast to what he appeared to claim above, that 
the schematisation (3.4) is 'concemed only with the logical connections between premises and 
conclusion'(p.60). In this case it would seem that we may after all conclude that Hempel did 
not intend what he said earlier, i.e. that he does not after all want to suggest that (3.4) is the 
proper construal of the schematic form of the argument represented by (2.2).'^ *^ The pressing 
questions outstanding then are 
(1) What exactly in the end does Hempel think is the proper construal of the schematic 
form of this kind of argument?, and 
(2) How does he think this is compatible with the view that we should not interpret the 
conclusion of such arguments as an unqualified categorical statement of the hypothesis? 
Regarding question ( I ) Hempel does not appear to be entirely clear or consistent on this matter. 
His concluding account of the situation is at best confused: 
In an inductive inference, ... even if the premises all belong to the class of statements previously 
accepted or possessed, the conclusion cannot be added to that class; it can only be qualified by a 
number representing its probability relative to the premises. In reference to inductive 
"inferences" or "arguments," therefore one can speak of a "conclusion" only cum grano salis: 
the conclusion cannot be detached from the premises and asserted on its own when the premises 
are true. (Hempel 1965 p61) 
However, the absurd interpretation seems to resurface again towards the end of Hempel's concluding 
passage, where he suggests that 'the various types of broadly statistical syllogism are accordingly 
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Thus it seems in the end that Hempel wants to talk about 'the conclusion' o f an inductive 
inference, for example maintaining that it cannot be 'asserted on its o w n ' - not at least 'when 
the premises are true', and yet seems at the same time to want to distance himself f rom the 
thought that we can indeed properly speak o f the 'conclusion' at all (and consequently, it would 
seem, whether we can properly speak o f the 'argument' and therefore the 'premises' either.) As 
a purported clarification o f the proper logical construal o f the arguments in question, Hempel's 
analysis, certainly as he ultimately presents it, would appear to be an abject failure. 
Nevertheless, let us look a little more closely at its apparent implications, and see what we can 
make o f it. 
It would seem that the proposition Hempel is referring to when he talks o f 'the conclusion' here 
(even i f he wants to question the legitimacy o f its logical status in the context as a 'conclusion') 
is the hypothesis (or 'evidendum', e.g. in the case o f (2.2) the proposition that 'a is G ' ) , since it 
is apparent f rom the foregoing discussion that this is what is supposed to stand in the relevant 
probability relation to the premises. Now a proponent o f the original account o f the logical 
form o f the argument as set out in (2.2) would o f course want to agree with Hempel that the 
unqualified hypothesis cannot 'properly' be construed as having the logical status o f the 
conclusion in this argument, but o f course it is the question o f what is the proper construal o f 
the argument that is our concern - in which case the correct response to this is simply to 
acknowledge unequivocally that the unqualified hypothesis is not to be construed as the 
conclusion. The wrong response - which is the line that Hempel seems to find himself forced to 
take, is to try to say that this is the conclusion but really it isn't a conclusion at all . But o f 
course once we take on board the correct response, that would only appear to support the 
proponent o f the original schematization o f (2.2), wherein the conclusion is a probabilistically 
qualified statement o f the hypothesis, precisely because the premises don't warrant unqualified 
assertion o f the hypothesis - only a probabilistic qualification o f it - which latter moreover 
Hempel appears to admit in the above cited passage. 
To conclude this section then, it seems that Hempel has ultimately conflated the question 'What 
is the proper construal o f arguments o f the surface form o f e.g. (2.2)?' wi th the relevant but 
quite distinct question 'What is the proper construal o f the probability relation that holds 
between premises and hypothesis in (2.2)?', and this has ultimately led h im to f a i l to be clear 
even about whether (2.2) is ultimately to be recognised as an argument at a l l , let alone about 
replaced by schemata of the kind suggested in (3.4)' (Hempel, 1965, p63. my emphases), 
albeit on the understanding that the qualification is relative to the premises. 
161 
what exactly is its proper logical form. However Hempel seems, at least at some points, to be 
reasonably clear that 
(a) the unqualified hypothesis 'a is G ' cannot properly be construed as the conclusion, 
but that there is a probability relation which holds between premises and hypothesis so that 
(b) the hypothesis can be qualified by its probability relative to the premises. 
Regarding the issue o f how this then relates to the proper construal o f the type o f argument in 
question, Hempel at best leaves a mystery, and at worst suggests, quite absurdly, that such 
arguments are in fact not arguments at all but merely (extremely) misleadingly formulated 
statements o f the respective probability relations (such as (3.4)).''*'' 
The proper construal of the conclusion of statistical inferences 
In what fol lows we may consider how, once we have acknowledged (a) and (b), we ought to 
construe the logical form o f the arguments in question. We have no reason (and Hempel has 
given us no reason) to suppose that the premises explicitly stated in (2.2) are indeed genuine 
premises o f this type o f argument. Leaving aside for the moment the question o f whether there 
might be any additional hidden premises that may rightly be taken to be involved in the 
inferences that are supposed to be explicated in such arguments, we may focus for the moment 
on the outstanding question o f the proper logical fo rm o f the conclusion, and furthermore what 
place (whether that o f the conclusion or any other) the probability relation to which Hempel 
appeals might actually take within the schematic structure o f the argument. We have seen that 
both Hempel and the proponent o f the original schematization (2.2) seem to agree that we can 
qualify the hypothesis by its probability, and it would seem that some such qualification would 
after all appear to be the most obvious, indeed the only, available candidate for the conclusion. 
The outstanding question we need to consider then is whether the probability qualification that 
attaches to the hypothesis in the conclusion should be interpreted as a simple (non-relative) 
qualification - basically o f the form 'Probably (or with probability r) h ' - as it is represented in 
the original schematization or as a more complex relative qualification, - basically o f the form 
'Relative to e, h is probable (or h has probability r ) ' - corresponding to the permissible 
probability qualification conceded by Hempel. 
'"^ This is absurd, for one reason, because it involves a denial that the sequence of statements that 
constitutes (2.2) 'properly interpreted' even implies the quite unproblematic and explicit statements that 
constitute its overt premises. 
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In order to approach this issue, the first point to note is that it is relatively easy to provide a 
plausible account o f the generally intended epistemic outcome o f my putting to you an argument 
o f the fo rm described in (2.2). The intended epistemic outcome in such a case is basically that 
having considered the bearing o f the evidence on the hypothesis, you should realise that you (or, 
more generally 'we ' ) ought rationally to regard the hypothesis with a high degree o f belief (near 
certainty). Now it is clear f rom Hempel's discussion that he relies heavily on Camap in his 
view that probability in the context o f inductive inference should be understood as a relation 
determined purely by logic that holds between evidence statements and hypothesis. O f course 
Carnap's view o f probability is now rarely regarded as viable,''"' but that need not concern us 
here. Taking for granted for the moment that we have in place a presumption o f 'total 
evidence', as Hempel calls it (we shall turn to the significance o f this shortly), so long as we 
think that there is some kind o f probability relation that holds between evidence and 
hypothesis''*', and we think that when this is taken into account with our knowledge o f the 
evidence there are implications for our epistemic attitude towards the hypothesis (as indeed 
Camap does) then it is relatively easy to comprehend related concepts o f both non-relative 
(unconditional) probability'''^ and relative (conditional) probability, that allow us to make sense 
o f the structure o f such arguments as those represented by (2.2). In this regard, a comment 
made by Hempel himself on the significance o f Camap's requirement o f total evidence is 
particularly helpful in elucidating the situation. 
Broadly speaking, we might say that according to this requirement, the credence which it is 
rational to give to a statement at a given time must be determined by the degree of 
conformation, or the logical probability, which the statement possesses on the total evidence 
available at the time.'"" (Hempel 1965 p64) 
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It is notable that Swinburne (2001) has recently endorsed a concept o f logical probability' that looks a 
lot like the logical conception advocated by Camap, however while Swinburne thinks that there are 
objective a priori criteria for the determination of his 'logical probabilities', he does not insist that the 
respective criteria must be purely logical, and indeed in 2002 (p4, footnote 10) he admits that his choice 
of terminology in this regard is not ' fully satisfactory' and distances himself quite explicitly fi-om any 
assumption that the value of every such probability is a 'truth of logic'. 
(whether in virtue of pure logic, or of some feature of the physical world, or of our own psychological 
make-up, or of some basic 'deontic laws' of epistemology, or as a matter of pragmatics). 
Even i f Camap himself was resistant to such a notion. 
Of course this ignores the complication of subject relativity, whereby the total evidence available to 
any particular subject at any given time will vary, but the common simplification is effectively to suppose 
that all parties to the argument share a common evidence base - or at least that all the relevant 
information is held by all parties and is as cited in the premises, in which case subject relativity may be 
ignored. 
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To put the point another way, wi th reference to the probability relation such as (3.4) earlier 
cited by Hempel, ' '" and for simplicity dropping the time index (on the natural understanding 
that unless indicated otherwise the temporal context is simply determined by the present tense) 
we may say that if we know that e (and e is the total relevant information) and there is a 
probability relation such that h is highly probable relative to e, then the credence which it is 
rational to give to h is high. This clearly respects the central point made by Hempel that the 
latter must be determined by the respective logical probability, in the sense that it is dependent 
on i t . But so long as Hempel insists on interpreting logical probability merely in terms o f a 
logical relation as exemplified in (3.4) - a relation which does not for example imply e - that 
logical relation in itself does not make it rational to give a high degree o f credence to h. It does 
so only in conjunction with the supplementary information that e (and that e is the only relevant 
information known). On this understanding o f the situation it would seem that we should have 
no d i f f icu l ty in making sense o f a (present tense) concept o f unconditional epistemic probability 
P(h) defined simply as the degree o f credence it is rational to give to h , " ' as wel l as a related 
concept o f conditional epistemic probability (functionally equivalent to Hempel's probability 
relation) P(h|e) defined as the degree o f credence it would be rational to give to h if our total 
relevant information were e. 
Regarding the principle o f total evidence, Hempel goes along with Camap in holding that this is 
a principle o f the methodology o f inductive reasoning, analogous to principles concerning the 
epistemological application o f formal deductive logic (Hempel 1965 p65-6). That might seem 
to be a fair position to take i f like Camap you think that indeed there are formal purely logical 
relations that determine the probability o f one proposition on a set o f propositions. However it 
w i l l not seem to be such a reasonable position to take i f you think that epistemological rather 
than purely logical relations are fundamental to the determination o f inductive probabilities. In 
any case our concern is with the informal logic o f induction, i.e. principles concerning the 
appraisal o f natural argument, understood basically as attempted explications o f supposed 
justifications for holding certain epistemic attitudes towards hypotheses. And in this case 
epistemological beliefs, such as that T h i s is all the relevant information we have', wherever 
operative - whether taken for granted or overtly expressed, w i l l typically be essential to the 
proper explication o f the supposed epistemic justification. 
Thus it seems that we may salvage the fo l lowing agreeable points f rom Camap's ultimately 
unsatisfactory analysis o f the proper construal o f inductive statistical arguments 
'^ ^ albeit without commitment as to whether the stated relation is determined, as Camap claims, purely by 
logic. 
or perhaps, less ambiguously, the degree of credence that ought rationally to be given to h. 
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(1) There is a presumption o f total evidence. 
(2) The argument invokes a probability relation connecting evidence and hypothesis - a 
relation which determines the degree of credence rationally to be given to the 
hypothesis, and 
(3) On the basis o f the evidence, in virtue o f the respective probability relation, the 
hypothesis can be qualified by its probability relative to the evidence. 
And having noted a simple and natural distinction between conditional and unconditional 
epistemic probabilities, defined in accordance wi th the relation described above, it would seem 
that we can establish a satisfactory explication o f the general form o f the line o f reasoning that 
w i l l typically underlie the type o f argument in question, in line with the thesis o f epistemic 
deductivism, as follows: 
An epistemic deductivist construal of statistical/inductive inference - first formulation 
(1) a i s F . 
(2) The proportion o f Fs that are G is less than 2 per cent. 
(3) Our total evidence relevant to the hypothesis that a is not G is (1) and (2). 
(4) I f (3) then we ought to regard the hypothesis that a is not G wi th a high degree 
o f credence. 
Therefore; 
(5) we ought to regard the hypothesis that a is not G with a high degree o f 
credence. 
Here (1) and (2) are the original explicit premises, and (3) is the presumption o f total evidence. 
Strictly o f course premises (1) and (2) are superfluous, in that all that is strictly necessary in this 
line o f justification for the proposed credence for the hypothesis is that (1) and (2) are (at least 
for the sake o f the argument) justly accorded credence 1 (which is clearly enough implicit in 
(3)). Moreover, depending on one's interpretation o f the concept o f evidence, one might even 
suppose that they are entailed by (3). However none o f this particularly concerns me, since they 
are nevertheless typically explicit in actual arguments and they at least perform the practical 
fijnction o f providing a clear list o f the points o f evidence that need to be acknowledged in the 
(often implici t) presumption o f total evidence (3), while their being perhaps more than is strictly 
essential to the key points o f justification does not in any way detract fo rm the capacity o f the 
argument to perform its intended function. (4) may be regarded as representing the probability 
relation that Hempel rightly perceives to be central to the argument, but wrongly regards as a 
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legitimate substitution for the argument. (5) clearly follows f rom (3) and (4) by a simple step o f 
modus ponens, and since it coincides wi th what it would seem such arguments are typically 
intended to establish, as well as with the form o f the original conclusion when the latter is 
interpreted as a statement o f unconditional epistemic probability as described above, it seems 
most appropriate to regard this as the proper construal o f the conclusion to arguments o f this 
kind. 
This accords with the standards o f epistemic deductivism since (a) it properly sets out the key 
features o f the line o f epistemic justification that the argument is intended to elucidate, (b) its 
logical adequacy is beyond reproach in that the argument is clearly deductively valid, and (c) 
the success o f the argument w i l l rightly depend on the audience's view o f the correctness o f the 
inferential connection claim (4) explicitly or implicit ly made by the arguer in putting the 
argument.'^^ In our discussion o f Goodman's new problem o f induction, we w i l l see further 
confirmation o f the merits o f the epistemic deductivist position in respect o f interpreting what 
are traditionally regarded as inductive 'rules' o f inference as premises, which need to be 
presented for evaluafion - as indeed Hempel (1965, p78) suggests we might regard the 
purported probability relations such as (3.4), as represented by (4) in the above argument. 
The trouble with the total evidence assumption 
One o f the benefits o f the epistemic deductivist approach to argument construal, as we have 
noted, is that it forces us to make explicit (or at least satisfactorily clear) certain assumptions 
that are relevant to the justification that is supposed to be explicated, which might otherwise 
remain hidden (for example, as Hempel suggests wi th regard to the total evidence requirement, 
in the background o f the 'methodology' wi thin which the argument is framed.). One o f the 
problems that can arise when we do this though is that on reflection we may sometimes come to 
realise that the respective assumptions are not quite so unproblematic as we might have initially 
supposed. This is a problem that is commonly noted with regard to the supposed presumption 
o f total evidence.'^^ Generally speaking any relatively concise specification o f evidence in 
As I have explained earlier, when such a claim is not explicitly stated it wil l generally be implicit in 
the inferential connective e.g. 'Therefore' in the original (explicit) formulation of the argument, where it 
wil l need spelling out since it will not be the simple deductive connective, and cannot be assumed to be 
analytic (as can the deductive connective) so needs explication as a premise for evaluation. 
Pargetter and Bigelow (1997, p68) for example question whether we will in general be able to specify 
all the relevant evidence. Swinburne (2001, p63) also emphasises how our probability, assignments must 
in principle be taken to be conditional a gi^ eat deal of our background information, and the many 
philosophical discussions of the concept and criteria for relevance illustrate the considerable difficulty of 
being entirely specific about this. 
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support o f a degree o f belief for a hypothesis w i l l strictly speaking not be all the relevant 
information we have.'^'' Hempel suggests that 
credence may be determined by reference to any part of the total evidence that gives to the 
statement the same support or credence as the total evidence (Hempel 1965, p64) 
But the problem is that it w i l l be extremely di f f icul t to specify any part o f the evidence that 
actually will give the same support as the total evidence when detached f rom all the remaining 
background evidence.'" 
Fortunately though, the problem for the above account o f the statistical inference is not 
particularly d i f f icul t to amend. For example we may replace the objectionable total information 
premise with a more agreeable acknowledgment (whether implicit or as here explicit, in 
parenthesis) o f the bearing o f our background information within the inferential connection 
claim, thus: 
An epistemic deductivist construal of statistical/inductive inference - Revisedformulation 
(1) We know that a is F. 
(2) We know that the proportion o f Fs that are G is less than 2 per cent. 
(3) I f (1) and (2) then (in the light o f our background information) we ought to 
regard the hypothesis that a is not G with a high degree o f credence. 
Therefore; 
(4) we ought to regard the hypothesis that a is not G with a high degree o f 
credence. 
Hempel's and Kyburg's objections to a probabilistic construal of the conclusion. 
Having illustrated how Hempel and Kyburg appear to have conflated two distinct questions 
while supposedly investigating the proper construal o f inductive/statistical arguments, each 
ultimately arriving at a different but implausible opinion, and having defended an analysis in 
'' ' ' Moreover, Goodman's 'new riddle' of induction, which we shall examine in a later chapter, may be 
taken to indicate that background assumptions that commonly go unsaid, and which moreover, may be 
extraordinarily difficult to articulate, can be very relevant to the justification for the inductive inferences 
that we draw. 
I f Lowe's account (1987 c.f p33 l)of the semantic dependence of certain assumptions we make in 
inductive inference on our background evidence (or assumptions), or anything like it, is correct, then it 
might not even be possible to make sense of any significantly partial account of our evidence considered 
in detachment from the remaining background evidence (or assumptions). 
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line wi th the original schematisation in which the hypothesis is qualified by a probability 
operator in the conclusion, we may now turn our attention to their independent"^ objections to 
such a position. With reference to Cooley (1959) Hempel pointed out how different but related 
instances o f arguments o f the form (2.2), each with true premises can yield incompatible 
conclusions, for example: 
Peterson is a Swede. 
The proportion o f Roman Catholic Swedes is less than 2 per cent. 
So, almost certainly, Peterson is not a Swede. 
Peterson made a pilgrimage to Lourdes. 
Less than 2 percent o f those making a pilgrimage to Lourdes are not Roman Catholics. 
So, almost certainly, Peterson is a Roman Catholic. 
Despite having noted in a footnote (fn.8, p.56) that Toulmin acknowledged the requirement o f 
total evidence in advancing this form o f argument, Hempel (1965, p57-8) then proceeds to 
conclude f rom these inconsistencies that construal o f such arguments in this form is untenable. 
O f course, i f we were to disregard the total evidence presumption, the situation would be no 
better were we to remove the probabilistic qualification f rom the hypothesis in the conclusion in 
each case, as Kyburg proposes, or replace the argument in each case by a corresponding 
probability relation as Hempel proposes. Whatever line we want to take, acknowledgement o f 
the total evidence presumption (or something like it) is essential to the solution to this problem, 
and o f course the crucial place o f this presumption in the logic o f the argument is rendered quite 
clear in the epistemic deductivist construal o f the appropriate fo rm o f such arguments as set out 
above. On this construal the premise-sets o f the corresponding instances, cannot both be all 
true. I f the relevant information cited in each original version is indeed known, then the total 
information premises in the epistemic deductivist versions w i l l be false in each case. In each o f 
these cases the probabilistic qualification o f the hypothesis in the conclusion is validly drawn, 
and in either case, i f all the premises are true then the conclusion w i l l be soundly drawn. Thus 
the problem cited does not constitute any objection against the probabilistic qualification o f the 
hypothesis in the conclusion. 
Moving on to Kyburg's objections (1990, p61-2), he presents four objections (supposedly) to 
the probabilistic model o f inductive argument, but unfortunately the first three are entirely 
misdirected. Following his immediate misrepresentation o f the original question (as described 
i.e. independent that is to their positive arguments in support of a different position, whose fallacies we 
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above) these objections are merely arguments in favour o f the relatively innocuous (and quite 
compatible) thesis 'that our body o f scientific knowledge consists o f categorical empirical 
statements rather than modally modified ones' (Kyburg, 1990, p60). His fourth objection is 
however properly directed against 'the probabilistic treatment' and is expressed in two distinct 
ways. His first formulation o f the objection is the relatively contentious claim that there is no 
objective source for probabilities. His second, less contentious, formulation is merely that that 
there is no agreed-upon source for the probabilities. Moreover, Kyburg then proceeds 
effectively to undermine his own objection by suggesting that, despite the lack o f agreement so 
far on any 'compelling objective standards', nevertheless we should give the ideal o f objectivity 
a run for its money and ' f ind out how far [ i t ] can take us' (Kyburg, 1990, p62) - which is o f 
course exactly what people (other than subjectivists) commonly do wi th regard to probability 
when they argue about probabilities. Perhaps there is no objective source for probabilities. 
Perhaps the probability connection claim ( o f the form o f (4)) in every instance o f the epistemic 
deductive expansion o f a statistical syllogism is false. But in many cases people are naturally 
inclined to think it is true, and want to present an argument to the respective probabilistic 
conclusion. And even i f Kyburg is right in suggesting that there are no objective probabilities, 
they have a right to argue their opinion. The epistemic deductivist construal o f such arguments 
merely sets out the appropriate construal o f their logical form, i f they are to satisfactorily 
explicate the essential features o f the represented line o f reasoning. As far as the issue o f 
objectivity is concerned, I shall discuss this matter further, in response to a recent formulation o f 
the subjectivist objection to the frequentist approach to probability judgement presented by 
Philip Dawid, in a later chapter. 
Justification for a degree of belief or degree of justification for belief? 
In my analysis thus far I have interpreted the concept o f (objective) epistemic probability in a 
way that would accord with the views o f most who would want to call themselves objectivists 
wi th regard to epistemic probability, i.e. as a rational, or justified, degree of belief or credence. 
However Achinstein (2001) has recently proposed is an alternative approach to objective 
epistemic probability, and the difference between the two is analogous to the difference between 
the two approaches to probability discussed by Hempel in the context o f the logical form o f 
inductive arguments. In the latter, the issue was presented by Hempel as a contrast was between 
probability as a relation between a set o f statements and an unqualified statement, and 
probability as a qualified statement. The contrast in this case is between probability as a 
have exposed. 
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just i f ied degree o f belief, and probability as a degree o f justification for belief (unqualified). 
This latter position has been propounded recently by. 
Achinstein proposes that probability be construed 'as a measure o f how reasonable it is to 
believe a proposition' (2001, p95). However he also entertains a supplementary non-degree 
theoretic concept o f reasonableness o f belief: 
The degree to which it is reasonable to believe something may make it reasonable to believe that 
proposition. ... Accordingly, I would claim, reasonableness of belief is a threshold concept with 
respect to probability: some probability significantly greater than 0 is necessary for it to be 
reasonable to believe a proposition. But degree of reasonableness of belief is not a threshold 
concept with respect to probability (Achinstein, 2001, p98.) 
For example, Achinstein suggests 
it is reasonable to degree Vi to believe that a fair coin wi l l land heads, but it is not reasonable to 
believe that the coin wi l l land heads since it is equally reasonable to believe it won't 
(Achinstein, 2001, p98.) 
But i f we know that it is not reasonable (either) to believe that the coin w i l l land heads (or that it 
won' t ) , the question naturally arises: what is the point o f even entertaining the thought that it 
might nevertheless, in some sense, be reasonable to degree '/S to believe the coin w i l l land 
heads? When i want to decide whether or not to believe something, i f I am rational, I w i l l want 
to know (a) whether (granted the evidence) rationality demands that I ought to believe the 
proposition, and i f that is not the case (b) whether rationally I may believe the proposition - in 
other words whether it is reasonable to believe the proposition. I f i t is not reasonable to believe 
the coin w i l l land heads then presumably the implication o f that is that 1 shouldn 7 believe it. 
That is exactly what I need to know - as far as the rational determination o f my decision to 
believe or not to believe is concerned. Granted that this is the case, the supplementary 
information (whatever it might be taken to mean) that nevertheless it is reasonable to degree 'A 
to believe it w i l l land heads is entirely superfluous to my concerns, since as Achinstein appears 
to admit, i t is nevertheless categorically not reasonable to believe the coin w i l l land heads. 
Let us continue with the point o f agreement (conceded on our part for the sake o f argument) that 
it is not reasonable to believe that the coin w i l l land heads. In that case we may ask ourselves 
whether we ought (or may) hold some lesser degree o f credence (than the threshold for 
categorical belief) that the coin w i l l land heads. The answer we may suppose is that we may 
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and indeed ought (on the supposition that the coin is fair and tossed randomly) to regard the 
proposition that it w i l l land heads with credence o f ' /2 , where this is understood in (at least 
something like) the traditional (inter)subjectivist sense that V2 is the betting quotient we regard 
to be fair for that proposition. Similarly we may conclude that in this case it is not reasonable 
to hold a credence o f 0.7 that the coin w i l l land heads. Again, this kind o f proposition o f 
categorical rational permissibility or obligation is all we need to know, there is simply no 
theoretical or practical point in deliberating on some further question about whether it might 
nevertheless be, in some sense, to some degree rationally permissible to hold a credence o f 0.7 
that it w i l l land heads. A statement o f partial permission to do X - whatever it might be 
supposed to mean - simply fails to tell me what I want to know, which is whether or not I may 
do X . Co/egowa/just i f icat ion is what we need, and all that we need. '" 
Achinstein (2001, p l O l ) poses himself the question 'What advantage accrues for characterizing 
degrees o f reasonableness o f belief as subject to the rules o f probability?'.'^* But whether or not 
it is even consistent to suppose that degrees o f reasonableness conform to the rules o f 
probability cannot be determined without first providing some account o f what degrees o f 
reasonableness are supposed to be, along wi th some indication o f what is supposed to determine 
their values. To emphasise this point, we may note that on a natural interpretation o f 'degrees 
o f reasonableness' i f we were attempting to capture a natural relation between simple or 
categorical statements of reasonableness and everyday expressions that appear to pertain to 
degrees o f variation in the reasonableness o f belief, we might nevertheless (plausibly) suppose 
that, for any proposition P, / / i t is categorically not reasonable to believe that P (i.e. i f the lower 
l imi t o f the rationally permissible degrees o f belief for P falls below the threshold for 
categorical belief) then the degree o f reasonableness o f believing that P is 0. We would assign 
non-zero degrees o f reasonableness to belief that P whenever (and only when) the rationally 
permissible degrees o f credence for P (on the evidence) include some value that falls above the 
threshold for categorical belief The degree o f reasonableness assigned would presumably be 
This is not meant to suggest that rationality cannot be relative. What it is rational for one to believe 
might vary with one's intellectual or even pragmatic values, while remaining categorical on whatever 
norms apply to the promotion of those values. For the sake of simplicity 1 am supposing that 'we' share 
at least near enough the same (and hopefully value-promoting) norms of rationality with respect to belief 
The point in any case is that, whatever one's norms might be, belief of any given proposition, granted 
one's evidence, either wil l be permitted (either by direct implication or by default. I.e. by absence of any 
implication of prohibition) or wil l not be permitted on those norms. (In other words they wil l fall into one 
or other of these categories.) 
In fact he seems to think that it is an advantage simply i f it is stipulated as a 'defining necessary 
condition' (Achinstein, 2001, plOl) . He also seems to think that it is not uncommon for a theory of 
probability simply to assert that the respective 'probabilities' are 'to be construed as one's satisfying these 
rules', suggesting that the subjective and propensity theories also do this (plOO-1). But in fact both types 
of theory typically provide basic definitions and offer more or less successful arguments in support of the 
hypothesis that they do, or at least should, conform to the probability calculus (as covered in most 
philosophical text books on probability theory). 
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some funcdon o f the short-fall ( i f any) o f the upper l imit o f the permissible degrees o f credence 
below absolute certainty (1) and the shortfall ( i f any) o f the lower l imit o f the permissible 
degrees o f credence below the threshold for categorical belief 
For example i f the threshold for ' be l ie f is taken to be 0.90, and the permissible degrees o f 
credence that P on the evidence range f rom 0.8 - 0.91, we may want to say that it is more 
reasonable to believe Q than it is to believe P, when the permissible degrees o f credence for Q 
range f rom 0.89 - 0.99. This would o f course constitute a much more complex view o f 
reasonableness and it is debatable whether the advantages o f such a theory would outweigh its 
complexity. The simpler point just that it is reasonable or permissible to believe either should 
suffice for most purposes, with specification o f the respective permission ranges as potentially 
useful supplementary information. In any case though, there should be no suggestion that 
believing P is to some non-zero degree reasonable when the permissible degrees o f belief for P 
do not include any that fa l l on or above the lower l imit necessary for belief For example i f the 
rationally permissible degrees o f credence for R, on the evidence, range f rom 0.70 - 0.80 (and 
0.90 is taken to be the minimal threshold for belief) then the degree of reasonableness for 
believing R, on this criterion for belief, could not plausibly be regarded as anything other than 
zero. 
N o w it might wel l be that we choose to represent degrees o f reasonableness, along the lines 
contemplated above, on the same scale as probabilities, i.e. on the unit interval 0 - 1. But not 
only would there be no advantage in characterising them as subject to the rules o f probability, 
but such a characterisation would be inconsistent wi th the bulk o f our intuitive judgements 
about rationally permissible degrees o f credence. For example, there are many propositions 
which, in our evidential situation, we would normally regard as warranting only agnosticism -
propositions for which it would simply not be reasonable to adopt an attitude o f categorical 
belief either way. A n ancient but still valid example is the proposition that the number o f stars 
is even. In view o f the absence o f any relevant information, anyone who was genuinely 
convinced that the number o f stars is even - anyone who really believed that wi th sufficient 
confidence to honestly assert the claim outright, without qualification, would be irresponsibly 
credulous. For such propositions your degree o f credence must, for the sake o f rationality, f a l l 
between the respective thresholds (or borders) for belief that P and belief that not-P.'^** 
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That is not to say that the respective borders might not be vague. More basically the point is that for 
such propositions one's degree of credence must take some non-extreme intermediate value - i e a value 
that is not close to either 1 or 0. 
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The implication o f this is that one's degree o f credence for P, and for not-P, in such a case must 
not be zero. But, fo l lowing the criteria suggested above, since belief for either o f these is not (to 
any degree) permissible, the degree o f reasonableness for believing P and for believing not-P in 
those circumstances is zero. By (a traditional subjectivist) definition your degree o f credence 
that P is the betting quotient for P at which ( i f you had to take a chance one way or the other) 
you would be equally wi l l ing to bet either on or against P. In this case, i f you do accept bets 
(either way) at quotients in accordance with your respective degrees o f reasonableness for 
believing P and not-P (both valued at zero) it would not take a particularly crafty bookie to 
ensure that you are thoroughly fleeced. Thus, on this apparently plausible criterion for belief 
being at all reasonable (and granted a credence-threshold for categorical belief greater than 
zero) it would not even be possible for your degrees o f reasonableness for belief to conform to 
the rules o f probability. 
This illustrates that we need not have any problem with entertaining the thought that there may 
be some relatively innocuous natural conception of'degrees o f reasonableness o f be l ie f , but 
that on such a natural conception they would not appear to be subject to the laws o f probability. 
O f course it would be a mistake to suppose that Achinstein has such a natural conception in 
mind, particularly since he admits that 
In accordance with my epistemic view, it may be very reasonable to believe that [John's] 
symptoms wil l be relieved, ... even if it is not particularly reasonable for you or anyone else to 
believe this (Achinstein 2001, p99, my emphasis) 
In the fo l lowing I w i l l argue that even despite Achinstein's stipulation that 'degrees o f 
reasonableness o f bel ief obey the probability calculus, i t would be a mistake to think that it 
could be a conception o f epistemic probability, which may usefully be employed for example in 
betting situations, and yet not be equivalent to a concept o f (rational) degrees of credence. 
Achinstein notes that subjectivist probability theorists 'supply an a priori answer' to the 
question as to what advantage could be accrued f rom characterizing degrees o f reasonableness 
o f belief as subject to the rules o f probability: 
I f a system of bets is made in accordance with [betting quotients equal to] degrees of 
reasonableness of belief, where these satisjy the probability rules, then no system of bets based 
on these degrees is bound to lose (no "dutch book" is possible) (Achinstein, 2001, p 101, 
my emphasis and clarificatory parenthesis.) 
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and agrees that indeed this is an advantage 'at least in typical betting situations'. The first 
problem wi th Achinstein's account o f the subjectivist's claim here is that what he says prior to 
the explanatory parenthesis is not quite right - in other words the antecedent is not an accurate 
account o f what it is to be invulnerable to a dutch book. And as we shall see, the respect in 
which it is inaccurate is important, and illustrates why simply characterising degrees o f 
reasonableness o f belief as conforming to the probability calculus is by no means sufficient for 
rationality - not even by the standards o f the most ardent subjectivist. 
The qualification omitted is simply that no system o f bets based on these degrees is bound to 
lose - whatever the outcome. O f course to be fair to Achinstein he would no doubt intend this 
to be taken as read. But the fact is that there is a natural and more liberal sense o f 'bound to 
lose', and a contrast with this illustrates the extreme minimality o f the condition o f mere 
invulnerability to a dutch book - even by subjectivist standards. For example, I may be quite 
certain that Lightning w i l l not win the Derby, since I have just seen him shot fo l lowing a bad 
fal l at an early fence. In this scenario, i f I risk anything on a late bet that Lightning will win , I 
am bound to lose. More importantly, f rom the point o f view o f the subjectivist - who defines 
probability, and judges the fairness o f bets, on the basis o f his degrees of belief- in this 
scenario, I may nevertheless, i f I am stupid enough not to fo l low his prescriptions, accept just 
such a bet within a system o f bets that is /wvulnerable to a dutch book - i.e. which is not bound 
to lose whatever the outcome (i.e. even on the hypothesis that Lighting does win) and thereby 
accept a perfectly probabilistically coherent system o f bets on which I am nevertheless bound to 
lose, and more significantly f rom the point o f view o f our concern for rationality, on which / 
know I am bound to lose. The subjectivist o f course not only avoids vulnerability to a dutch 
book, but also ensures that he freely accepts a systems o f bets only i f he does not believe he is 
bound to lose - precisely because he defines the probabilities he associates with particular 
propositions, on which he decides his betting strategy, as exactly equal to his degrees of belief 
for the respective propositions, i.e. the betting quotients that he perceives to be fair. Only by 
also setting his 'degrees o f reasonableness o f bel ief exactly equal to his degrees of belief by 
the standard definition o f the latter, can Achinstein match the advantage o f the subjectivist 
approach to probability in meeting both o f these minimal requirements o f rationality. 
The significant difference between the subjectivist and traditional objectivist about epistemic 
probability is that the latter believes that there are certain betting quotients that a subject with 
certain evidence ought (or ought not) to regard as fair, but o f course he also accepts the 
subjectivist point that rationality dictates that these must satisfy the calculus, and that ( i f he is 
rational) his actual degrees o f belief w i l l in any case be equal to the degrees o f belief he believes 
to be rational. In this case the traditional objectivist about epistemic probability can agree with 
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the subjectivist, that so long as he is rational, he w i l l set his probabilities equal to his degrees of 
belief- in other words at the betting quotients he believes to be fair (i.e. to incur no advantage 
on either side). But i f Achinstein wants to propose some novel variant on the concept o f 
objective epistemic probability that departs f rom this venerable tradition, as we have seen, he 
w i l l do so only at the cost o f minimal standards o f rationality. O f course Achinstein might be 
happy to concede that what he understands to be his 'degree o f reasonableness for believing' a 
proposition is exactly what he perceives to be his fair betting quotient - in other words his 
(rational or otherwise) degree o f belief - but then o f course we would have little incentive to go 
along wi th his relatively peculiar and potentially misleading terminology. 
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PART T H R E E 
OTHER PROBLEMS FOR I N D U C T I O N - F R I E N D L Y D E D U C T I V I S M 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE NEW RTODLE OF INDUCTION (AND JACKSON'S SOLUTION OF IT) 
The case of 'grue' 
For the sake of our evaluations of inductive inferential connection claims, e.g. the particular 
projectibiiity claim ' I f all of the (many) emeralds that have been observed have been green, 
then we may be sure that the next emerald that is observed will be green', we may hope to be 
able to appeal to acceptable principles of inductive inference, which (as with the examples we 
considered earlier in the case of deduction) may take the form of their respective 
generalisations - in this case - ' I f all observed As have been B, then we may be sure that the 
next A that is observed wil l be B' . We have already noted the general line of Hume's 
problem for the provability of such claims, but noted that so long as it seems satisfactorily 
clear to us that such claims are true, we may nevertheless employ such them effectively in 
associated arguments. Unfortunately though things aren't quite so simple in this regard. As 
Goodman (1954) pointed out, such general principles of induction, as stated, turn out on 
reflection to appear quite unacceptable, citing for example the consequences of such 
principles of projectibiiity in the case of'grue': 
X is grue i f f either x is observed before t and x is green or (x is not observed before t 
and X is blue) 
Goodman took the view that some candidate properties are unprojectible outright - i.e. 
irrespective of evidential context. But as Jackson (1975) has pointed out, it is possible to 
conceive of an evidential situation in which 'grue' in this sense would be projectible, while 
'green' would not, so what we need to provide is an account of the relevant conditions on 
account of which 'grue' is not projectible when it is not. It is a merit of Jackson's solution 
that it accounts for such exceptional cases as well as those that arise with regard to our normal 
epistemic situation. However, for the sake of simplicity and practical relevance we may focus 
our attention on the normal situation where it seems obvious that 'grue' is not projectible. In 
order to clarify the situation we need first to consider carefully the precise implications of 
'grue'. 
From the surface structure of the definition it would appear that what is being defined is a 
type of predicate, namely predicates definable in the form specified above, admitting of 
various semantically distinct instances in each of which a particular date-value will be 
substituted for t. On this interpretation, as Jackson points out, any particular instance of the 
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predicate type will either simply apply or not apply to any (enduring) object throughout the 
duration of its existence (unlike 'green' which may apply to an object at one time and not at 
another). Different instances of the grue type of predicate could be conveniently 
distinguished by indexing with the respective date, for example 'grue,i' where t l encodes a 
particular date that takes the place of t in the definition schema for that particular instance of 
the predicate type. 
In the context it would appear that Goodman intends us to consider any hypothetical instance 
of the predicate type that we may construct by substitution of t by a date that is taken to 
represent the 'editorial present', or the time of reading for the reader, since he immediately 
invites us to consider the implications of grue 'at time t'. Subsequently 'grue' has more 
commonly been formulated by taking a value for t that, at the time of authorship (and 
anticipated readership), lies somewhere in the modestly distant future. However Goodman's 
approach of considering the present moment as the value of t has the advantage of posing an 
immediate problem for even the relatively modest next-case induction as well as for the more 
ambitious generalisation schema. 
Let us consider for the sake of illustration of the problem the simplistic formula for next-case 
induction: ' I f all As observed before t have been B, then we may reasonably predict that the 
next case of an A (observed at or after t) will be B ' . We may of course note that various 
provisos need to borne in mind, for instance that we do not know that the next A to be 
observed at or after t will not be a B, that we have seen enough of them and so on. And, 
granted the understanding that such provisos are taken to be satisfied, we are generally happy 
to agree that under such circumstances it does seem reasonable (and moreover important to be 
able) to predict in line with the general schema. To highlight the point, and to satisfy the 
various other provisos on which we might for stringency wish to insist, we may consider the 
case of a huge urn containing millions of marbles, fi-om which a sequence of several thousand 
marbles has been randomly selected - all o f which turned out to be green, and where we have 
no prior or independent knowledge regarding the variety or proportions of the colours of the 
marbles in the urn. 
In such circumstances we would generally agree that it will be reasonable to predict (with a 
high degree of confidence) that the next drawn marble to be observed at or after t wil l be 
green. The trouble is that even under such circumstances, we would also have to agree that 
all of the large random sample of marbles observed before t have been grue. In other words 
they have all satisfied the description 'either observed before t and green or (not observed 
before t and blue)', by virtue of satisfying the first specified disjunct, in a context where 
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sufficient supplementary provisos have been satisfied for us to endorse the qualified schema 
with considerable confidence. And yet the implication of even such a strongly qualified 
schema - granted its satisfaction with regard to 'grue' - yields the incompatible prediction 
that the next marble to be observed at or after t wil l be blue. Being observed at or after t, the 
first disjunct 'observed before t and green' will not apply to the next marble drawn, and so in 
order for 'grue' to apply, as predicted, the second specified disjunct will need to apply, i.e. the 
marble must be unobserved before t and blue. 
I f indeed, as we believe to be the case, the prediction that the next marble will be grue cannot 
reasonably be made with a high degree of confidence under these circumstances (which 
would appear to be a necessary condition for maintaining that the prediction that it wi l l be 
green can reasonably be made) we should be able to offer some reason as to why it can't. 
Since our standard accounts of the usual provisos don't rule out the projectibility of grue 
under these circumstances - i f our instincts about its unprojectibility are right - there must be 
some other proviso that is satisfied in cases such as this by the inference to the 'green' 
conclusion, but which fails to be satisfied by the inference for 'grue'. 
Jackson's 'counterfactual condition' solution 
Frank Jackson, in 1975, has identified just such a proviso, moreover one which is readily 
acknowledged with reference to everyday inferential situations. In order to appreciate the 
proviso one may first consider the point that there are always features common to all the 
members of sample that we know are not features of all (or sometimes any) members of the 
population outside the sample. This is a quite obvious and relatively trivial matter in many 
cases. For example, where we know that the sample of consists of all As observed before t, 
and the target population is all As (whether observed before t or not) and we know that the 
sample is a proper sample form the population of As (i.e. it doesn't contain all the As) it wi l l 
clearly be the case that none of the population of As outside the sample wil l have been 
observed before t. 
Of course, for such common features of the sample as this where it is known that not all the 
population have the particular sample property in question, that consideration in itself would 
defeat any inference to the conclusion that all the population have the respective feature. 
However, as Jackson points out, sometimes when it is not simply known that not all the 
population have the property in question, our knowledge that not all the population have some 
related sample property can nevertheless be defeatingly relevant to the projection of the 
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property in question in a way that is not quite so immediately obvious from its surface 
structure. Jackson offers, among others, the following example: 
Every diamond I have observed has glinted in the light. Does this support the contention that 
the next diamond that I observe will glint in the light? Clearly yes. But suppose we add a 
detail to the story, namely that the next diamond that I observe is unpolished. Now all the 
diamonds I have observed so far have been polished, and, moreover, 1 know that they glint 
because they have been polished - that is, if the diamonds had not been polished, then they 
would not have glinted. It is clear that once we add this detail, it is no longer reasonable for 
me to regard it as likely that the next diamond 1 observe will glint in the light. (Jackson, 
1975, p88) 
The operative proviso in this type of case then may be generalised as follows: 
certain Fs which are H being G does not support other Fs which are not H being G if it is 
known that the Fs in the evidence class would not have been G if they had not been H 
(Jackson, 1975, p88, my emphases) 
Expressed more positively, what is required'^" for certain Fs which are H being G to support 
other Fs which are not H being G, is the proviso that the Fs in the evidence class would still 
have been G i f they had not been H. Jackson refers to this proviso as the counter/actual 
condition (for projectibility). 
Consider the case of'grue' in the context of our random drawings of marbles from the urn. 
First we may note that the next-case projectibility of 'grue' is unproblematic for the marbles 
observed prior to t. In these cases this is quite compatible with the fact that we also expect it 
to be green, since a marble's being observed prior to t and green is sufficient for its also being 
grue, in virtue of the first specified disjunct in our definition. The problem arises with regard 
to the question of projectibility across the temporal threshold (t) at which satisfaction of the 
second specified disjunct (unobserved prior to t and blue) becomes instead the necessary and 
sufficient condition for the applicability of'grue' to marbles not observed earlier. This is a 
problem because the applicability of'grue' in these cases is not compatible with the 
applicability of'green', and so we cannot probabilistically consistently predict both outcomes 
each with a high degree of confidence. 
Note I do not say 'sufficient' 
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So what is it that makes the projection of 'grue' in contrast to the projection of 'green' so 
utterly implausible in these circumstances? It would appear that Jackson has a simple and 
straightforward answer to this question. The reason why the projection of 'grue' is so utterly 
implausible is precisely because in these circumstances it contravenes the counterfactual 
condition for projectibiiity. As Jackson argues: 
We know that an emerald that is grue and examined [before t] would not have been grue if it 
had not been examined [before t]; for if it is grue and examined, it is green and examined ... 
[But] a green examined emerald would have been a green unexamined emerald [and so, not 
grue] if it had not been examined'*' 
(Jackson, 1975, p89.) 
So, applying the general principle of the counterfactual condition or proviso on the 
projectibiiity of candidate properties, all the marbles observed before t being grue does not 
support other marbles not observed before t being grue, because we know that the marbles 
observed before t would not have been grue i f they had not been observed before t. 
As Jackson also argues (p89), the projection of 'green' in contrast does, at least initially, 
appear to survive the counterfactual condition. The prime candiadate for a potential problem 
is the worry that there might be an analogous defeating counterfactual with regard to green, 
i.e. ' I f the marbles observed before t had not been observed before t, they would not have 
been green'. I f that counterfactual were also known (or believed) to be true, under the 
evidential circumstances we are considering, then Jackson's counterfactual condition would 
also rule out the projectibiiity of'green' in that evidential situation, and would thereby fail to 
provide us with a solution to the problem. But of course we don't know that that is true. On 
the contrary, our background belief about this counterfactual is that, in contrast to its 'grue' 
counterpart, it is false. 
Jackson himself accepts and illustrates how we may conceive of other evidential situations 
where we do not believe this, and moreover where the projection of grue satisfies the 
counterfactual condition and is rational. In particular Jackson describes a possible situation 
where be believe that the greenness or otherwise of certain objects is affected by the 
observation methods we need to apply. But, the argument goes, in our evidential situation we 
As indicated in the first clause, Jackson is taking 'before t' for granted for simplicity of expression. 
In the unabridged account Jackson makes explicit the crucial condition implicit in the final clause, that 
the examined emeralds would still have been green if they had not been examined. 
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believe that the marbles in the evidence class, as with any other objects that actually are green 
before t, and are observed to be so, would still have been green even i f they had not been 
observed. In this case, the counterfactual condition appears to provide an independently 
justified and effective criterion for distinguishing and explaining the typical situations in 
which 'grue' and predicates of similar semantic form are not projectible, from other 
imaginable situations in which, intuitively, they would be. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
PROBLEMS FOR DEDUCTIVISM AND DEDUCTION 
We have already dealt with Mill 's extension of Hume's charge against inductive argument, that 
deductive argument in general begs the question. But there is another problem commonly 
associated with Hume's that is brought to bear against deductive principles of inference such as 
modus ponens (and which could likewise be raised even against specific inferential connection 
claims that are instances of modus ponens,) and that is the question of the justification for 
accepting such principles (or claims). 
The justification of deduction 
In his recent book Hume's Problem, Colin Howson addresses the issues raised by Hume's 
classical problem of induction, ukimately concluding that 'Hume was r i g h t ' - and that 
no theory of rationality that is not entirely question-begging can tell us what it is rational to 
believe about the future, whether based on what the past has displayed or not. (Howson, p239) 
Howson argues that the principles of deduction are free from the circularity inherent in the use 
of inductive principles. With reference to Machover (1996, p i 21) Howson invokes a meta-
logical theorem of deduction called 'Cut'. He then argues as follows: 
Suppose that some antecedent proof, using assumptions I , had established the soundness of 
modus ponens. ... 'Cut' tells us that there is a proof of the truth of B from Z and S [the statement 
that A and ' I f A then B' are true] alone. Moreover this proof need not use modus ponens. In 
other words there is a deductive justification for detaching the conclusion of a modus ponens 
inference which ... need not employ modus ponens at all. ... Thus there are independent 
arguments for the soundness of deductive rules; that is to say that there are rules which are not, 
as they are in the inductive case, circular. 
But, i f the thesis of epistemic deductivism is right, any well-formulated natural argument to the 
conclusion that modus ponens is deductively valid will itself be an instance of modus ponens. 
Howson does however defend a Bayesian position on the 'logic' of induction and argues positively 
that inductive inferences can be constructed in such a way that they are 'sound', in a sense similar to that 
of deductive validity. Fox (1999, p453) however conveniently illustrates how Bayesian inference can be 
reconstructed in line with the principles of epistemic deductivism in an argument to the pertinent 
epistemic conclusion that is deductively valid. 
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Of course Howson would presumably respond that that all we need do in that case is to appeal 
to formal arguments for our proof of modus ponens, as indeed he would seem to intend in the 
above defence of deduction. But the problem with such a suggestion is that purely formal 
proofs, which, certainly as far as Howson is concerned, may for example take the form of a 
diagram, don't clarify anything unless they are suitably interpreted. Once exactly what is 
supposed to be shown by the formal proof is fl i l ly set out propositionally, in the manner 
required for clarity, in accord with the theory of epistemic deductivism, we wil l end up with an 
argument whose final step of inference is an instance of modus ponens. Now 1 agree with 
Howson that circular arguments are epistemically impotent when it comes to supplying 
clarification of the justness of adopting a particular epistemic attitude towards a hypothesis 
when previously there was none, and so in view of the above I am inclined to take the view, in 
contrast to Howson, that there is an analogous problem for showing that modus ponens is valid 
to anyone who seriously doubts it. But, as with the case of induction, I don't think that this 
unprovability (in the natural sense of the term) is a particularly serious problem for the practice 
of logical reasoning in a world where few of us have any serious doubts about the validity of 
modus ponens. 
Haack (1976)'°^ agrees that there is also a problem in this regard for any attempt to justify 
deduction with the aid of deductive argument, but takes a different view to myself of the moral 
of the point, suggesting that: 
The moral of the paper might be put pessimistically, as that deduction is no less in need of 
justification than induction; or optimistically, as that induction is no more in need of justification 
than deduction. (Haack 1976, 118) 
But I would disagree with the moral on both counts. I don't think deduction is in any serious 
need of justification (at least in the context of everyday reasoning, as distinct from the 
philosophy of logic) - its justness is pretty well obvious to most of us, even i f it might be 
unprovable. Moreover I am nevertheless inclined to agree with Howson to some extent in his 
view that the situation is not entirely analogous with the case of induction, since there clearly 
are more serious questions to answer about the various inductive inferential connection claims 
that arguer's are inclined to invoke in the context of inductive inference. However as we have 
noted Jackson has shown us that there are answers to be had even with regard to what have 
seemed to many to be the most serious of these problems, (whether in an attempt to justify 
induction or otherwise) - not least the relative degree of disagreement. To conclude my defence 
163 For further discussion of this issue see Dummet's (1973, 290-318) and Haack's response (1982). 
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of epistemic deductivism though I shall briefly consider how problems of apparent 
inconsistency have even been raised against such a simple and apparently crucial principle of 
deduction as modus ponens, and how we might defend our theory of logical cogency in the face 
of such difficulties. 
Illusory problems with deductivism: 
Catton and the significance of indefinable concepts. 
Philip Catton (1999) claims to find certain novel problems with what he calls 'the deductivist 
image of scientific reasoning' - problems associated with our intuitive comprehension of 
theoretical concepts, and their resistance to formal definition. Catton claims that 
the deductivist image is challenged by cases of actual scientific reasoning, in which hard-to-
state and thus discursively ill-defined elements of thought nonetheless significantly condition 
what practitioners accept as cogent argument. (Catton, 1999, p452). 
He addresses his objections against the form of deductivism advocated by Musgrave'*'', which 
Catton describes as the view that, when scientists reach conclusions that are not deductively 
valid implications of the premises they state, their arguments may be treated as enthymemes, i.e. 
arguments within which additional premises sufficient to secure logical validity have been left 
merely tacit. Catton claims to show that this position 'cannot be sustained' (p453). As it stands 
Catton's account is, to say the least, a misleading account of the deductivist position, and is 
certainly not representative of mine. While I may concur with Catton to the extent that a purely 
alethic form of deductivism would appear to be unrealistic, I do not accept that the purported 
problems to which Catton appeals here do indeed pose any significant challenge to 
deductivism.'*' On the contrary, 1 shall argue that the insights of deductivism provide the 
resources for overcoming the problems posed by intuitive and ill-defined concepts for 
determination of the logical adequacy of arguments involving them, and that the real challenge 
posed by such cases is in fact one for the anti-deductivist. 
Preliminary doubts about Catton's claim 
164 
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Catton refers to Musgrave's 1981 (esp. 83-84), 1988 (esp. 237-239), and 1989. 
I do however accept that there are other, well-known, problems posed by intuitive and ill-defined 
concepts relating to the logical adequacy of deduction, and thereby relevant to the issue of deductivism 
i.e. the problem of vagueness and sorites paradox. However Catton does not discuss this particular 
problem, and so I will limit my comments on this issue to a brief appendix on the logic of vagueness. 
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Supposing for the moment that there are indeed actual cases of the kind described by Catton, 'in 
which hard-to-state and thus discursively ill-defined elements of thought nonetheless 
significantly condition what practitioners accept as cogent argument', it is difficult to see how 
such cases would in any way pose a challenge to deductivism, since of course deductivism is a 
thesis about argument's that are cogent - not about arguments that might mistakenly be 
believed to be cogent as a result of ill-formulated lines of thought or inevitable shortfalls in our 
powers of comprehension or analysis. Furthermore it is a thesis about the cogency of properly 
identifiable arguments - not about the cogency of some elusive unspecifiable psychological 
entities - perhaps consisting in part of some inarticulable intuitive elements of thought. 
Psychologically we might make all sorts of useful (and harmful) inferences that, at least in 
practice, we are unable to explain or defend by the articulation of any actual arguments - cogent 
or otherwise. But the thesis of deductivism does not concern such inarticulable inferences. 
When a scientist is unable to satisfactorily or fully state his or her supposed rational 
justification'^^ for the drawing of a conclusion, as Catton appears to maintain in the purported 
problem cases, then we simply do not have any complete or satisfactorily specified argument to 
appraise. 
Having raised these preliminary doubts about the significance of Catton's central claim for the 
issue in question, let us then proceed to examine the details of Catton's objections to the 
deductivist position. 
Catton's argument for the non-monotonicity of Euclid's Proofs 
With regard to geometrical reasoning, Catton begins his argument with reference to Euclid's 
argument to Proposition One in Book I of the Elements, and claims that 'As a logical 
demonstration, Euclid's argument is not cogent.' (p460). Catton explains that this is so because 
counterexamples can be constructed to arguments of the same logical form as Euclid's. Of 
course deductivists need have no problem with that. Euclid made a bold and impressive attempt 
to prove certain geometrical propositions and, although his arguments for a long time appeared 
to be good, they were in fact fallacious, and (as Catton admits, p459-60) it was precisely 
developments in our understanding of deductive logic that helped to enlighten us on that. One 
up for deductivism one might think. But that is not the line that Catton wants us to take. Catton 
Note the distinction between/wZ/y stating the justification that is supposed to be conveyed by the 
argument, however deep that might go, and stating the full Justification for the conclusion, in the sense 
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wants to argue that there is a 'latent non-monotonicity' in intuitive reasoning - which wil l 
apparently include any form of reasoning where we employ concepts that are intuitively 
understood, rather than formally defined. He attempts to justify this claim with reference to 
Euclid's intuitive geometrical arguments, and then to argue that this likewise applies in the case 
of contemporary mechanics and theoretical science in general since 'one cannot take for granted 
the meanings of theoretical terms in empirical sciences' (p466). 
Now if, as Catton would have it, much or even most of the good reasoning in science is, in 
virtue of its reliance on intuitively understood thoughts and concepts, inherently non-monotonic 
it would seem that the deductivist must be mistaken, since deductively valid inferences must be 
monotonic. However, from the story thus far regarding the invalidity of Euclid's proofs, this 
would not appear to be the right analysis of the situation in respect of Euclid's arguments, since, 
in accord with Catton's own account of non-monotonicity (p461), an argument is non-
monotonic if, given the premises it is right (i.e. rationally correct, or 'reasonable' in Catton's 
terminology) to infer the conclusion, but addition of further premises could make it no longer 
right to do so. However, this would not appear to be the case on the above account of Euclid's 
arguments, since the correct analysis in this case would appear to be that it was in fact a mistake 
to infer the conclusion on the basis of the considerations presented. Surely the fact of the matter 
is that it merely seemed to be a cogent argument in the first place - not that it was cogent in the 
first place - but a modem extension of it, with the addition of new information, is not.' 167 
Nevertheless, we must give Catton's argument for his view a fair hearing. Let us then examine 
the argument he presents for his claim that 
there was a latent non-monotonicity in Euclid's reasonings which came to light only in the last 
two centuries or so and was fully disclosed only by Hilbert's work. (Catton, 1999, p462) 
Catton's argument (abridged) goes as follows: 
Any reasoning that depends on discrimination of relevance relationships is non-monotonic. A 
prime example is reasoning which employs ceteris paribus or 'other things being equal' 
statements, and this depends on judgements concerning what is relevantly similar (equal) or 
that implies there will be no further questions about the justification for the premises employed. It is the 
former that I intend here. 
'*' Qn Catton' terminology ('reasonable' to infer) it might seem in a sense rigfit to say that Euclid's 
inferences were eminently reasonable in his day, since he could not possibly be expected to appreciate the 
logical subtleties required to demonstrate that they were in fact fallacious - but that is a psychological 
sense of 'reasonable' that is not definitive of the concept of non-monotonicity. That is why I opt for the 
alternative term 'right', which has a less psychological ring to it. 
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relevantly dissimilar (unequal) to what. Discerning relevance seems not a mechanical process: 
... Our way of discerning relevance relationships seems to involve a generalised "feeling" we 
have for the kind of world we are set into. Such feelings involve intuitions which gather 
together into a unitary cognition certain features of ourselves and our world - features which 
resist discursive codification. 
For example, such undefined intuitive notions as "length," "breadth," and "evenly" get 
their content from gestures we make with our hands, things we do with blackboard diagrams, 
calculation we can make, and many other skills. ... So although we have an innate readiness to 
acquire the classical concept of length, the concept acquired nonetheless is open-textured and 
can be changed. ... With the addition of new things to think about - non-Euclidean geometries, 
more powerful conceptions of the continuum - the cogency of this reasoning was called into 
question. In effect, the addition of new premises undermined the inferences. Thus the reasoning 
was non-monotonic. (Catton 1999, p462-^64) 
Focusing on the pertinent points, this argument may be summarised thus: 
(1) Discerning relevance is not a mechanical process: Perception of relevant similarities 
involves intuitive cognition of features of the world that resist discursive codification. 
(2) Intuitive geometrical concepts are 'open-textured' and can be changed. 
(3) Alternative geometrical theories have been developed in which the intuitive concepts 
employed in Euclid's arguments have been changed, and as result the cogency of 
Euclid's arguments has been called into question. 
(4) In effect, Euclid's arguments have been undermined by the addition of new premises. 
Therefore: 
(5) Euclid's arguments were non-monotonic. 
Now there is a fairly clear relation between (4) and Catton's conclusion (5). I f we ignore for the 
moment the 'In effect' qualifier, from the supposition that Euclid's arguments have been 
undermined'^^ only by the addition of new premises (not for example, even in part, by the 
rejection or modification of any of the original premises) it would indeed follow that Euclid's 
arguments were non-monotonic. But is this the effect of the situation described in (1) - (3). 
Clearly not. Catton spends considerable space developing and emphasising the point that the 
intuitive geometrical concepts employed in Euclid's proofs can and have been 'changed' and 
'reshaped' with the effect that they are 'only in certain respects analogous' with the original 
in the sense relevant to Cattbn's account of nori-mbnotofiicity on p 461, an argument has been 
'undermined' in this sense if the addition of more premises has made it unreasonable to infer the 
conclusion, while in the original case it was reasonable. For the sake of establishing additional objections 
to this argument of Catton's, we may ignore our earlier comment that it would seem more appropriate to 
conclude that Euclid's original arguments weren't inferentially correct in the first place. 
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intuitive concepts (p463-4). In this case the 'undermining' of the conclusions in the modem 
'extensions' of the arguments is not achieved simply 'by the addition of new premises', but, on 
Catton's own account, by the modification of the concepts involved. In this case, since the 
original premises have been modified, premise (4) of Catton's argument is false, and 
consequently the argument does not go through. 
Catton does not seem to realise that an argument's being 'undermined' by the addition of newly 
comprehended logical 'information', such as a clearer understanding of the logical implications 
of the concepts involved, as provided by Hilbert in the case of Euclid's arguments, does not 
make an argument non-monotonic. An initially apparently good argument being turned into a 
patently bad argument by the addition of purely logical information simply means that the 
argument was fallacious all along. Even by the standards the inductivist, it is generally 
understood that it is possible for a reasoner to misunderstand some aspect of the meanings, or 
logical implications, of the premises of an inductive argument, and as a consequence to 
misjudge their inductive implications, and thereby the cogency of the argument that draws some 
such erroneous inductive implication. Thus even for an inductivist, i f we can be made to realise 
by the addition of purely logical considerations (clarifying the proper logical implications of the 
premises) that it would be a mistake to draw the original conclusion from the premises of the 
original apparently good inductive argument plus just the pertinent logical information, then the 
right conclusion to draw is that the original argument was fallacious all along. Misjudging the 
inferability of a conclusion from a stated set of assumptions on account of a failure to appreciate 
the bearing of pertinent logical matters, however complex, might well in retrospect be judged to 
be perfectly understandable. But it remains nonetheless a matter of misjudgement - not a matter 
of matter of difference in inferability. 
Before proceeding to further considerations relating to the formalisation of theories, Catton 
briefly comments on one type of argument that is quite commonly regarded as inductive in 
nature. Despite the brevity of his comments on this case, it is worth attending to Catton's 
treatment of ceteris paribus reasoning, not only to highlight the problems with his general line 
of argument, but in order to illustrate the positive merits of deductivist analysis in this further 
test case of Catton's choosing. 
The deductivist analysis of ceteris paribus reasoning 
With regard to ceteris paribus reasoning, Catton sets up his argument against the deductivist 
approach with the following account of it: 
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A proponent of the deductivist image of scientific inference will seek to reconstruct any 
reasonings whatsoever as deductively valid in form; For example, a deductivist will take the 
inference to 'B' from ' i f A, then (ceteris paribus) B' and 'A', to involve the additional premise 
ceteris paribus - other things are equal. (Catton 1999, p464-5) 
Before proceeding to consider Catton's objection to such an approach to the construal of ceteris 
paribus arguments, we should first pause to consider a couple of problems with Catton's initial 
claim here, and with his chosen representation of this type of inference. First it is altogether 
false to say that a deductivist 'wi l l seek to reconstruct any reasonings whatsoever as deductively 
valid in form'. A deductivist has no reason whatsoever to construe inferences that are clearly 
inferentially unsound (on as broad a conception as you like) as deductively valid, or to insist on 
the inclusion of certain additional premises in an argument put forward by a scientist who insists 
that his conclusion does not depend an any such covert presumptions. A bad argument is as 
much a bad argument for a deductivist as it is for anyone else - even when a perfectly good 
argument can be readily constructed from it with a little modification. 
What the deductivist does believe is that the underlying structure of any inference that is cogent 
may authentically be construed (i.e. without misrepresentation of the implicit or background 
beliefs of the inferer that are relevant to the inference) in a form that is deductively valid. 
This is a bold claim. It is not immediately obvious, although I believe relatively simple 
considerations do establish that it is true. Whether or not it is analytic, as Catton rhetorically 
suggests (p465), is an interesting question, but it is not a crucial question. A basic 
methodological point of the deductivist approach is that where the cogency of an argument is 
not patently obvious to all parties from its surface structure (plus agreement about the stated 
premises) the question of its cogency can profitably be investigated by probing its deeper (and 
often, for the epistemic deductivist, its epistemic) structure. This involves in particular 
examination of whether there are any unexpressed additional assumptions (whether factual or 
epistemic) held by the arguer that, i f added to the stated premises, would render clear (or at least 
overtly accessible) the purported justification for the conclusion in the argument. 
Let us then consider how such an investigation might go in the type of case discussed here by 
Catton. First we may note that the typically informal type of argument mentioned here - the 
ceteris paribus argument - may naturally be expressed in various different formats, and Catton's 
My own elaboration on this as an epistemic deductivist, is that this will in many cases involve 
explication of whatever epistemic principles (or connections) are supposed by the arguer to facilitate the 
inference. 
190 
semi-formal parenthetic representation of it is just one possible (and, as we shall see, i l l -
formulated) construal. Before commenting on the detail of this construal, there is an important 
preliminary point that needs to be borne in mind when considering what might appear to be an 
argument of this kind. The case of ceteris paribus reasoning is particularly susceptible to the 
fallacy of argument construal whereby we can sometimes be inclined to 'read in' a supposedly 
silent (or enthymematic) conclusion where in fact none is intended. Sometimes we simply 
make ceteris paribus claims in the context of discussion of an issue, without thereby implying, 
or claiming further, that these considerations are conclusive. In such cases, having noted that B 
has been associated with A in certain standard or typical cases, and that A is so in the case in 
question, the intent of a claim that ' i f A then other things being equal B ' might for example 
simply be to make the case for an investigation as to whether there are any identifiable relevant 
differences in the case in question - and not all to propose (or exemplify) jumping to the 
conclusion that B is so. In such common cases, where no explicit conclusion (that B) is 
expressed (or intended) - merely a ceteris paribus claim, it would of course be a mistake to 
interpret such a sequence of connected claims as an inference to an implicit conclusion B.'™ 
Having clarified that, let us leave such non-conclusive cases aside, and consider the logical 
structure of cases where the categorical conclusion is (let us suppose explicitly) drawn, as 
indicated in Catton's representation of the inference. 
First let us consider the significance of the fact that Catton places the ceteris paribus clause in 
the premises in which it occurs in brackets. Does Catton intend this to suggest that the ceteris 
paribus clause (or a synonym) might not be explicit in the premise, or perhaps that it is 
somehow not essential to its significance! Neither of these thoughts would seem to be plausible 
since of course the ceteris paribus clause is the definitive feature of a ceteris paribus inference, 
and indeed i f it were absent from the surface structure of the inference - otherwise constructed 
as represented by Catton - we would in any case be left with an argument that is 
straightforwardly deductively valid, namely modus ponens ( i f A then fi. A, therefore B) and 
there would be no need to appeal to any hidden assumptions, ceteris paribus or otherwise, in 
order to explicate its logical adequacy. Whatever Catton's intended significance ( i f any) for the 
brackets around the ceteris paribus clause then, we may regard this clause as an integral (and 
indeed generally explicit) part of the structure of the ceteris paribus inference, and so (as far as 
our analysis of its structure is concerned) ignore them. 
Another preliminary point we need to note is the unclarity of the logical form of the ceteris 
paribus clause within Catton's representation of the relevant (stated) premise of the inference ' i f 
' although that is not to say that one might rightly regard the prior premises as the basis of a more 
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A, then ceteris paribus B ' . By this 1 do not mean the difficulty in spelling out the precise 
meaning of'other things being equal'. Rather my concern here is with the logical operator that 
applies directly to this clause. In the detached version (in the hypothetical additional premise) 
the ceteris paribus clause, according to Catton simply reads as a straightforward proposition 
'Other things are equal' - no hidden conditionals or other funny business here. But what 
happens i f we transpose the same simple interpretation back into the consequent of the relevant 
conditional, where Catton places the clause in the stated premise? To highlight the question 
symbolically, let us symbolise the straightforward ceteris paribus proposition 'Other things are 
equal' by 'E' . Then Catton's representation of the ceteris paribus premise comes out as ' i f A, 
then £ B ' - which is nonsense. A simple way of restoring some sense to this would be to 
suppose that Catton intends an implicit conjunction to be operative here, thus ' i f A, then E and 
B' . But then of course, with one or two flirther steps of straightforward deduction, we would 
again have another va//V/deduction to B from the stated premises. Furthermore this would not 
in any case appear to be a reasonable construal of the relevant premise in a typical ceteris 
paribus inference. 
Clearly there is a significant question concerning the logical status of the ceteris paribus clause 
placed as it is in the stated conditional premise as depicted by Catton. Another problem for 
Catton's position on this issue, is that 'being' clauses within the antecedent of conditionals are 
commonly intended precisely to signal a relevant assumption. For example one might say ' I f he 
has travel more than a few hundred yards, then John being lazy he will take the car.'. In cases 
such as this the 'being' clause within the surface consequent is sometimes most simply 
construed as a background assumption that grounds or explains the truncated conditional 
generated by it extraction, thus 'Because John is lazy, i f he has to travel more than a few 
hundred yards, he will take the car.' A subtly different, slightly more complicated, albeit 
surface-structure preserving interpretation would be to read the 'being' clause within the 
surface antecedent as reflecting a nested 'since', thus ' I f he has to travel more than a few 
hundred yards, then since John is lazy, he wil l take the car', but in either case the 'because P, Q' 
or 'since P, Q' in the paraphrase reflects a presumption of the relevant proposition P, as well as 
an assumption of the implicit conditional 'if? then Q'. Now in at least some cases I would 
contend, this will be the proper interpretation of an 'other things being equal' inference of the 
surface form depicted by Catton. For example imagine a pair of race-goers debating the 
outcome of a race. The proponent of the argument points out that in the 3.30 it just so happens 
that all the horses run best on the current going (firm), they are all in good health, their 
respective loads are roughly equal, and they have all had to travel similar distances to the 
modest inference to the ceteris paribus claim. 
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racecourse. He then argues as fol lows: ' I f Lightning has the superior fo rm then, other things 
being equal, he wiW win. Lightning clearly/zoj the superior form: He w/7/win. ' . In such cases, 
the ceteris paribus clause is in fact an overt expression o f a presumption that other things are 
equal, and the inference is (relatively) straightforwardly valid - without any need for appeal to 
covert assumptions. 
However we may reasonably suppose that not all cases o f a ceteris paribus clause expressed in 
this fo rm o f conditional w i l l be intended in this presumptive way (i.e. as partly indicative o f a 
presumption that 'other things are equal'): the 'other things being equal' clause in an 
expression o f the form ' i f A , then other things being equal B ' can o f course, and often w i l l be, 
intended in a purely provisional sense - as mentioned above wi th regard to the case where no 
conclusion is drawn. Furthermore, it may also be used in such a provisional sense in an 
inference where nevertheless the respective conclusion (B) is drawn. This is clearly the 
particular type o f ceteris paribus inference that Catton has in mind. Bearing in mind the 
question we have raised regarding the logical construal o f such a clause within such a 
conditional expression, let us then consider how this is to be spelled out on this provisional 
interpretation o f the clause. Spelled out in natural English, the 'other things being equal' clause 
in such a conditional expression could be paraphrased as ' I f A , then providing other things are 
equal B ' . In this case it seems clear that in this type o f ceteris paribus inference, the appropriate 
logical interpretation w i l l be in terms - not o f a nested 'since' or a prior 'because' - but in terms 
o f a nested conditional, or more simply an additional antecedent, i.e. either as ' i f A , then (i/E 
then B ) ' or more simply as ' i f A and E, then B ' . But then the argument forms 
If A and other things are equal, then B 
A 
Therefore B . 
I f A, then (if other things are equal, then B) 
A 
Therefore B. 
as they stand are most obviously not cogent. As they stand, without any supplementary 
presumptions, such forms o f argument would not rightly convince anyone in virtue o f the 
rational merits o f the stated line o f reasoning. As far as the surface content o f such arguments 
goes, they are clearly unsatisfactory lines o f reasoning. Nor do you need to be a deductivist in 
order to appreciate this. To illustrate the latter point, it might be quite natural for someone to 
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think (whether rightly or wrongly) that an argument o f the fo l lowing form is perfectly 
inferentially adequate as it stands, despite the fact that it is not deductively valid. 
A l l o f the countless numbers o f As that have ever been observed in the practically 
unlimited variety o f circumstances in which they have been observed have been B. 
We have no reason to think that in this particular case it w i l l be otherwise. 
Therefore, in this case, A w i l l be B. 
But more challenging cases fo r the deductivist such as this bear no comparison whatsoever with 
the natural and uncontroversial evaluation o f the patently hopeless cases set out above. In fact 
such argument forms are so obviously unsatisfactory without supplementation that it is hard to 
imagine that anyone ever should seriously argue from either o f these i.e. expressly E-
provisional premises and A alone to an immediate and unqualified assertion o f B. To help to 
illustrate the point i f anyone should remain unconvinced, it is worth noting that simply by 
expressing the provision 'providing other things are equal' within the stated premise, you are 
effectively expressing a belief that the implication that B is provisional on other things being 
equal. To then proceed immediately to a categorical assertion o f the conclusion that B, without 
any understanding that you are taking as granted, or at least for the sake o f the argument 
supposing, that the stated provision is satisfied, would be patently absurd. This is nothing to do 
wi th some kind o f deductivistic chauvinism, as Catton suggests. It is simply common sense. 
In arguments o f this surface structure then, where the categorical conclusion is drawn, it would 
indeed seem right to suppose either that there is an unspoken presumption or supposition that 
other things are equal, or that the 'other things being equal' clause within the relevant 
conditional is in fact intended - not in the provisional sense but in the indicative sense - i.e. as a 
paraphrase o f 'since other things are equal', thereby overtly implying that other things are equal, 
as discussed above. In either case the argument, rspectively construed, turns out to be 
deductively valid. 
Catton's objection to the deductivist analysis of ceteris paribus reasoning 
Having clarified and confirmed the deductivist analysis o f the underlying structure o f a ceteris 
paribus inference, let us now move on to consider Catton's objection to the view that this form 
o f inference involves implicit appeal to a presumption that other things are equal. Catton's 
stated problem for such a construal o f ceteris paribus arguments is brief and goes as follows: 
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What it means to say that other things are equal, is for the present at least quite beyond us to say 
adequately. The whole question concerns how we reason not logically, but intuitively -
geometrically, or analogically, or inductively, or ceteris paribus. It is not illuminating to answer 
this question with the suggestion that we simply build intuitive premises (like "other things are 
equal") in reasonings that are deductively valid. This is not illuminating because it is quite 
unclear what these premises mean. (Catton 1999, p465, my emphasis) 
But that is hardly a satisfactory reason for claiming that there is no such implici t assumption, 
since the ceteris paribus clause in any case occurs in the stated premise ' I f A then ceteris 
paribus B ' , and Catton could hardly deny that this premise exists! On this particular line o f 
objection then we may rest our defence. 
The problems of theory formalisation, and ill-defined concepts 
However, Catton has another argument to offer against deductivism, and this concerns the 
axiomatisabiiity o f theories. In the case o f mechanics for example Catton claims that ' I n order 
for the deductivist image to f i t mechanics, Hilbert 's sixth problem (for mechanics) would need 
to be solved.' (Catton 1999, p452). Catton argues the point as follows: 
Hilbert's sixth problem challenged mathematicians to do for physics what had been done for the 
science of geometry. Success so far in answering this challenge has been very limited. As a 
consequence, it is not altogether clear what we are talking about in physics. It is difficult even to 
determine i f we are saying the same thing a different way when we move from one formulation 
of a theory to an alternative one. ... 
A work such as Newton's Principia sets out a theory of mechanics much as Euclid set 
out his theory of geometry. The use of various key terms is regularized by means of definitions, 
which connect these key terms with one another and with ftirther terms left intuitive and 
undefined. The meaning of these intuitive terms plays a significant role in shaping what 
reasoning is regarded as cogent. And so cogency (or what passes for such) does not amount 
simply to discursive deductive validity. To bring this about, 1 believe one would need to 
formalize, or discursively delimit, ideas left merely intuitive and informal in present 
formulations of the theory ... (which ... might not [prove possible] i f , say, as in the case of 
arithmetic, mechanics is not first order axiomatizable) (Catton 1999, p467) 
The first point to note in this regard, is that argument deductivism is by no means the same tiling 
as theory-formalism, i.e. the view that all theories either are, or should in principle be, f u l l y 
formalisable. Even the most ardent deductivist about argument might al low that theories may 
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and, even perhaps should, permit a variety o f interpretations o f theoretical terms, some or even 
al l o f which bear some non-logical semantic content - so long as any specific arguments a 
scientist might offer are clearly deductively valid. In this case it would seem that Hilbert 's 
problem for the formalisation o f physics need not be solved, or even soluble, in order for 
argument deductivism to be right. Let us then examine Catton' argument to the contrary. 
Catton's key premises in this argument is that 'The meaning o f these [undefined or primitive] 
intuitive terms plays a significant role in shaping what reasoning is regarded as cogent.'. But 
there are a number o f problems with this suggestion, particularly in the context o f a debate 
about deductivism. For one thing anyone who is a formalist about inference (i.e. anyone who 
thinks that the only good arguments are those that are formally valid (relative to a specified 
system) would want to point out immediately that this w i l l be a problem only for those 
misguided theorists who have failed to see the light in this regard. In any introductory text in 
logic, one o f the first things we learn is that the formal validity o f arguments does not depend on 
the meanings o f any terms other than the logical operators. (And o f course whether or not the 
premises o f an argument, granted their intuitive meanings, are true or acceptable - which is 
another requirement o f argument 'cogency', since Catton expresses his point wi th that term - is 
neither here nor there with regard to the debate between the deductivist and the anti-deductivist, 
since this is an issue about /og/co/-adequacy, i.e. argument cogency granted the premises - not 
about premise-adequacy.) As regards Catton's perception o f what is required for solution o f the 
purported problem - even a deductivist who is a formalist about deduction would not accept that 
formal definition of primitive terms in a theory is necessary to secure determ inability o f the 
logical adequacy o f arguments constructed in the context o f that theory. Even f rom the 
viewpoint o f such an extreme fo rm o f deductivism, Catton's perception o f the demands o f 
deductivism is way over the mark. 
Semantic v formal deductivism 
But what about those deductivists who don't take such an extreme position? Do we have any 
reason to regard Catton's claim as true? And i f so is it a problem for us in the way that Catton 
suggests? The first question can clearly be answered in the affirmative: for a semantic 
deductivist the meanings o f terms other than the logical operators may indeed, in some cases, 
have a bearing on the cogency o f an argument. On this view, potential disagreement about the 
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meanings o f terms, or even plain misunderstanding, as wel l as elements o f indeterminacy o f 
meaning, may in fact result in disagreement or error or even indeterminacy about the logical 
adequacy o f arguments. And o f course the formalist about deduction w i l l leap on these 
problems as indications o f precisely the reason why we ought to be formalists. However, the 
situation in this regard is certainly no better for the anti-deductivist - and in particular for any 
o f them who allow that the meanings o f non-logical terms can be relevant to the cogency o f 
non-deductive arguments. They w i l l not only share the problems associated with determination 
o f the cogency o f any given deductive argument, but they w i l l have an additional problem with 
regard to the bearing o f disagreement, misunderstanding and indeterminacy wi th regard to the 
meanings o f terms on the supposed non-deductive implications o f the premises o f an argument. 
This is not a problem for deductivism over against anti-deductivism; it is simply the shared 
problem o f the d i f f icul ty o f identifying the (non-formal) semantic implications o f a set o f 
premises when the meanings o f non-logical terms in the premises are not entirely clear. 
Fortunately, wi th regard to (semantic) deductive implications at least, there is a well-established 
method for constructing perfectly logically adequate arguments, even in such problem cases. 
Moreover it is a method that sti l l does not demand that we provide f u l l formal definitions for all 
the terms we employ in our arguments, as Catton suggests we would need to do. In order to 
illustrate the method in question we need only consider the simplest o f text-book examples. 
Consider for instance the argument 
John is a bachelor. 
Therefore, John is male. 
Most o f us would accept that this argument is semantically valid, even though it is not formally 
valid. In other words, it is not possible for the conclusion to be false while the premise is true -
and this is so in virtue o f the meaning o f the premise, but not in virtue o f any pertinent features 
o f the logical form o f the argument - as it is stated. However a formally valid argument can 
easily be constructed that more clearly illustrates why the conclusion may be drawn on the basis 
o f the material premise, and which does so without invoking anything other than tr ivial 
semantic truths which no-one would want to deny and whose relevance to the derivability o f the 
conclusion no-one would want to deny. Thus: 
John is a bachelor. 
'John is a bachelor' semantically implies 'John is male'. 
Therefore, John is male. 
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So how does this relate to the problem cases, where the problem is precisely that the semantic 
implications aren't so clear? In order to illustrate this let us consider a more contentious 
conclusion.'^' 
John is a bachelor. 
Therefore, John does not have a long-term, exclusive, l ive- in , female partner. 
might not seem quite so clear cut. Some readers might think that this argument is semantically 
valid - that for any named individual ' x ' , ' x does not have a long-term, exclusive, l ive- in , 
female partner' is a semantic implication o f ' x is a bachelor'. Others might dispute this. One 
might suppose that the current natural meaning o f the term 'bachelor' is not entirely 
uncontroversial in this regard. In a 'discursively i l l -def ined ' context such as this, is there any 
way that I , as a semantic deductivist, can satisfactorily express my argument to the stated 
conclusion in such a way as leave no question about the logical adequacy o f my argument and 
satisfactorily set out what are the pertinent assumptions on the basis o f which I believe this 
conclusion may be cogently drawn. In particular, granted, as we have already noted, that the 
issue at stake is about the bearing o f meanings on inferential adequacy - can I do all this 
effectively i f / t h i n k that the conclusion does fo l low in virtue o f the meaning o f the premise 
(rather than on account o f some further material presumptions, such as say that there is a law 
banning bachelors f rom having l ive- in partners, and that John invariably obeys the law)? The 
answer is o f course yes 1 can - and indeed I can do so quite easily. A l l we require for this is 
another simple informal modal argument, thus: 
(1) John is a bachelor. 
(2) 'John is a bachelor' semantically implies 'John does not have a long-term, exclusive, 
l ive - in , female partner' 
Therefore; 
(3) John does not have a long-term, exclusive, l ive- in , female partner. 
Now, despite the debatability o f the pertinent question regarding the natural or intuitive 
meaning o f 'bachelor', and my admitted incapability o f providing a f u l l formal (and 
uncontroversial) definition for this term, you have a simple and straightforward argument that is 
clearly semantically valid, and which clearly sets out why (granted that we have initially 
previously established that we share the belief that John is a bachelor) / infer that John that does 
not have a long-term female partner. N o w i f you have an equally f i rm opinion otherwise on 
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I f you don't think this conclusion is contentious, you may wish to think of an argument whose 
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premise (2), and we cannot find any satisfactorily objective authority who might be able to 
adjudicate on the matter, it might wel l be the case that we are doomed to genuine disagreement 
about this - but that is a question about the premise-adequacy o f the argument - not about its 
logical adequacy. The important thing, f rom the point o f view o f our concerns about the 
philosophy o f argument, is that by formulating the argument in this uncontroversial deductive 
way I have managed to explain my line o f reasoning to you perfectly clearly - without any 
distortion or misrepresentation. Moreover, I have managed to achieve this quite easily despite 
the debatability o f the intuitive meaning o f the crucial term whose meaning is central to the 
argument. 
A point o f further interest in this regard is that the simple (informal) modal argument presented 
could easily be expressed formally, by means o f a logical implication operator (to be interpreted 
in the semantic sense) in the context o f an appropriate modal logic. Moreover it is easy to see 
that any arguments based on such perceptions o f logical or semantic implication might be 
simply and, as far as inferential adequacy is concerned, uncontroversially set out in such a way. 
So once again it might seem that perhaps the formalist has the upper hand in this matter. M y 
own disagreement with the formalist in this regard is relatively t r ivia l . 1 simply think that in 
cases o f quite simple arguments that are clearly semantically valid, such as 
This is red. 
Therefore, this is coloured. 
are (at least as far as inferential adequacy is concerned) good enough as they stand, in that they 
are, and are clearly, valid. The difference is tr ivial since in any case, as we have noted, such 
arguments can be reformulated, without injustice to the underlying structure o f the inference, in 
such a way as to render them formally valid.'^^ 
The deductivist solution to the problem of conceptual unclarity 
O f course the real debate between the deductivist and the anti-deductivist is centred on the 
treatment o f inductive or ampliative inferences, rather than matters o f theoretical analysis, such 
semantic validity is questionable. 
Nor need this always involve appeal to modal operators. A formally valid reconstruction might be 
made simply by adding a perfectly unobjectionable non-modal premise that is effectively grounded by 
the respective semantic implication, such as 'Anything that is red is coloured.' or ' I f this is red then it is 
coloured.'. Moreover, for anyone who was unfamiliar with the concept of semantic implication, such 
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as those on which Catton focuses, and in the case o f ampliative inference, whatever the 
interpretation o f the relevant evidence statements, the hypothesis w i l l not be a semanticaliy 
valid implication. As we have noted, even in cases where there is no question about the 
hypothesis being a semantic implication o f the evidence statements the meaning o f the evidence 
statements may still be relevant to the inferential adequacy o f the argument. In cases where the 
precise meaning o f the premises is unclear, there may also be cases where, even in the 
judgement o f a committed inductivist, the cogency o f an inductive argument is unclear because 
the meaning o f the premise is imprecise or unclear. For example: 
A l l o f the red mushrooms that have been eaten in the past have been poisonous. 
This mushroom is (slightly) reddish orange. 
Therefore, this mushroom w i l l be poisonous. 
This kind o f unclarity ( in this case the vagueness o f the respective colour terms) is a problem for 
both the deductivist and the anti-deductivist, and may (at least in cases where the unclarity 
resides in the premises) be regarded as primarily a problem concerning premise-adequacy, 
rather than simply a problem o f logical adequacy, since it is essentially a problematic feature o f 
the premises - namely that their meaning is unclear or imprecise (in respects relevant to the 
inference) - that is the root o f the problem. Clearly one o f the basic criteria that we ought to 
demand for the adequacy o f a set o f premise statements when appraising an argument is whether 
their meaning is satisfactorily clear - at least in any respects that might be relevant, whether 
semantically or otherwise, to the inferability o f the conclusion. 
However, the same sort o f interpretive problem might equally apply to unclarity in the 
conclusion. It might be the case that the meaning o f the conclusion is imprecise or unclear in a 
respect that makes the cogency o f the argument unclear (or inclines us to be mistaken about it) . 
To illustrate the point suppose we have an ordered division o f the spectrum into n relatively 
precise colour specifications C, - C„, and that C]^^ designates a colour that lies somewhere 
between paradigm yellow and paradigm green, in the vicinity o f the hazy borderline area o f the 
extension o f 'yel low' . Some people might be inclined to say that Ci 17 is a shade o f yellow, 
while others would be inclined to disagree, insisting that it would be quite misleading to 
describe it as yellow, and that it is at most a slightly yellowy shade o f green. Nor there does not 
appear to be any off ic ia l semantic legislation to which they might appeal in order to settle the 
matter. Consider then the inductive argument: 
non-modal connecting claims might be about as basic as the explanation gets as to the arguer's supposed 
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(CY) 999 balls have been randomly drawn (without replacement) f rom an urn 
initially containing 1000 balls, and all 999 o f the sample balls are CUT in 
colour. 
Therefore, the remaining ball in the urn is yellow. 
For an inductivist who thinks C i n is (a shade o f ) yellow, ( C Y ) as it stands might seem to be 
perfectly satisfactory argument. But even an inductivist who thinks it is not yel low w i l l think 
that (CY) is not a satisfactory argument. In fact he or she might well think that the conclusion is 
rendered extremely /'wprobable by the premises, since they appear to make it highly probable 
that the ball w i l l be C i n . Perhaps an inductivist who regarded the question o f whether Ci n is 
yellow as indeterminate might regard it as indeterminate whether this argument is logically 
adequate as i t stands, i.e. whether one would be right to infer the conclusion granted exactly the 
stated premises. In this case it would appear to be a problem, even f r o m the point o f view o f 
inductivism, to determine whether the conclusion is a reasonable inductive inference, because 
the conclusion is vague in respects relevant to the judgement o f whether it is inductively 
supported by the premise.'" 
Clearly the problem for the determination o f argument cogency in the case o f relevant points o f 
unclarity or potential misunderstanding o f key terms in the argument, is as much a problem for 
the anti-deductivist wi th regard to the inductive arguments he may want to construct wi th 
intuitive terminology, as Catton mistakenly thought it was in the cases where the deductivist 
wants to construct a sound deductive argument that employs intuitive or relatively i l l -defined 
terminology. However, as we have seen, even in such d i f f icu l t cases, it was wel l within the 
capability o f the deductivist to express his deductive arguments in a form that is clearly 
logically adequate, and which constitutes an honest and authentic account o f the pertinent points 
o f his reasoning. To be fair, o f course the anti-deductivist is equally free to employ the same 
deductive techniques in his analyses o f deductive inferences involving i l l -def ined concepts. 
The outstanding problem with regard to the problem o f determining the inferential adequacy o f 
an argument when some o f the terms employed are to some extent unclear or potentially 
misunderstood, in respects relevant to the inference, lie wi th arguments such as this that do not 
even appear to be intended to be deductive. 
connection between the material premises of the argument and the conclusion. 
' " Depending on one's interpretation of the concept of vaguehbs, exainp^ ^^ ^^  this might be taken 
to illustrate either of two types of problem of unclarity: For those who take the traditional view this is a 
matter of indeterminacy, sometimes paraphrased as that there is no fact of the matter. For those who take 
the epistemic position on vagueness (c.f Williamson 1992 & 1994) there will be a fact of the matter but 
we simply have no way of knowing that fact. 
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The epistemic deductivist solution to the problem of conceptual unclarity in inductive 
inference 
Catton does not discuss overtly inductive arguments in any detail - choosing to concentrate 
rather on failed or would-be mathematical proofs or axiomatisations, and logical formulations 
o f theories. But while he may have been wrong about the enthymematic expandability o f 
ceteris paribus inference, I think he is nevertheless right to a large extent in thinking that such 
simple (alethic) enthymematic analyses w i l l not always be entirely plausible. For example it is 
my view, as an epistemist about (most) induction, that the traditional standard form o f 
representation o f inductive arguments in purely alethic terms,"'' is more often than not 
misleading - that inductive inferences may often more authentically be represented by epistemic 
arguments. We have seen in an earlier chapter how drawing out the pertinent epistemic features 
o f an inference naturally leads us to some form o f epistemic argument that is straightforwardly 
deductively valid, and which properly draws out all the pertinent beliefs o f the arguer (whether 
factual or epistemic) for the scrutiny o f his audience. It is the position o f epistemic deductivism 
that when an inference is not appropriately represented simply as an alethic deduction, some 
such f o r m o f deductively valid epistemic elaboration w i l l generally be appropriate to the proper 
interpretation o f the argument. A n interesting challenge for the epistemic deductivist then is 
whether this approach to argument analysis and evaluation can also provide a clearly logically 
adequate and authentic reconstruction even o f such an interpretively problematic inductive 
inference as the one that poses the problems for the inductivist that we have outlined above. It 
is my view that this challenge may be met, and the logic o f this particular case may be 
illustrated as follows. 
A primary indication that an argument presented in the terms o f (CY) might be an 
enthymematic argument expression is the absence o f any explicit 'total evidence' assumption. 
On checking with the presenter o f an argument expressed thus, we may expect to confirm that it 
is intended to be understood for example that it is not known prior to the draw that one o f the 
balls placed in the urn is black, and more generally that there is a background epistemic 
assumption in operation that we have no further relevant information regarding the colour o f the 
remaining ball. In this case, provided (contra Musgrave)" ' that there are no other material 
i.e. extracting the non-epistemic content of the account of the evidence and identifying these evidence 
statements with the premises of the argument and extracting the non-epistemic evidedndurn irom any 
associated epistemic packaging and identifying this with the conclusion. 
or rather, contra Musgrave according to Catton, whereby the deductivist claim is supposed to be that 
there are sufficient total assumptions to deductively valid infer the original conclusion, i.e. the 
evidedndum. 
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assumptions that have gone unsaid, we w i l l have at least one enthymematic assumption, namely 
that we have no further (material) information relevant to the hypothesis or hypothesis that the 
remaining ball is yellow. However, as we have noted above, it is also more than likely that the 
presenter o f this argument w i l l take the view that C| n is yellow. And since this is a contentious 
semantic assumption - moreover one that is relevant to the inferability o f the hypothesis - this 
is a semantic assumption that needs to be declared i f the arguer is to succeed in clar ifying to his 
audience the particular line o f justification initially summarily expressed in the purely alethic 
form o f ( C Y ) . 
A further point o f interpretation that needs to be addressed is the significance o f the inferential 
connective 'Therefore' in the context o f this particular argument. So long, as we are supposing, 
that we don't have a set o f premises that deductively imply the hypothesis, it would seem that 
the interferential connection claim implici t here is not intended to be interpreted as a deductive 
implication connective. The implicit claim rather is that the hypothesis is somehow inductively 
infereable granted the premises. What kind o f inductive support is supposed to be granted to the 
hypothesis in virtue o f the epistemic assumption that the only relevant material information we 
have is as stated, plus the semantic assumption that Cn? is a shade o f yellow, is a question that 
needs to be put to the arguer i f the argument is to be properly understood as intended. For the 
sake o f the example we may suppose that the arguer in this case is implici t ly claiming that since 
the only relevant material information we have is as stated, and C| n is a shade o f yellow, we 
ought to regard the hypothesis wi th an extremely high degree of belief. Since the corresponding 
conditional implicit in this 'since' c la im"* is not (or at the very least it is contentious whether it 
is) a logical truth, it is an (inductivist) inferability assumption that ought not to go without 
explication in a proper elaboration o f the underlying argument. The interesting thing to note 
then f rom a logical point o f view - and the key point o f epistemic deductivism - is that granted 
these epistemic, semantic, and inferential assumptions, the epistemic conclusion that the arguer 
would have us draw, namely that we ought to regard the hypothesis wi th an extremely high 
degree of belief, follows deductively validly. Thus we have an epistemic reformulation (CYE) 
o f the original inductive argument (CY) which is clearly deductively val id: ' 
(CYE) 
(Premise 1) The material information we have which is relevant to the hypothesis 
'that the remaining ball in the urn is yel low' is exactly that 999 balls 
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i.e. the conditional obtained by substituting ' i f for 'since'. 
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have been randomly drawn (without replacement) f rom an urn initially 
containing 1000 balls, and all 999 o f the sample balls are C| 17 in colour. 
(Premise 2) ' x is/are C i n ' semantically implies ' x is/are yel low' . 
(Premise 3) I f (Premise 1) and (Premise 2) then we ought to regard the hypothesis 
'that the remaining ball in the urn is yel low' with an extremely high 
degree o f belief. 
(Conclusion) We ought to regard the hypothesis 'that the remaining ball in the urn is 
yel low' wi th an extremely high degree o f belief. 
and so there need be no question arising wi th regard to the logic o f the underlying epistemic 
argument thus properly elaborated.'^^ 
In conclusion then, the problems o f interpretation for the determination o f argument cogency to 
which Catton draws attention are not, as he suggests, a problem for the deductivist account o f 
argument cogency. As we have observed, this problem o f interpretation is fundamentally a 
problem o f premise (and/or conclusion) adequacy - a problem which merely obscures the 
question o f logical adequacy that is relevant to the issue at stake between deductivist and ant i -
deductivist. Furthermore, we have seen that this problem may be overcome wi th the aid o f 
familiar tools o f deduction, and, wi th the insights o f epistemic deductivism, even in the case o f 
overtly inductive inference, where simplistic alethic deductivism does not appear to be realistic. 
We have seen that the results yielded by the epistemic deductivist analysis are overt clarity of 
logical adequacy plus authentic representation o f the assumptions (and conclusion) that 
constitute a satisfactory explication o f the justification that the arguer aspires to satisfactorily 
present in the argument. The challenge is then turned against the anti-deductivist, and is the 
challenge o f how he might propose to achieve the same results in the analysis o f inductive (or 
any other non-deductive inferences) without resource to any such deductivist clarifications. 
Vagueness, and the logical adequacy of classical deduction 
Since it is simply an instance o f modus ponens. 
' ' A fiuther consequent merit of this formulation of the argument is that, despite the vagueness of key 
terminology and the debatability of premise 2, since it is deductively valid, it would seem at least to ful f i l 
the condition of premise and conclusion adequacy noted above that the meanings of its constitutive 
statements are sufficiently clear in respects that are relevant to determination of its logical adequacy. 
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I do however acknowledge that there are other, wel l -known, and more d i f f i cu l t problems posed 
by intuitive and il l-defined concepts relating to the logical adequacy o f deduction, and thereby 
relevant to the issue o f deductivism, i.e. the problem o f vagueness and sorites paradox, and I 
shall examine the significance o f these problems below. 
Intuitively understood, i l l-defined, terms o f the vague sort have long been understood to pose a 
challenge to the logical adequacy o f deductive logic (and thereby one might suppose, to 
deductivism). The traditional problem in this regard is the sorites paradox, which in its classical 
formulation turns on the apparent implication o f the vagueness o f 'heap'"^ whereby the addition 
o f one grain o f sand does not make the difference between an accumulation o f grains o f sand 
that is not a heap and an accumulation that it is a heap. The argument then goes, f rom a set o f 
premises all o f which appear to be true, such as: 
Sorites Paradox 
(Premise 1) One grain o f sand is not a heap. 
(Premise 2) I f one grain is not a heap then an accumulation o f two grains is not a 
heap. 
(Premise 3) I f an accumulation o f two grains is not a heap then an accumulation o f 
three grains is not a heap. 
(Premise 10*) I f an accumulation o f 10* - 1 grains is not a heap then an accumulation 
o f 10* grains is not a heap. 
by a simple sequence o f steps o f modus ponens, to the patently false conclusion that an 
accumulation o f 10* grains o f sand is not a heap. Thus we have a classically valid argument 
f r o m a set o f premises all o f which appear to be true to a false conclusion. 
Four o f the main lines o f approach to the logic o f vagueness are the supervaluation approach, 
degrees o f truth theory, the intuitionist approach'*", and the epistemic approach. On the 
supervaluation and epistemic approaches, it is claimed that the argument valid but one o f the 
premises is false. The supervaluationist says that it is indeterminate which premise is false, 
while the claim on the epistemic approach is that there is a fact o f the matter which premises is 
'Sorites' is derived from 'soros' the Greek for 'heap'. Other popular formulations exploit such vague 
terms as 'bald', ' tall ' , and 'yellow'. 
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false, but we have no way o f knowing which it is. The intuitionist also maintains that the 
argument is valid, but declines to suggest that one o f the premises is false, and instead employs 
a deviant logic which permits him to say that it is false that all the premises are true, while 
nevertheless claiming that this does not imply that there is a false premise. On the degree 
theoretic view, when vague terminology is in operation the truth or falsity o f the propositions so 
constructed is not an all or nothing affair. Truth values may vary, even by the slightest o f 
degrees, between the limits o f definite or whole truth (val 1) and definite or whole (or 
'absolute') falsity (val 0). In this case, while the sorites argument remains valid on a 
sympathetic interpretation o f the classical sense, insofar as it guarantees preservation o f simple 
or absolute truth, the logic o f degrees o f truth explains how an argument o f such form, when it 
contains many premises which are extremely highly, but nevertheless short o f absolutely, true 
(as it does in the sorites case) may nevertheless lead to a conclusion whose truth value is (much) 
lower than that o f the lowest valued premise.'^' 
A useful introductory reading and bibliography can be found in Sainsbury and Williamson 
(1997), and Keefe and Smith (1996) is a good collection o f readings. Williamson endeavours to 
defend the intuitively implausible epistemic position in his (1992 and 1994). For a comparison 
o f the supervaluation approach with degree theory, see Sainsbury (1988, Ch.2), and for an 
exchange on the relative merits o f degree theory against intuitionism see my Rea (1989) and the 
response o f Schwartz (1990). I shall not discuss the relative merits o f these alternative 
approaches in any detail here, except to make one or two comments in further defence o f my 
own favoured view, which is the degree theory. 
It is an important merit o f the degree theory that this is not an ad hoc suggestion, but a view that 
is grounded on consideration o f the pragmatics o f vague language use. Whether or not a 
predicate 'applies' to a subject - and thereby whether or not the subject/predicate statement is 
true - depends fiindamentally on the conventions relating to the use o f the predicate - and a 
basic indicator o f this is whether competent language users would acknowledge that the 
predicate applies to the subject. But o f course where vague predicates are concerned there is 
significant variation as to the perception o f their applicability in different cases. In some cases 
we might be quite certain about the applicability o f the predicate, while in other cases we may 
be more hesitant or doubtful about their applicability. Such variation in inclination can range 
The approach I refer to here is Putnam's proposal for applying intuitionist logic to sorites paradoxes, 
Putnam (1983). 
Whether or not one might want to say that it is thereby degree-theoretically 'invalid' in respect of that 
wi l l depend on one's intuitive understanding of the central significance of the concept of validity. 
Edgington for instance suggests we mark the distinction between validity and invalidity with respect to 
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between absolute certainty about the applicability o f the predicate, and absolute certainty that 
the predicate does not apply. The degree theorist, unlike the epistemic theorist, sees this not as 
simple uncertainty about a perfectly determinate matter o f fact, but as a symptom o f normal 
variation in the ongoing grounding use o f the predicate (and its negation) in application to 
gradually di f fer ing subjects, effectively yielding variation in applicability, and thereby o f the 
truth o f the respective subject/predicate statements, that is mirrored in a responsive attitude akin 
to (simple) uncertainty, and roughly measured in a similar manner, on a scale f rom 0, 
representing absolute falsity to 1, absolute truth).'^^ Complex propositions are then evaluated 
on the basis o f (intendedly) intuitive expansions o f the traditional truth functions, which agree 
wi th the traditional truth fimctions in the l imit ing case where only absolute values are 
admitted.'*^ 
Edgington (1992, p 203) suggests that 'the Sorites paradox and the Lottery paradox are 
structurally the same phenomena'. But this claim, in the context o f a discussion o f logic, could 
be misleading.'^"* The epistemic theorist, supervaluationist, and the intuitionist would certainly 
like to stress their structural similarity in certain logical respects: the epistemic theorist and 
supervaluationist both want to claim that one o f the premises is false (as in the case o f the 
lottery 'paradox' - one o f the tickets will win) while the intuitionist wants to deny that all the 
premises are true (as one must do in the case o f the lottery paradox). But in the view o f the 
degree theorist it is key differences in their logical structure that are crucial to a proper diagnosis 
o f the sorites problem. The degree theorist is surely right in insisting that while the above 
logical features clearly hold in the case o f the lottery, they do not appear to hold in the case o f 
the sorites. The particular and distinguishing problem in the case o f the sorites is that it would 
appear that all the premises are true. And it is only the degree theory that does justice to this 
crucial feature o f the sorites argument, since the degree theory explains how all o f the premises 
are extremely ( i f not all absolutely) true, and yet the conclusion is quite false. 
whether the argument form makes possible a shortfall in the truth value of the conclusion that is not 
attributable to truth value deficits in the premises. 
1 have said more about this in an early unpublished paper (Rea,1992) where 1 discussed the 
transferability of the concept of'partial grounding', as developed by Devitt and Sterelney (1987, p62-3) 
in association with the process of reference change, to the pragmatics of predicate vagueness. 
Sainsbury and Williamson (1996, p476) cite the standard approach which I also endorsed in (1989). 
On this approach: 
[~P] = 1-P 
[P&Q] = min {[P], [Q]} 
[PvQ] = max {[P], [Q]} 
[P->Q] = l - ( [ P ] - [ Q ] ) i f [ P ] > [ Q ] 
= 1 otherwise. 
It is reasonably clear that the similarity to which Edgington refers here relates to a comparison 
between the epistemic structure of the lottery argument and the logical structure of the sorites argument. 
Nevertheless the idea that they are the same in respect of their logical structure is a mistaken idea that 
opponents would like to exploit. 
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Degrees of truth versus intuitionism 
The intuitionist tries to salvage some respectability in this regard by maintaining that although 
he denies that al l the premises are true he does not thereby imply that one o f them is not true.'^^ 
In intuitionist logic (~P v ~Q) does not fo l low f rom ~(P&Q). 1 have argued (Rea, 1989), that 
such an approach to logic is hopelessly too broad'**" since it effectively renders the coercive 
power o f logic impotent. Faced wi th a conclusion he wishes to avoid, in an argument which 
seems perfectly valid, and for which it seems that not one o f the premises is untrue, the 
intuitionist need feel under no pressure at all to reconsider his prior opinion o f the conclusion. 
As far as the intuitionist is concerned, he does not need to deny the apparent truth that none o f 
the premises are untrue, or that the argument is valid. In his system, these logical features o f an 
argument are perfectly compatible wi th the conclusion's being false, since none o f the premises 
being untrue is intuitionistically compatible wi th not all o f the premises being true. 
Schwartz (1990, p44-5) in his response tries to argue that this apparent 'free for all escape 
route' f rom any such classically pressing arguments is in fact 'nothing peculiar to the 
intuitionist proposal' and that 'the classicist and the intuitionist are about on a par' in this 
respect. His first line o f defence for this claim is that 
i f we believe of an argument that it is valid and that its conclusion is false, we are rationally 
committed to disbelieving the conjunction of the premises. This is not an escape route, it is just 
logic. (Schwartz, 1990, p44) 
But o f course things are not quite that simple in the more detailed and problematic context we 
are considering i.e. in the case o f an apparently good argument, where (in common wi th the 
paradoxical case o f the sorites) ' i t also seems to be the case that all the premises are true' (Rea, 
1989, p31). Since he does not believe that one o f the premises may be false, the classicist 
thereby feels unable to deny that all the premises are true. In such a scenario the classicist is 
under logical pressure to rethink his prior opinion o f the conclusion. He may o f course seek the 
explanation o f the problem elsewhere,'*' but the crucial point is that i f he can find no fault with 
See Schwartz (1987). 
Here I use Haack's terminology, (1978) pl39 'Further requirements concern the scope of a solution; it 
should not be so broad as to cripple the reasoning we want to kebp'. 
As of course one is forced to do when faced with a paradox such as the sorites where acceptance of the 
conclusion, like denial of the premises, and like denial of validity, does not even appear to be an option. 
But of course the general point about a 'free for all escape route' when faced with an 'apparently good' 
argument relates more broadly to the context of argument in general, rather than paradox, where 
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the validity o f the argument and he cannot bring himself to believe that one o f the premises is 
false, then he w i l l be under considerable logical pressure to reconsider his evaluation o f the 
conclusion. In the same situation however, the intuitionist w i l l not be under any such logical 
pressure, since even i f he cannot bring himself to believe that (at least) one o f the premises is 
false, he remains logically free to deny the conjunction o f the premises, and thereby free to deny 
the conclusion. That is the logical loop-hole that the intuitionist is free to exploit in order to get 
himself o f f the hook whenever he wishes to avoid acceptance o f the conclusion o f an apparently 
good argument.'^* 
Schwartz's second line o f defence fo r his claim that the classicist and the intuitionist are 
actually 'on a par' in respect o f this apparent difference in logical constraints goes as fol lows: 
It may seem that the intuitionist is getting away with something when he says that the 
conjunction of the premisses is false, but is unwilling to deny any of the conjuncts. Classical 
logic, in effect allows the same thing however. ... i f a classicist rejects a conjunction, he must 
hold that at least one conjunct is false but he need have no beliefs about which conjunct is false. 
So the classicist and the intuitionist are about on a par with respect to 'free for all escape routes'. 
The intuitionist can say that the conjunction is false but refuse to deny any particular conjunct. 
The classicist as well can say that the conjunction is false but refiise to deny any particular 
conjunct. Schwartz (1990, p45, my emphasis) 
But o f course it is quite obvious that this common ground between the classicist and the 
intuitionist is not the logical difference between the classicist and the intuitionist that Schwartz 
carefiilly sets out and invokes in his account o f Putnam's proposed escape route f rom the sorites 
argument (Schwartz 1987). The key difference between the lottery 'paradox' and the sorites 
neatly illustrates the irrelevance o f this point in the kind o f case in question where we have an 
apparently good argument in which it seems that not one o f the premises is false. In the case o f 
the lottery paradox it is patently obvious that one o f the premises is false, although we cannot 
possibly know in advance which premise is false. The lottery argument does not even appear to 
meet the basic requirements o f a cogent argument.'^' The problem when we have an apparently 
cogent argument is o f course that it does not seem to be the case that one o f the premises may 
be false. In such a case this poses a logical barrier to the classicist who might have liked to 
acceptance of the conclusion is at least a conceivable option for the disputants, even in the face of initial 
conviction that it is false. 
It does of course seem somewhat disingenuous of Schwartz to refuse to acknowledge this crucial 
distinction between the respective logical constraints faced by the classicist and the intuitionist in his 
response, when the primary point of his initial article was precisely to clarify that distinction in order to 
illustrate how it is exploited in the case of the sorites. 
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have been able to say that the conjunction o f the premises is false (in order to maintain a denial 
o f the conclusion), since for the classicist the latter implies the apparent falsehood that one o f 
the premises is false. Schwartz's key point, as set out in his (1987), was precisely that the 
intuitionist in contrast can simply deny the conjunction o f the premises o f an argument without 
thereby committing himself to the apparent falsehood that one o f the premises is false. What is 
more, in the same paper, Schwartz was perfectly clear in explicitly distinguishing this crucial 
difference between the classicist and the intuitionist f rom the common ground between them 
whereby neither the classicist nor the intuitionist needs to be able to say which premise is false: 
Here i f anywhere is a significant difference between the intuitionist and the classicist. I f the 
classicist denies a conjunction then he is committed to asserting that at least one of the conjuncts 
is false Of course he need not be able to say which of the premises is false, but he must hold 
that one is false. (Schwartz, 1987, p i 82, my emphasis) 
Nor did he appear to have any doubts that this diminishment o f the requirements for the denial 
o f the conclusion o f a valid argument supplies the intuitionist with a relatively easy escape route 
f rom arguments wi th conclusions we have previously judged false, where nevertheless we 
cannot plausibly commit ourselves to the apparent falsehood that there is a false premise (such 
as in the case the sorites). 
Thus when the classicist denies the conclusion ... he is committed to denying one of the 
premises, in the face of all the difficulties of such a denial The intuitionist seems to be able 
to avoid this unwanted consequence because he refuses to deny any premise (he just denies the 
conjunction of the premises) (Schwartz, 1987, p i 82) 
Whatever lengths Swartz might go to in his attempt to deny that the intuitionist has a peculiar 
logical escape route, not open to the classicist, f rom unwanted conclusions (and he spends an 
entire page pushing the arguments cited above in support o f such a denial) there is ultimately no 
escaping his earlier detailed clarification o f the precise nature o f such an escape route, and o f 
Putnam's proposal for its deployment in the case o f the sorites. 
It would be a less absurd retort ( i f not a defence) to say (as Schwartz does not) that some 
versions o f degree theory also allow that a conjunction may be false without implying that one 
o f the conjuncts is false,'^" (although as I indicated in Rea 1989, p32, it is not such a version that 
I endorse). But even i f one were to take that line, as I was careftil to emphasise in Rea (1989, 
The sense in which it is a 'paradox' may be regarded as relating, for one thing, to the challenge it 
poses to intuitive probabilistic criteria for acceptability. 
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p32), the degree theorist is able to make more fine-tuned evaluations o f the truth values o f the 
premises o f arguments employing vague terminology than are available to non-degree theorists, 
and thereby judge when these threaten to undermine the truth value o f the conclusion. The same 
point would hold even i f one took the view that the latter takes place via disvaluation o f the 
conjunction o f the premises. So even then such a measured response to the sorites argument in 
the context o f the degree theory would not open up a 'free for all escape route' as the intuitionist 
proposal seems to do, since the latter does not appear to be accompanied by any such crucial 
discriminatory constraints. On the intuitionist proposal whether or not it seems implausible to 
suppose that one o f the premises is false appears to be logically irrelevant to your right to deny 
the conjmction o f the premises (and thence to decline to draw the conclusion) o f an apparently 
valid argument. I f your prior or independent opinion o f the conclusion o f a valid argument is 
that it is false, then even i f (as in the case o f the sorites) it also seems equally or even more 
implausible to suppose that even one o f the premises may be untrue, you are in effect free to 
ignore the argument, since the latter poses no logical barrier to your nevertheless denying the 
conjunction o f the premises (on the basis o f your independent opinion that the validly drawn 
conclusion is false) and thereby disposing o f the argument. 
O f course an intuitionist might like to try to f ind some basis for rejecting my suggestion that this 
apparent logical loop-hole in the intuitionist's system might be exploited whenever he wants to 
maintain a denial o f the conclusion o f an apparently valid argument for which it seems 
implausible to suppose that one o f the premises is false - in other words to counter my 
suggestion that this escape route is indeed a 'free for alV escape route f rom any such classically 
pressing arguments. Unfortunately Schwartz in his response does not even purport to pursue 
such a line, opting instead to take the absurd line o f denial that the intuitionist has any peculiar 
escape route at his disposal. 
The excessive precision objection 
Schwartz also objects that the degree theorist, in assigning specific degrees o f truth to the 
component sentences o f the sorites argument, fails to 'take vagueness at face value' 
complaining that 'this is the most refined and unbelievable precision'.'^'. He also suggests in a 
footnote that even i f degree theorists allow vague degrees o f truth ' i t is hard to understand their 
definitions o f the logical functions' since the arithmetic functions involved are 'not defined for 
As for example in the version advocated by Michael Clark in (1997). 
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vague quantities' (Schwartz 1990, p46). However degree theorists who discuss this issue 
commonly acknowledge that precise specifications o f assignments w i l l o f course be somewhat 
arbitrary, and that theoretical precisification is simply a feature o f the common practice o f 
idealisation in the mathematical modelling o f real variables. Theorists who take this view 
typically and rightly cite the analogue o f mathematical treatments o f the probability o f 
propositions. Few probability theorists would want to insist that it is not to some extent an 
arbitrary decision when the probabilities o f particular propositions are assigned an absolutely 
precise number in the real unit interval, or even for that matter, when perfectly precise values 
are assigned to common physical quantities. But no-one would want to suggest that the 
arithmetic functions are not applicable to such variables. 
In practice o f course, as with the case o f probabilities, it is generally the qualitative picture that 
matters. But for the purpose o f mathematical application we typically represent relatively vague 
quantities by suitable precisifications. For most practical purposes it does not matter whether a 
proposition is absolutely certain or merely extremely certain. Likewise with degrees o f truth. I f 
I simply need to know whether the litmus paper has turned red, and on observing the paper my 
judgement o f the truth value o f the proposition that the litmus paper is now red is that it is true, 
and moreover that it is extremely true, I am unlikely to need to worry about the theoretical 
question o f whether it is absolutely true. Similarly, i f a Bayesian weather forecaster tells me 
that his subjective degree o f belief that it w i l l rain tomorrow is .7,1 am unlikely to need to want 
to contact him to ask whether it is exactly .7, or i f perhaps it might really be .713. Moreover the 
analogy holds just the same wi th respect to the question o f an objective reality underlying the 
theoretical dividing line between absolute certainty and less than absolute certainty. To 
illustrate the point, suppose I step f rom the pouring rain into a perfectly soundproof building 
without any windows. The prediction on the lunchtime forecast was that the rain would persist 
until lat in the evening, and it is now just 2 pm in the afternoon. One tenth o f a second after the 
door is closed I am absolutely certain that it is raining outside. Another tenth o f a second after 1 
am stil l absolutely certain. Ten seconds after I may be inclined to admit that while 1 am 
virtually completely certain, I am perhaps no longer absolutely certain that it is raining outside. 
But where do we draw the line? To draw the line between absolute certainty and anything 
however vanishingly less, as wi th the corresponding dividing line in the case o f degrees o f truth, 
is almost always arbitrary. The division is vague, and is only idealistically represented as 
precise. But this is unimportant, in both cases, because it is the significance o f the variability 
between the extremes, and the approximate values o f quantities o f interest, that is the important 
Sainsbury and Williamson (1997, p477) among others also raise the same complaint, although their 
evaluation of its significance is more restrained, suggesting simply that the degree theory 'does not do 
justice to higher order vagueness'. 
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matter o f the theory, not the identification o f any precise and objective dividing lines between 
the extremes and the intermediate quantities. Thus, not only does the inauthenticity o f precise 
quantification apply equally in the common case o f probabilities, but so does the inauthenticity 
o f the dividing line between cases that fa l l on the absolute limits o f the variable and those that 
take intermediate values."' And in each case this is not a significant problem for the theoretical 
value or the workability o f the theory. 
The "paradoxes" of degree theoretical truth functions 
Another allegation that has been raised against the degree theory is that in some cases the 
degree-functional assignments o f truth values to complex propositions do not seem to concur 
wi th what intuitively they ought to be. Sainsbury and Williamson (1996, p477) take this line. 
The examples they note are: 
(1) On the degree theory, 'P & ~P' (a traditional logical falsehood) w i l l be as true as 'P v 
~P' (a traditional logical truth) when P, and therefore each o f them, has a value o f 0.5. 
(2) I f Eve is definitely female but a borderline adult, so that [Eve is an adult] and [Eve is a 
woman] are both 0.5, degree theory assigns value 1 (whole truth) to both 'Eve is a 
woman i f and only i f Eve is an adult' and 'Eve is a woman i f and only i f Eve is not an 
aduh'. 
(3) For a vague predicate '9' (where x and x' indicate adjacent members in a sorites series) 
degree theory assigns ' ( V x ) ~((px & ~(px')' a value 0.5, whereas its classically logically 
equivalent [ ( V x ) (cpx —» -cpx')] ~ 1. 
Sainsbury and Williamson suggest that on account o f these (admittedly thought-provoking) 
implications o f the degree theory, it is open to the objection that 'Its logic is unintuitive and 
unmotivated'. But on reflection, to draw such a far-reaching negative conclusion f rom the 
Edgington makes the same point in 1992, p203. 
Edgington presents an interesting discussion of the analogies and disanalogies between probability and 
degrees of truth in her (1996). 
Sainsbury and Williamson (1996, p476), as I did in (1989), cite the standard approach advocated by 
Forbes in 1985. On this approach: 
[~P] = 1 - P 
[P&Q] = min {[P], [Q]} 
[PvQ] = max {[P], [Q]} 
[ P - Q ] = l - ( [ P ] - [ Q ] ) i f [ P ] > [ Q ] 
= 1 otherwise. 
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initial oddity o f these results seems to be quite unfair. Given a little consideration o f the 
relevant context, these results are not particularly surprising or objectionable at all (comparative 
that is, in respect o f example (2), to closely related pre-existing problems wi th the t ru th -
functional definitions in classical logic). 
In the case o f example ( I ) we need only bear in mind that these formulae will take a value o f 0.5 
only when we are dealing with profoundly indeterminate cases, for example when a coloured 
patch is no more clearly red than it is clearly not red - not on account o f any problem wi th the 
lighting under which it is viewed, but because the limited semantic conventions that govern our 
application o f the predicate 'red' fail to determine decisively either that it does or that it does 
not fa l l within its extension. Usage o f the predicate in similar cases displays more or less 
equally mixed tolerance and intolerance for its application, as well as more explicitly qualified 
attitudes indicative o f partial applicability and equally partial applicability for its negation.'*^' It 
is in just such instances that the law o f excluded middle yielding the classical logical truth 'P v 
~P' most clearly seems to fail, and where there is a positive motivation to regard the degree 
theory o f truth as a more authentic account o f the situation. 
In the case o f (2) the natural inclination is to think o f the situation as logically analogous to one 
where we simply don't know whether Eve is an adult (but where there is a definite fact o f the 
matter). In such a logically straightforward situation we should naturally want 'Eve is a woman 
i f and only i f Eve is an adult' to come out true, but 'Eve is a woman i f and only i f Eve is not an 
adult' to come out false. But o f course the situation is not that straightforward, since the 
situation we are set in the example dictates that there is no definite fact o f the matter as to 
whether Eve is an adult. Eve is a 'borderline' or middling case, more or less equidistant f rom 
definite adulthood and definite non-adulthood. Moreover, similarly odd results arise even in 
the case o f classical logic where the standard truth functional definition is given for the material 
conditional. The 'paradoxes' o f the material conditional are well known. In the present 
example it is particularly worth noting that essentially the same odd result arises, even in the 
context o f classical logical logic applied to the above determinate case, when we suppose 
instead that (unbeknown to us) Eve is not an adult. A moment's examination o f the classical 
truth table for 'Eve is a woman i f and only i f Eve is not an adult' reveals that in this case it also 
comes out true. For any classical logician who has came to terms with the oddities o f the 
material conditional, the discovery o f an extension o f these oddities into a more broadly 
applicable logic that employs degree theoretic counterparts o f the classical truth-functions 
should come as neither a surprise nor as anything particularly objectionable. 
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Regarding (3) Sainsbury and Williamson seem to think that a degree theorist ought intuitively to 
expect formulae that are classically logically equivalent to remain equivalent in degree theoretic 
logic. But wi th a little reflection it should be clear that such a pre-theoretical idea is no more 
plausible than the thought that the conclusion o f a classically valid argument should preserve 
the value o f the premises in a degree-theoretic analysis o f it. In fact o f course the theory was 
designed specifically to explain how, where vague propositions are concerned and intermediate 
values are acknowledged, classically valid implications o f (very) true complexes o f propositions 
can fail to retain the values o f the complexes. And in view o f that, in contrast to what Sainsbury 
and Williamson suggest, it is patently obvious that we should expect classical logical 
equivalences to fai l (since o f course classical logical equivalence is just two way classical 
logical implication). 
The basic fact o f the matter is that, once the semantic case is made for acknowledgement o f 
degrees o f truth, the degree-theoretic functions are defined in a way that is intuitively plausible. 
Intuitively, the value o f a conjunction should be just that o f its lowest valued conjunct, and the 
value o f a 'material' conditional should not fa l l any further below 1 than the value o f the 
consequent falls below that o f the antecedent. But once this intuitive interpretation o f the 
complexes is adopted, results such as those mentioned above are just a matter o f t r u t h -
functional calculation (and o f course are only relevant where in any case the classicist is unable 
to assign any definite truth value to the relevant atomic propositions). Why should it then be a 
surprise that '(px ~(px" is never more than marginally less than 1, while ' - ( ipx & -tpx ') ' can 
fa l l as low as 0.5, just because when we consider only the limited cases where the respective 
atomic propositions can be assigned definite values o f 1 or 0 they w i l l always come out equal? 
A n interesting, albeit logically radical, probabilistic version o f the degree theory which neatly 
eliminates some o f the above oddities, and in particular the 'paradoxes' relating to the material 
conditional, has been advocated recently by Edgington (1992 and 1996). Edgington's proposal 
builds on ideas raised by Ernest Adams (1975), in particular that an argument is (deductively) 
valid i f f it is impossible (on the probability calculus) for the uncertainty o f the conclusion to 
exceed the sum o f the uncertainties o f the premises, and that the 'real ' conditional ' I f A , B ' 
should be interpreted, not in classical truth-functional terms, but on the basis o f a formula for its 
probability - which should simply be the conditional probability o f B granted A , i.e. p(B|A) , 
rather than the classical 1 - p(A & ~ B ) . Edgington proposes extending the same probabilistic 
structure to degree theoretic logic, whereby 
It is also in such cases that people are sometimes naturally inclined, albeit with less than ful l 
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[ ~ A ] = 1 - [ A ] 
[ A ^ B ] = [B |A] i.e. the value that should be given to B on the supposition that A is true. 
[ A & B ] = [ A ] . [B |A] 
[ A v B ] = [ A ] + [B] - [ A & B ] 
thereby avoiding the worst o f such oddities as those underlying the latter examples noted above, 
as well as solving related problems that arise for the standard degree theoretical approach when 
we are dealing with complexes involving independent variables (Edgington 1992, p i97 & 200-
2). 
Notwithstanding the above-noted mitigations regarding the odd results o f the standard 
formulation, the positive merits o f Edgington's proposal seem to me to be very appealing. 
However there is quite a profound problem with this proposal. The problem is Lewis's (1976) 
proof that there is no proposition the probability o f whose truth matches the conditional 
probability o f B given A.'^^ 
Edgington seems to think that this is not too serious a problem for the proposal, and suggests 
that the message o f the proof is that 
conditional judgements are irreducibly hypothetical. They are judgements about what is the case 
under a supposition. And the proof shows that such judgements are not equivalent to 
judgements about what is the case full stop. (Edgington 1992, p i 96) 
While admitting (in a parenthesis) that 'Embedded conditionals are still a headache', and 
referring to a range o f literature on that issue including her own (1994), Edgington does not 
seem to appreciate that simply regarding conditionals as 'hypothetical judgements' rather than 
'propositions' does not appear to do anything to defuse the broader implications o f the proof 
Edgington clearly wants us to be able to 'do logic with conditionals', but in order to be able to 
do this we must surely be able to allow that it might not be the case that A—>^B, and that A—>B 
may or may not be compatible wi th certain other statements or judgements. And i f this is the 
case then we can just as well run a hypothetical-friendly variant o f Lewis's proof, where 
Edgington's proposition name ' F A B ' is simply replaced by the hypothetical judgement name 
'A—>B', and ~(A—»^B) is interpreted accordingly (or simply replaced by 'not-(A—>B)'). The 
commitment, to make statements of the form 'P & ~P'. 
Edgington outlines and responds to this proof in (1992, pi96). 
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result is a proof*'' that there is no hypothetical judgement the probability o f whose truth 
matches the conditional probability o f B given A . In view o f this, despite the otherwise 
beautiful results o f Edgington's proposal, I am inclined to remain o f the opinion that the best 
account o f the logic o f vagueness that we have for the time being is the somewhat uglier but 
more robust standard version o f the degree theory. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion on this issue then, paradoxes such as the sorites, which arise when we are dealing 
wi th vague concepts, do not need to be regarded as a serious threat to the logical adequacy o f 
deduction. The broader degree-theoretic logic that may be invoked to deal wi th such cases may 
be regarded as preserving the validity o f classical deduction, at least in the context o f arguments 
restricted to precise concepts. However, as we have seen, the problem o f vagueness does 
pose some significant difficulties and challenges for a broader analysis o f argument cogency. 
And we may be inclined to regard these problems as a reinforcement o f our earlier 
considerations relating to the demonstrative function o f argument, whereby clarity o f premises 
(and conclusion) is understood to be a basic condition o f argument cogency, as o f course is 
generally appreciated in the tradition o f scientific analysis and argumentation. 
'^ ^ Call it an 'informal' proof i f you like. In any case the logic of the proof may be regarded as analogous 
to that of deontic logic or legal analysis, which Edgington refers to as examples of non-truth-va|ue-
friendly logics. 
Edgington's suggestion that we hold on to the idea that validity does not permit additional falsehood 
(beyond the sum of the degrees of false hood it assigns to the premises) can be applied equally well to 
classical deduction and to traditional degree theory - it is not dependent on her probabilistic account of 
the degree-functions. 
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S U M M A R Y A N D C O N C L U S I O N 
In Part One o f this thesis, I have approached an analysis o f the concept o f induction via a 
detailed interpretation o f Hume's classical discussion o f inductive inference and the problems 
he associated with it. This has led us to reject the common view that induction (in general) is 
inherently non-deductive, and allowed us to develop a more tolerant appreciation o f various 
related concepts o f induction. I have focused on a particularly important concept o f ' logically 
ampliative' inductive inference that avoids conflation o f the concepts o f 'premise' and 
'conclusion' - which relate to arguments, wi th the associated but significantly distinct concepts 
o f the 'evidential propositions' and 'hypothesis' - which relate to inferences. 
Following a detailed analysis o f the function and structure o f argument, in Part Two I have 
shown how an argument that is suitably designed to fu l ly and clearly explicate an inductive 
(logically ampliative) inference may - and indeed w i l l generally - take the form o f a 
deductively valid argument. The inferential adequacy (or 'val idi ty ' in a suitably broad sense o f 
the term) o f such an argument w i l l depend on the truth o f its associated 'inferential connection 
claim' . I have called this view o f argument 'epistemic deductivism', since on this view all 
arguments w i l l have an overall form that is deductive, and inductive arguments w i l l generally 
need to be explicated as essentially epistemic arguments. I have defended the latter claim 
against the traditional objections raised by Hempel and recently endorsed by Kyburg. 
In Part Three I have defended this induction-fi-iendly version o f deductivism against various 
further problems that may be raised against it, in particular with regard to Goodman's problem 
for inductive principles o f projectibility and Jackson's solution to it, the Hume-like problem for 
the justification o f deduction, and the sorites problem for the principles o f deduction 
themselves. 
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S U P P L E M E N T A R Y M A T E R I A L S 
This basic idea underlying this thesis began with a paper, predating my work on the thesis,"' 
comprising a response to a recent paper by Patrick Maher (1996), claiming that certain 
considerations relating to a priori probabilities pose a problem for the assumptions o f a 
statistical inference as defended by Williams (1947), and proposing a different approach to 
the validation o f induction (in view o f the inadequacy o f a recent proposal by Pargetter and 
Bigelow, 1997) based on what I have called an 'epistemic frequentist' analysis o f probability 
( c . f Rea, 2003). In view o f limited space, I have chosen to focus on the main problems o f 
induction in the thesis (primarily Hume's) rather than discussing the relatively obscure 
problem raised by Maher, particularly since, i f I am right in my central thesis, such debates 
are in any case more relevant to appraisal o f the assumptions we make in inductive inference, 
while my central concern is with establishing the appropriate logical construal o f inductive 
arguments. 
In particular I have been concerned to emphasis that the approach I propose to the construal 
o f inductive inference and argument should be generally applicable, whatever one's views on 
the content or prior justification for the details o f the inferential relations that have a bearing 
on the inferences we make. For this reason, in view o f limited space, I have also excluded a 
discussion o f the epistemic frequentist approach to probability (Rea 2003) that I have 
produced in the course o f my study, and an associated discussion o f a problem raised by 
Dawid (1982) with regard to the associated objective o f making judgments o f probability that 
are 'well-calibrated' . I have also excluded a response to problems raised by Cohen (1989) 
for the applicability o f the (traditional) Pascalian calculus o f probability to certain 
applications, notably in the context o f Law, and a discussion o f the concept o f question-
begging. Since Quine's classical objection (1951) to the notion o f analyticity has resurfaced 
in recent discussions (e.g. Boghossian 1997) and has been alleged to entail similar problems 
for the concept o f deductive validity (e.g. by Govier, 1987), I have also produced a detailed 
critique o f Quine's argument in that paper, along wi th comments on recent discussions o f the 
issue. Again however space does not permit me to include such relatively peripheral material. 
This paper was accepted for publication in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy (initially due to 
appear March 2001) but I requested withdrawal as I anticipated substantial development of my views 
on the main topic (the validation of induction) in the course of my study for this PhD. 
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